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ABSTRACT
The dissertation aims to investigate the role of asymmetric information in
capital structure, investment, compensation of mortgage servicers, and bond and
equity returns. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of credit ratings on debt issuance
and investment of private and public firms, as well as the effect of asymmetric
information on compensation of loan servicers in the mortgage backed securities
market. Further, I study the relationship between ratings issued by investor and
issuer-paid credit rating agencies and equity analyst recommendations. Finally, I
evaluate the effect of the aforementioned signals on bond and equity returns as
well as firm leverage and investment decisions.
Chapter one in the dissertation is the first study to empirically evaluate the
effect of credit ratings on capital structure and investment for private U.S. firms,
relative to equivalent public firms. I find that private firms constrain debt is-
suance and investment by 4.5 and 6.5 percentage points more than public firms,
respectively, when their credit ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
Consistent with these results, private firms that become public through an IPO
constrain debt issuance by 10 percentage points before going public, if their ratings
are on an upgrade or downgrade boundary.
The second chapter studies the impact of asymmetric information between
mortgage sellers and servicers on mortgage servicer compensation. We proxy for
asymmetric information using the decision to retain mortgage servicing rights,
which creates a principal-agent problem between sellers and servicers. Using loan-
level data on Fannie Mae-insured, full documentation mortgages, we first find that
loans in which sellers retain servicing rights default and foreclose at a significantly
lower rate, and lose less in foreclosure than those in which they are not retained.
Since it is more costly to service non-performing loans, these ex-post differences in
default rates should be reflected in servicer compensation. However, using Fannie
Mae MBS pool-level data, we find no difference in servicing fees for pools in which
servicing rights are retained relative to pools in which they are not retained. In
order to identify the impact of seller/servicer affiliation on servicing fees, we exploit
a post-crisis regulatory change which altered the incentive to retain servicing rights
for small sellers of MBS relative to large sellers.
Finally, in the third chapter, we evaluate the information flows to the stock
and bond markets of issuer versus investor-paid rating agencies and equity ana-
lysts. Equity analysts’ forecasts and ratings assigned by issuer-paid credit rating
agencies such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and by investor-paid rating agen-
cies such as Egan and Jones (EJR) all involve information production about the
same underlying set of firms, even though equity analysts focus on cash flows to
equity and bond ratings focus on cash flows to bonds. Further, the two types
of credit rating agencies differ in their incentives to produce and report accurate
information signals. Given this setting, we empirically analyze the timeliness and
accuracy of the information signals provided by each of the above three types of fi-
nancial intermediary to their investor clienteles and the information flows between
these intermediaries. We find that the information signals produced by EJR are
the most timely (on average), and seem to anticipate the information signals pro-
duced by equity analysts as well as by S&P. We find that changes in leverage are
associated with lower EJR ratings but higher equity analysts’ recommendations;
further, credit rating changes by EJR have the largest impact on firms’ investment
levels. We also document an “investor attention” effect (in the sense of Merton,
1987) among stock and bond market investors in the sense that changes in equity
analyst recommendations have a higher impact than either EJR or S&P ratings
changes on the excess returns on firm equity, while EJR rating changes have a
higher impact on bond yield spreads than either S&P ratings changes or changes
in equity analyst recommendations. Finally, we analyze differences in bond rat-
ings assigned to a given firm by EJR and S&P, and find that these differences are
positively related to the standard proxies for disagreement among stock market
investors.
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1.0 CHAPTER 1
CREDIT RATINGS AND DEBT ISSUANCE:
HOW DO PRIVATE FIRMS DIFFER FROM PUBLIC FIRMS?
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Private firms represent a major part of the economy. Many receive credit
ratings and rely heavily on public debt markets to raise capital. The aggregated
revenue in 2015 for private firms that issued bonds to public investors accounted
for more than seven percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. Moreover, over
40 percent of all private firms with more than one billion dollars in revenue issued
bonds to public investors1.
This paper documents differences between private and public firms and eval-
uates their implications for firm capital structure and investment decisions. De-
spite the large economic importance of private firms, in studying the relationship
between credit ratings and capital structure, the literature has predominantly fo-
cused on public firms. Kisgen (2006) documents that public firms near a credit
rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a
change in rating. Moreover, Kisgen (2009) outlines that firms reduce leverage fol-
lowing credit rating downgrades, while rating upgrades do not affect firms’ capital
structure. Michelsen and Klein (2011) find that companies near a rating change
issue 1.8% less net debt relative to net equity as a percentage of total assets than
firms not near a rating change. For private U.S. firms, the evidence on the effect
of ratings on investment and capital structure remains scarce.
The contribution made by this paper is three-fold. First, this study is the first
to document how private U.S. firms adjust their capital structure and investment
1Information for private firms with credit ratings is reported from Bloomberg and Capital
IQ.
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differently from public firms when they are concerned about rating changes that
may impact their cost of debt. Second, this study outlines differences in leverage
patterns and credit ratings between private and public U.S. firms that issue bonds
to public investors. Third, this study shows how the aforementioned differences
between private and public firms are consistent with theories of capital structure
such as the Pecking Order Theory (Myers and Majluf 1984), Trade-Off Theory
(Myers 1984), and the CR-CS theory (Kisgen 2006).
Investors generally have less information about private firms than they do
about public firms. Private firms with credit ratings are required to file 10K re-
ports. However, investors cannot track the evolution of private firms’ share values,
as they can for public firms, and thus must rely on less timely information when
evaluating investment opportunities. Further, private firms are not required to
file some of the financial reports that public firms are mandated to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission2. As evidence for the larger information
asymmetry for private firms, I find that credit rating agencies disagree more fre-
quently about ratings assigned to private firms than those assigned to equivalent
public firms (section 1.5.1).
The direct implication of the larger information asymmetry for private firms
between firm management and outsiders is that investors observe less information
about private firms than they do about public firms. Therefore, investors must rely
more heavily on private firms’ publicly available credit ratings. Internalizing that
as a result, investors in private firms are expected to be highly sensitive to credit
rating changes, private firms should be more responsive than public firms to credit
rating fluctuations, particularly when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade
thresholds where shifts in credit ratings give rise to large changes in the cost of
debt.
The indirect implication of the larger asymmetric information for private firms
2For instance, private firms do not file form 14A. This document constitutes a financial
disclosure that public firms are required to file before shareholders’ meetings.
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is based on the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order theory, which suggests
that the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information. Since investors
in private firms face greater information asymmetry relative to investors in public
firms, it follows that the discrepancy between the cost of debt and equity is greater
for private firms relative to public firms. Therefore, debt issuance is a particularly
attractive channel for private firms to raise funds. Indeed, I find that the average
level of debt, as a share of assets, is 56% for private firms, following their first
access to the public debt market. This measure of leverage is significantly larger
than that of equivalent public firms – a mere 25%. As private firms utilize heavily
the public debt channel of financing, it follows that they would be more sensitive
to concerns of credit rating changes that would affect their cost of debt. I find
that even after controlling for the leverage level, private firms are more responsive
than public firms to rating changes when their ratings are on boundaries where
rating fluctuations have a major impact on the cost of debt.
The aforementioned rating boundaries refer to credit ratings where upgrades
or downgrades lead to new ratings of different letter bins. Specifically, I define
upgrade and downgrade thresholds similarly to Kisgen (2006), as ratings with
positive or negative signs (respectively). Kisgen (2006) argues that rating changes
on these boundaries lead to large changes in the cost of debt. The rationale is that
shifts in the cost of debt are going to be larger when an upgrade or downgrade will
yield a rating of a different letter. Put differently, firms incur distinct costs from
a downgrade (benefits from an upgrade) particularly when the rating downgrade
(upgrade) results in a letter change. For instance, a downgrade from a B- to CCC+
would yield a larger increase in the cost of debt, relative to a rating downgrade
from B to B-. Similarly, the decrease in cost of debt will be larger given a credit
rating upgrade from B+ to BB-, than from B to B+.
Constraining debt issuance when firms’ ratings are on upgrade/downgrade
thresholds is likely to increase the probability of getting rating upgrades or avoid-
ing downgrades. In particular, when firms’ ratings are at a downgrade threshold,
3
firms internalize that a downgrade would yield a significant increase in the cost
of debt. Thus, they send a favorable signal to the credit rating agencies by con-
straining their debt issuance and thereby boosting cash flow to equity holders.
Similarly, when a firm’s credit rating has a plus sign, firms know that an upgrade
would significantly reduce the cost of debt. Therefore, firms constrain debt is-
suance to signal that they have sufficient cash flow available after repayment of
their debt obligations. This in turn makes investment in these firms less risky and
can increase the likelihood of a rating upgrade. Given that private firms disclose
less information to public investors and have fewer channels to raise capital, they
are more sensitive to credit rating fluctuations relative to public firms. Conse-
quently, I hypothesize that private firms constrain debt issuance more than public
firms when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Alternatively,
when private firms’ ratings are not at upgrade/downgrade boundaries, I expect
them to issue more debt as a share of assets relative to public firms. This is be-
cause equity financing is more costly for private firms as they cannot access the
public equity market, and have greater information asymmetry between investors
and firm insiders, which increases the discrepancy between the cost of debt and
equity. This makes debt issuance an attractive channel of financing for private
firms.
My results confirm this hypothesis. I find that private firms constrain debt
issuance at least 4.5 percentage points more than public firms when their ratings
are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. However, when their credit ratings do not
have plus or minus signs, private firms issue substantially more debt, as a share of
assets, than equivalent public firms (section 1.5.2). Figure 1 depicts the change in
annual debt issuance as a share of assets (Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
) averaged by credit rating
sign categories3. The average change in debt issuance is calculated for private
and public firms across all firm-year observations that have credit ratings with
3The credit rating sign categories include ratings with minus signs, ratings with no signs,
and ratings with plus signs.
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plus, minus, and no signs. The black bars represent levels of new debt issuance
for private firms, while the gray bars represent the average new debt issuance
for public firms. Figure 1 suggests that private firms reduce new debt issuance
from an average of 6.5%, when their ratings do not have a plus or minus sign,
to 0.62% when their ratings have minus signs, and to 1.16% when their ratings
have plus signs. These summary statistics indicate that private firms constrain
new debt issuance by 5.88% when their ratings are on a downgrade threshold,
and by 5.34% when their ratings are on an upgrade threshold. However, public
firms constrain new debt issuance from 2.86% to 2.06% when their ratings have
negative signs and from 2.86% to 2.27% when their credit ratings have positive
signs. This constitutes a decrease of only 0.8% in new debt issuance when public
firms’ ratings are on downgrade thresholds and a reduction of 0.59% when their
ratings are on upgrade thresholds. On the other hand, when their ratings are not
on the upgrade/downgrade boundaries, private firms issue substantially more new
debt as a share of assets (6.5%) relative to public firms (2.86%).
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Figure 1
Debt Issuance for Private and Public Firms
Figure 1 depicts the average annual change in debt issuance for public and private
firms by credit rating signs. The vertical axis represents the change in debt issuance
between year t − 1 and t over assets in year t − 1 defined as Debti,t−Debti,t−1Assetsi,t−1 . The
horizontal axis represents ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs. The black
bar refers to average new debt issuance for private firms, while the gray bar represents
the average new debt issuance for public firms.
0% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
Minus No Sign Plus 
N
ew
 D
eb
t I
ss
ua
nc
e 
by
 R
at
in
g 
Si
gn
 
 
Private Public 
While I demonstrate that private firms constrain debt issuance when their
ratings are on upgrade/downgrade boundaries, I also find that they turn to equity,
as a substitute for debt in order to raise capital. However, the reduction in debt
issuance more than offsets the increase in equity issuance4. Thus, it appears
that raising capital is less cost effective for private firms, particularly when their
ratings are at a boundary. As a result, I hypothesize that firms reduce capital
expenditure when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade threshold. Indeed, I
find that private firms constrain investment, defined as capital expenditure as a
share of assets, by at least 6.5 percentage points more than public firms, when
their credit ratings are on an upgrade/downgrade boundary (section 1.5.6).
4Figure 2 demonstrates that the debt net of equity issuance is negative since the fall in debt
issuance more than offsets the increase in equity issuance.
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Next, I evaluate how bond issuance patterns change as private firms become
public through IPOs. Figure 3 depicts the change in debt net of equity issuance
averaged by rating sign categories during years prior to IPOs. As hypothesized,
the summary statistics suggest that these firms constrain debt issuance when their
ratings have positive or negative signs. Interestingly, as firms get closer to the
public offering, in addition to constraining debt issuance on rating boundaries, they
also reduce overall leverage, presumably to get higher valuation of their publicly
offered equity. When firms that file for IPOs turn public, in contrast to pre-
IPO years, there is no clear pattern of capital structure or bond issuance (section
1.5.5). Moreover, my regression results suggest that private firms that become
public through IPOs constrain their debt issuance at least 10 percentage points
more during pre-IPO years if their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade boundaries,
relative to years after they turn public.
The aforementioned discrepancy in debt issuance between private and public
firms disappears when I consider private firms that are backed by private equity
funds (section 1.5.3). This result reinforces the intuition that private firms’ capital
structure behavior is partly driven by their reliance on the public debt market
as a cost effective channel to raise capital. Private equity support also sends a
signal to the market about the quality of the financed firms, thereby reducing the
information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors. Consistently,
private and public firms exhibit similar capital structure patterns when public
firms issue more bonds than the median number of bonds issued by firms in the
given industry (section 1.5.4).
Lastly, I evaluate leverage trends for private and public firms prior and follow-
ing their first access to public debt (section 1.5.7). Since private firms do not have
access to the public equity market as a channel to raise capital, they are likely
to rely more heavily than public firms on issuance of bonds to public investors to
raise funds. I demonstrate that equivalent private and public firms have similar
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levels of leverage prior to their initial access to public debt5. However, following
their first credit rating, the leverage for private firms is significantly higher (an
average of 56%) and upward trending while the leverage for public firms is lower
(an average of 25%) and downward sloping. These results confirm the intuition
that private firms utilize the opportunity to raise capital by issuing bonds to pub-
lic investors since they have fewer cost effective channels to raise funds, relative
to public firms6.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the closely
related literature. In section 3, I briefly outline the theoretical background and
develop testable hypothesis. In section 4, I describe the data, sample selection,
and my matching methodology of private and public firms. Section 5 presents
my regression models and empirical results that address the testable hypothesis
H1−H7. Section 6 concludes.
5Figure 6 shows the average annual leverage for private and public firms for years relative
to first year of getting a credit rating.
6Faulkender & Petersen (2006) argue that public firms have higher leverage following their
first credit rating, which they define as first access to public debt. My results confirm their
conclusion for public firms, but show a more pronounced positive leverage trajectory for private
firms.
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1.2 RELATED LITERATURE
1.2.1 Capital structure literature
Evidence that debt issuance can raise firm value was first introduced by Modigliani
and Miller (1963). They demonstrate that the market value of levered firms can be
higher than that of non-levered firms due to the tax benefits of debt. Modigliani
and Miller’s idea has contributed to the rise of the trade-off theory (Myers 1984),
which suggests that firms balance the cost of financial distress due to the risk
of bankruptcy with the benefit from tax shield on interest from debt issuance,
when determining the optimal level of leverage. Subsequently, Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Jensen (1986) incorporate debt and equity agency costs into the
trade-off theory by documenting costs that stem from conflicts of interest between
different stakeholders in firms where asymmetric information is prevalent between
firm insiders and outsiders. They mention that one of the benefits of debt issuance
beyond the tax shield on interest is that the need to pay interest will reduce waste-
ful spending by firm insiders and thus will have monitoring effect on cash flow.
Therefore, this theory suggests that firms would adjust their capital structure to
ultimately converge towards an optimal leverage ratio while balancing the costs of
bankruptcy with the benefits of the tax shield on interest from debt issuance, as
well as trade-offs between agency costs that stem from debt and equity issuance.
Moreover, Graham (2000) shows that a typical firm could double tax benefits by
issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline.
Consistently, Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984)
construct dynamic models of firm leverage decisions in a multi-period framework.
They consider the trade-off between tax savings and bankruptcy costs and demon-
strate that it is beneficial for firms to maintain high levels of debt in order to take
advantage of the debt financing tax savings. Likewise, additional studies of dy-
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namic trade-off theory highlight the benefit for firms to minimize transaction costs
by adjusting financing only periodically. They suggest that firms would deviate
from optimal leverage ratios since they can decrease leverage in one period know-
ing that they may raise their leverage in following periods [Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007), Fischer et al. (1989)].
An alternative approach to explain how firms target optimal capital structure
was introduced by Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory. This theory
states that the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information. They
argue that firms prefer to use internal financing over debt or equity issuance to
raise capital. In case internal financing is depleted, firms prefer to issue debt
over equity since issuing debt sends a favorable signal about the quality of the
firm to outside investors which in-turn reduces the cost of debt relative to equity
financing. Put differently, investors seek greater compensation when they purchase
firm equity since they perceive firms that raise capital by issuing equity rather than
debt to be riskier. This idea is consistent with costs of asymmetric information
outlined by Akerlof (1970). He suggests that the quality of goods traded in a
market can degrade in the presence of information asymmetry between buyers and
sellers. Subsequently, Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that one way to mitigate
such information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors is to have
an intermediary send an informed signal about the quality of the firm by investing
its wealth in firms’ assets about which it has special knowledge. Moreover, Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) explain that unlike the trade-off theory, the pecking order
theory does not specify an optimal debt ratio, but rather as Frank and Goyal
(2003) suggest, firms will inevitably raise debt issuance when internal financing is
depleted.
In contrast, the market timing theory of capital structure argues that firms
issue new stocks when the equity prices are perceived to be overvalued, and buy
back own shares when their equity is undervalued. Baker and Wurgler (2002)
argue that managers issue equity when they believe its cost is irrationally low
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and repurchase equity when they think its cost is irrationally high. They find
that leverage changes are strongly and positively related to their market timing
measure. Further, Graham and Harvey (2001) document managers disclosing
that they try to time the equity market when issuing shares. Managers assert
that whether the firms’ stock was undervalued or overvalued played an important
role in their equity issuance decisions.
Finally, Kisgen (2006) outlined the Credit Rating–Capital Structure hypothesis
(CR-CS). This hypothesis states that ratings on downgrade or upgrade thresholds
are associated with discrete costs or benefits (respectively) that cause managers to
balance considerations of discrete changes in the cost of debt around upgrade or
downgrade rating thresholds with trade-off theory considerations. For instance, it
is plausible that it is optimal according to the trade-off theory for a firm to issue
additional debt to increase its leverage. However, according to CR-CS theory such
increases in leverage will trigger discrete increases in the cost of debt when the
credit rating is on a downgrade boundary. Thus, the optimal leverage equilib-
rium in this instance should not increase to avoid a large rise in the cost of debt
financing.
1.2.2 Empirical literature on credit ratings and capital structure
While there exists vast literature on credit ratings for public firms, the literature on
credit ratings for private firms remains scarce. The most closely related empirical
literature includes papers that evaluate the effect of credit ratings on capital struc-
ture for public firms. Kisgen (2006) provides evidence that public firms constrain
debt issuance when their credit ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds,
and issue more debt when their ratings are not near those boundaries. He defines
ratings being close to upgrade or downgrade thresholds as ratings with plus or
minus signs, and argues that firm behavior is consistent with existence of distinct
costs from downgrades or benefits from upgrade particularly when rating down-
grades or upgrades yield letter changes. For instance, for a firm with B- rating, a
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downgrades will yield a CCC+ rating which will constitute a letter change. Ac-
cording to Kisgen’s CR-CS theory, a drop in credit rating from B- to CCC+ would
yield higher change in cost of debt than a decrease of credit score within a letter
group such as from CCC+ to CCC or B to B-. In a subsequent paper, Kisgen
(2009) documents that firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades,
while rating upgrades do not affect firms’ capital structure.
Michelsen and Klein (2011) evaluate the impact of credit ratings on capital
structure for international firms. They find that companies near a rating change
issue 1.8% less net debt relative to net equity as a percentage of total assets
than firms not near a rating change. They conclude that the negative effect on
debt issuance is pronounced for US firms particularly in times when access to
the commercial paper market is at risk. On the other hand, Drobetz and Heller
(2014) document that changes in the capital structure and financing choices of
creditworthy privately-held firms in Germany are independent from credit rating
changes. Further, Kisgen and Strahan (2010) show that credit rating regulations
have an important role for cost of capital. They demonstrate that following DBRS
certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm’s DBRS
rating. Consistently, Kisgen (2012) provides evidence emphasizing the impact
of credit rating adjustments on capital structure and investment decisions. He
concludes that when Moody’s changes the adjustments it makes to GAAP leverage
for determining its ratings, firms react in both their financing and investment
decisions. If the change in adjustment results in an improvement in a firm’s rating
status, the firm is then more likely to issue debt and grow assets the following year.
Moreover, Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010) highlight that the cost of being
overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that
expected default costs constitute approximately half of the total ex ante cost of
debt. Finally, Rauh and Sufi (2010) demonstrate the importance of heterogeneous
debt structure where low-credit-quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered
capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and
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subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants.
In addition to studying the impact of credit ratings on changes in debt issuance,
recent empirical literature has documented how public firms optimize their level
of leverage. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) evaluate the changes in leverage for
public firms prior and following first credit rating. They find that firms that have
access to the public bond markets, as measured by having a bond credit rating,
have higher leverage7. Faulkender and Petersen argue that after controlling for
firms characteristics, firms with access to public debt have 35% more debt as a
share of assets.
Finally, the literature has addressed the impact of credit default swaps on
loans and debt issuance of public firms. Intuitively, CDSs create new hedging
opportunities and could lead to a reduction in the cost of debt by revealing new
information about firms. Consistently, Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) evaluate
credit default swap changes conditional on rating announcement as well as rating
announcements conditional on credit default changes. They find that the credit
default swap market anticipates credit rating events. This may in-turn contributes
to reduction in the cost of debt by lowering the rents that banks extract from
borrowers as compensation for information asymmetry between investors and firm
insiders (Santos and Winton (2008) and Hale and Santos (2009)). In contrast,
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find no evidence that the onset of CDS trading lowers
the cost of debt financing for the average borrowers, but rather find economically
adverse effects on risky and informationally opaque firms.
This paper is the first to document how private U.S. firms adjust their capital
structure and investment differently from public firms when they are concerned
about rating changes that may impact their cost of debt. It also outlines differences
in leverage patterns and credit ratings between private and public U.S. firms that
issue bonds to public investors.
7Faulkender and Petersen (2006) define leverage as book value of debt as a share of assets
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1.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
In this section, I briefly discuss the underlying theory and develop hypotheses for
my empirical tests. First, I evaluate whether private firms have greater informa-
tion asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors, relative to equivalent
public firms. I anticipate this to be the case since private firms do not have pub-
licly traded shares that allow investors to get the most updated information about
firm performance, as well as private firms are not required to file the same financial
disclosures that public firms are mandated to file8.
Consequently, I test whether credit rating agencies disagree more frequently
about ratings assigned to private firms (H1). If there exists grater information
asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors for private firms, one would
expect the credit rating agencies to have a more difficult task of assessing the
default risk of private firms. I find statistically significant evidence that rating
agencies disagree more frequently about rating scores assigned to private firms
than to equivalent public firms. This reinforces the intuition that private firms
have greater asymmetric information between firm insiders and outside investors.
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory implies that as information
asymmetry increases between firm insiders and investors, so does the cost of ex-
ternal capital. They argue that debt issuance is a preferable source of financing
to equity since issuing equity sends a signal to investors that firm management
perceives the equity to be overvalued. Therefore, investors demand a higher re-
turn when they purchase firm equity, which in-turn makes equity more expensive
channel to raise capital. Thus, the greater information asymmetry between firm
insiders and outside investors for private firms, leads to greater discrepancy be-
8For instance, private firms do not file form 14A. This document constitutes a financial
disclosure that public firms are required to file before shareholders’ meetings.
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tween cost of debt and equity for private relative to public firms9. Consequently,
debt issuance becomes more cost effective channel for private firms to raise capital.
As private firms rely heavily on debt financing, they are likely to be more sensitive
than public firms to credit rating changes that shift their cost of debt.
Additional explanation for why private firms are more responsive to credit rat-
ing fluctuations is that they disclose less information to public investors than public
firms do. Consequently, investors have limited information about the performance
of private firms, and thus are more responsive to the publicly posted credit rating
changes. Consistently, I develop testable hypothesis to evaluate whether private
firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms when their credit ratings are
on upgrade/downgrade thresholds (H2). Intuitively, I expect private firms to con-
strain debt issuance, and thus send a favorable signal to the rating agencies in
order to avoid rating downgrades when they have ratings with minus signs, or
achieve rating upgrades when their ratings have plus signs. This is due to the
large costs associated with rating downgrades and the significant benefits from
rating upgrades at those respective boundaries. While this logic applies to pub-
lic firms as well, public firms are less sensitive to credit rating fluctuations since
investors have a better understanding of the firms’ financial performance, partly
due to availability of their financial statements and equity trading information.
Similarly, I evaluate if private firms that are backed by private equity funds
constrain debt issuance similarly to public firms when their credit ratings are on
upgrade/downgrade thresholds (H3). This unique set of private firms is different
along two important dimensions, from private firms that do not have external
financial support. First, private equity backed private firms are less dependant on
the bond market for raising capital. Second, the support of private equity funds
sends a positive signal to the market about growth opportunities of the firms
that they support, which in-turn reduces the asymmetric information between
9I refer to the management of the firm as firm insiders since they have full information about
the state of the firm. I consider public investors to be firm outsiders since they are not privy to
all information about the financial performance of the firm.
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firm management and outsiders for those firms. Therefore, I expect private equity
backed private firms to be less sensitive to credit rating fluctuations, and hence
less likely to adjust their capital structure to avoid rating changes.
In addition to matching private firms with equivalent public firms, I study how
capital structure changes for the same firms before and after they turn public.
To that end, I evaluate whether firms that file for IPOs constrain debt issuance
when their ratings have positive or negative signs only prior to becoming public
(H4) when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade boundaries. This difference-
in-difference analysis is a useful robustness check since it allows differencing unob-
served firm characteristics that do not change prior and following the IPOs. Next,
I move on to test whether public firms that issue more bonds than industry me-
dian number of bonds per firm, have similar debt issuance patterns to private firms
(H5). I hypothesize that public firms that issue large number of bonds are highly
sensitive to credit rating fluctuations and thus constrain debt issuance when their
ratings are on the boundaries, similarly to private firms.
In summary, hypothesis H1 tests whether there exists greater information
asymmetry for private firms relative to equivalent public firms by evaluating if
credit rating agencies disagree more frequently about credit ratings assigned to pri-
vate firms. Testable hypotheses H2-H5 examine the implications of greater afore-
mentioned information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors for
private firms. As a result, if private firms constrain debt financing when their
ratings are on the upgrade or downgrade thresholds, they might have less avail-
able funds to invest in new projects. Thus, I test whether private firms constrain
investment more than public firms following years when their ratings were on up-
grade/downgrade thresholds (H6). I expect private firms to restrict their capital
expenditure more than public firms around the rating boundaries since they do
not raise enough funds on the private equity market to compensate for the insuf-
ficient capital raised on the public debt market when their ratings have plus or
minus signs (figure 2).
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Finally, I analyze the discrepancy in leverage trends, defined as debt as a share
of assets, for private and public firms prior and following first access to public debt.
Similarly to Faulkender & Petersen 2006, I define first year of having access to
public debt as the first year when firms get credit ratings. Private firms do not have
access to public equity and thus rely more heavily on public bond issuance when
given access to the public debt market. Therefore, I evaluate whether leverage is
higher for private firms relative to public firms following first access to the public
debt market (H7). I find that private firms have similar leverage levels to public
firms before their first credit rating. However, when given access to public debt
market, private firms have higher (56% on average) levels of leverage relative to
equivalent public firms (25% on average). In summary, the hypotheses tested in
this study include:
H1: Credit rating agencies disagree more frequently about ratings assigned to
private firms
H2: Private firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms when their
credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds
H3: Private firms that are backed by private equity funds constrain debt issuance
similarly to public firms when their credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade
thresholds
H4: Firms that file for IPOs constrain debt issuance when their ratings have
positive or negative signs only prior to becoming public
H5: Public firms that issue more bonds than industry median number of bonds
per firm, have similar debt issuance patterns to private firms
H6: Private firms constrain investment more than public firms when their credit
ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds
H7: Leverage is higher for private firms relative to public firms following first
access to the public debt market
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1.4 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
1.4.1 Sample of private and public firms with credit ratings
I construct a panel dataset over 1990-2014 of 257 private firms that issue bonds
to public investors. I incorporate in my data private firms with credit ratings that
are included in the 2014 Forbes list of largest American private firms, as well as
all private firms with credit ratings in the Bloomberg Terminal that have more
than one billion dollars in revenue. The aggregate annual revenue for the private
firms included in the sample accounts for more than 7% of U.S. GDP in 2014.
Subsequently, I turn to the Bloomberg Terminal and Capital IQ to obtain credit
ratings and firm characteristics for each of the private firms in my sample.
The credit rating data for private firms in my sample includes long and short
term bond products issued by all rating agencies available on Bloomberg such as
Standard & Poor, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, EJR, A. M. Best, and Duff & Phelps.
In this paper, I primarily focus on long term bond ratings issued by Standard &
Poor. This is because the data reported for S&P is highly detailed and is available
for all firms in my sample. For each bond, Bloomberg reports the dates of the
rating changes. This allows me to construct a daily time series of credit ratings for
each firm, which I aggregate monthly or annually by firm given the context of my
analyses. Next, I match firm specific credit ratings with annual firm characteristics
that I obtain from Bloomberg and Capital IQ. I observe on average about 9 years
of financial data for each of the 257 private firms that issue bonds to investors in
my sample.
Subsequently, I construct a sample of public firms to compare the impact of
rating changes on capital structure and investment for private versus public firms.
To that end, I obtain S&P monthly ratings and annual firm characteristics from the
Wharton Research Data Services over the time period of 1970-2014. The sample
includes 33,177 distinct public firms with about 8 years of data available on average
per firm. Finally, I employ nearest neighbor matching of private and public firms
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within the same industry, and across assets, sales, and profitability. This allows
me to compare the capital structure and investment behavior of equivalent private
and public firms.
Table one provides summary statistics of my raw and matched data of public
and private firms. Noticeably, the leverage for private firms with credit ratings
following access to the public debt market is about 56%.This is substantially higher
than the average leverage for public firms - a mere 25%10. This summary statistic
confirms the intuition that since private firms do not have access to the public
equity market, they rely more heavily on bond issuance to public investors as a
channel to raise capital.
Moreover, the mean and median credit ratings are higher for public firms than
for private firms. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that private
firms have substantially higher leverage and thus may be perceived as more risky.
Finally, the mean annual sales, cash as a share of assets, revenues, assets and other
firm characteristics in table one are comparable across public and private firms.
It suggests that a comparison between private and public firms on these variables
seems appropriate.
1.4.2 Identification, matching private and public firms
A potential identification challenge when comparing the impact of credit ratings
on capital structure and investment of private and public firms is that private
firms that choose to issue bonds to public investors may inherently be different
from public firms. For instance, if the private firms in my sample exhibit rapid
growth, they may be more sensitive to credit rating fluctuations than public firms,
and thus adjust their capital stricture more than public firms, when their ratings
are on downgrade/upgrade thresholds. Hence, a potential concern is that my
findings that private firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms when
10Leverage is defined as debt over assets for each firm-year cell.
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their ratings are on the boundaries are driven by sample selection.
To address the aforementioned self selection challenge, I employ nearest neigh-
bor matching to match for each private firm in my data, a public firm within the
same industry 4 digit sic code, with the closest assets, sales, and profitability. The
matching methodology is graphically described in figure 7. The large sample of
public firms (33,177) allows me to find highly equivalent public firms for each of
the private firms in my data. I choose to match private and public firms based on
the first year that I observe financials for both types of firms in the data to avoid
matching based on endogenous growth of these companies over their lifespan in
my data. However, to make sure my results are not driven by the choice of my
matching approach, I performed multiple robustness checks of matching private
and public firms based on first year of access to public debt, average annual firm
characteristics, as well as matching on different observables within the same in-
dustry. The results are highly robust to my choice of the matching methodology.
This suggests that if a private firm in my sample is growing rapidly, so would an
equivalent matched public firms within the same industry. Hence, the difference
in firms’ responses to credit ratings is not likely to be driven by sample selection.
Moreover, the industry, firm, and year fixed effects that I include in my regressions
can also mitigate potential challenges of self selection.
Further, I regress the change in debt net of equity issuance on lagged dummy
variables for ratings with positive and negative signs rather then regressing the
change in debt issuance on the rating level itself. This is done to avoid concerns
of reverse causality or simultaneity bias. Thus, this methodology allows me to
evaluate causal effects of ratings on capital structure and investment of private
and public firms, rather then merely documenting correlations.
After constructing my sample of private and public firms, I turn to adjusting
my data for econometric analysis. My guiding principle is to keep data cleaning
to the minimum needed. For all regressions, I drop observations where any of
my dependent variables or controls are missing in the data. For instance, in my
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regression specifications for H2-H4, I define debt net of equity issuance as the
change in the debt minus the change in equity level for each firm from year t− 1
to year t over total assets in period t − 1. This requires that private firms in my
data disclose debt and equity issuance for at least two consecutive years. Lastly,
as a robustness check, I truncate the distribution of debt net of equity issuance
below the 1st and above the 99th percentile. This does not have any meaningful
impact on my results.
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1.5 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS
1.5.1 Disagreement between credit rating agencies about ratings as-
signed to private and public firms
The first aim of my regression analysis is to test whether there exists greater
asymmetric information between firm insiders and outside investors for private
versus public firms. To that end, I evaluate if credit rating agencies disagree more
frequently about ratings assigned to private than public firms. Unlike private
firms, public firms have traded shares which allow the credit rating agencies and
investors to get updated information about public firms’ performance at any point
in time. Consequently, the rating agencies may have a more difficult task of
assessing the riskiness of default of private firms, and thus may disagree more
frequently about the rating scores that they assign to private firms as apposed to
public firms.
Therefore, I test whether there exists greater information asymmetry for pri-
vate firms between firm insiders and investors by evaluating if credit rating agen-
cies disagree more frequently about the ratings that they assigns to private firms
relative to public firms. I create two different measures for disagreement be-
tween credit rating agencies for ratings assigned to the same firm within each
year where I observe S&P and Moody’s ratings in the data. The first measure
of disagreement is the absolute value of the difference between average S&P and
Moody’s ratings |S&Pi,t−Moodysi,t| for each firm-year combination. The second
measure is the squared difference between the average S&P and Moody’s ratings
(S&Pi,t −Moodysi,t)2.
I hypothesis that the credit rating agencies disagree more frequently about
ratings assigned to private firms as apposed to public firms. Indeed, my regression
results in table 2 confirm this intuition. The dependent variable in model (1) of
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table 2 is |S&Pi,t − Moodysi,t|. I regress this dependent variable on a dummy
variable for private firms (Privatei) and industry and year fixed effects. The
positive and highly significant coefficient on the dummy variable for private firms
indicates that the discrepancy between S&P and Moody’s ratings is larger for
private firms. The regression specification in model (2) is similar to model (1),
but also controls for profitability, assets, and log of sales in addition to industry and
year fixed effects. The coefficient on Privatei is still positive, highly significant,
and of similar magnitude to model (1). This suggests that my finding that credit
rating agencies disagree more about ratings assigned to private firms is robust for
controlling for firm characteristics. Finally, models (3) and (4) in table 2 have
similar regression specifications to models (1) and (2), however, the measure for
discrepancy between S&P and Moody’s ratings in this case is the squared difference
between the two ratings. My positive and significant coefficients on the dummies
for private firms in those models reinforce the intuition that credit rating agencies
may have a more difficult task of assessing the riskiness of default for private
firms due to the greater information asymmetry between firm insiders, CRAs, and
outside investors for private firms.
1.5.2 Effect of credit rating thresholds on debt issuance of private
versus public firms
The greater information asymmetry for private firms between investors and firm
insiders makes investors in those firms more sensitive to publicly available infor-
mation such credit ratings. This in-turn suggests that private firms are expected
to be more responsive to rating changes, particularly on thresholds when those
rating adjustments have major implications for the cost of debt. Consequently,
I evaluate whether private firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms
do, when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds, in order to send a
favorable signal to the rating agencies and thereby avoid a rating downgrade or
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achieve an upgrade.
Similarly to Kisgen (2006), I define rating upgrade thresholds as ratings with
a positive signs next to the letter grades, and downgrade thresholds as ratings
that have negative signs. Thus, the dummy variable Plusi,t−1 = 1 in table 3 when
the majority of the monthly ratings for firm i during year t − 1 have plus signs.
Similarly, Minusi,t−1 = 1 when the majority of the ratings for firm i during year
t− 1 have minus signs. Ratingi,t−1 refers to the level of Standard and Poor’s long
term issuer credit ratings for firm i in year t − 1. I assign for each S&P rating a
number between 1-23 such that higher assigned levels represents ratings for bonds
with low probability of default. For instance, the highest grade of 23 is assigned
to AAA rating. Furthermore, the Bloomberg data allows me to observe when
the rating agencies disclose that firms’ ratings have positive or negative outlooks.
These outlooks represent potential future rating upgrade or downgrade. Therefore,
NegativeOutlooki,t−1 = 1 and PositiveOutlooki,t−1 = 1 when the majority of the
monthly ratings for firm i during year t − 1 have positive or negative outlooks
(respectively).
In table 3, I evaluate how private firms adjust their capital structure when
their credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds. In models (1) and
(2), I regress the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1
Assetsi,t−1
on a dummy
for ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a dummy for ratings with minus signs
(Minusi,t−1), rating level for firm i in year t−1 (Ratingi,t−1), dummy variables for
negative and positive rating outlooks (NegativeOutlooki,t−1, PositiveOutlooki,t−1),
and firm and year fixed effects. In model (2) I also add firm controls that include
Profitabilityi,t−1, Log(Salesi,t−1), and
CashF lowi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
. I adjust my regression mod-
els 3 and 4 in table 3 to account for the fact that when ratings are on upgrade or
downgrade thresholds, while firms constrain their debt issuance, they may turn to
alternative channels to raise capital such as private equity issuance. Thus, mod-
els 3 and 4 have similar specifications to models 1 and 2 (respectively), however
the dependant variable is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
24
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
.
Thus, the regression specification of model (4) in table 3 is depicted in equation
(1) where the variableKi,t−1 represents firm controls Profitabilityi,t−1, Log(Salesi,t−1),
and CashF lowi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
while γi and γt represent firm and year fixed effects.
4Debti,t −4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β0Minusi,t−1 + β1Plusi,t−1 + β2Ratingi,t−1
+β3NegativeOutlooki,t−1 + β4PositiveOutlooki,t−1 + γi + γt + φKi,t−1 + εi,t
(1)
The negative and highly significant coefficients on theMinusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1
dummy variables in all models in table 3 suggest that private firms constrain debt
issuance when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. The fact that
the magnitude of the coefficients on the plus and minus dummies is similar across
regression specification suggests the change in debt issuance rather than equity
issuance drives these results, which are robust for inclusion of controls. Moreover,
the coefficients on Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1 are also similar in magnitude. This
implies that firms’ decisions to constrain debt issuance are symmetric around both
the upgrade and downgrade thresholds. Further, the insignificant coefficients on
the rating variable across models suggests that the change in debt issuance is
not driven by the level of the rating, but rather by the fact that the ratings are
on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Lastly, mostly insignificant coefficients on
NegativeOutlooki,t−1 and PositiveOutlooki,t−1 suggests that having a positive or
negative rating outlook is not sufficient to motivate firms to adjust their capital
stricture. Firms constrain debt issuance when they have ratings with plus or minus
signs because they may face significant changes in the cost of debt if their rating
upgrades or downgrades would lead to new ratings within a different letter bin.
However, since rating outlooks may not necessary imply a meaningful change in
the cost of debt, they are less likely to trigger a change capital structure.
Note that my coefficients in table 3 for private firms on the Minusi,t−1 and
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Plusi,t−1 dummy variables are larger in magnitude than the respective coefficients
in a similar model for public firms that are reported in Kisgen (2006). Specifically,
Kisgen (2006) reports a coefficient of -0.0064 for credit rating with plus signs and
-0.0051 for ratings with minus signs. However, I report the coefficient of -0.128 on
the plus dummy and -0.0972 on the minus dummy for private firms in model (4) of
table 3. These discrepancies in the size of the coefficients suggest that private firms
are more sensitive to credit rating changes and constrain debt issuance significantly
more than public firms when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds.
Next, in tables 4, I include both private and public firms to evaluate the dis-
crepancy in debt issuance of these types of firms when their ratings are on up-
grade or downgrade thresholds. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2)
is the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1
Assetsi,t−1
. The dependent vari-
able in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined
as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance
[models (1)] and debt net of equity issuance [models (3)] on a dummy for ratings
with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1),
interaction term of a dummy variable for private firms with a dummy for ratings
with plus signs (Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei), interaction term of a dummy variable for
private firms with a dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei)
, and controls such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales, and
year and industry fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 have similar regression specifi-
cations to models 1 and 3, however I replace the dummy variables for ratings
with minus and plus signs (Minusi,t−1, Plusi,t−1), with a single dummy variable
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 that turns on when the majority of the monthly ratings
within a year have positive or negative signs. Thus, regression model (3) in table
4 can be described in equation 2, while model (4) is depicted in equation 3. Vec-
tor Ki,t−1 represents firm controls such as Profitabilityi,t−1, Log(Salesi,t−1), and
Leveragei,t−2 while γi and γt represent industry and year fixed effects.
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4Debti,t −4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β0Minusi,t−1 + β1Plusi,t−1 + β2Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei
+β3Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei + β4Privatei + β5Ratingi,t−1 + γi + γt + φKi,t−1 + εi,t
(2)
4Debti,t −4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β0Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 + β1Privatei
+β2(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei + β3Ratingi,t−1 + γi + γt + φKi,t−1 + εi,t
(3)
My coefficients on the Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1 dummy variables in table 4
are negative and highly significant. This implies that public firms constrain their
debt issuance when their credit ratings have plus or minus signs. These results are
highly consistent with Kisgen (2006) as he reports coefficients of -0.0064 for credit
rating with plus signs and -0.0051 for ratings with minus signs, while I report
-0.0071 and -0.00655 for the respective coefficients in model (1) of table 411.
The coefficients on interaction termsMinusi,t−1∗Privatei, Plusi,t−1∗Privatei,
and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei are my primary coefficients of interest as
they outline the discrepancy in debt issuance between public and private firms
when their ratings have plus or minus signs. The magnitude of the negative and
highly significant coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that private firms
constrain debt issuance at least 4.5 percentage points more than public firms
do when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds (model 3). Finally,
the positive and significant coefficients on the dummy variable for private firms
indicates that, on average, private firms issue more new debt relative to public
firms. This result is consistent with the intuition that since private firms do not
11My regression specification is similar but not identical to Kisgen (2006) due to data limita-
tions for private firms
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have access to the public equity market, they have less channels to raise capital,
and thus will rely heavily on issuing bonds to public investors to raise funds.
Finally, I use the same regression specifications in table 5 as in table 4, however
in table 5, I match for each private firm, an equivalent public firm within the
same industry that has similar profitability, assets, and sales in the first year it is
observed in the data. The results on the interaction terms Plusi,t−1∗Privatei and
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei are negative and highly significant. This implies that for a
matched set of private and public firms, private firms constrain debt issuance more
than public firms when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
1.5.3 Effect of rating thresholds on debt issuance of firms that receive
financing from private equity funds
After documenting the discrepancies in capital structure of private and equivalent
public firms, I turn to evaluating whether private firms that receive financing from
private equity funds constrain debt issuance more than public firms, when their
credit ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Intuitively, private firms
that have alternative source of financing such as private equity funds, are not as
sensitive to credit rating fluctuations since they depend less on the public debt
market for financing. Moreover, the fact that private equity firms are willing to
provide financial support to particular private firms sends a signal to the market
that those firms have good growth prospects. This in-turn reduces the information
asymmetry between insiders and public investors for these firms.
Consequently, I expect private firms that are backed by private equity funds to
be less sensitive to rating fluctuations and thus have similar debt issuance patterns
to public firms. Specifically, I hypothesis that private firms that get support from
private equity funds do not constrain debt issuance more than public firms when
their ratings have positive or negative signs.
My regression models in table 6 have similar specifications to the regressions in
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tables 4 and 5. However, the data for table 6 is limited to information about private
firms that are supported by private equity funds along with public firms. Thus,
the coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei,
and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt issuance
between public firms and private firms that are backed by private equity funds
when their ratings have plus or minus signs. Hence, the fact that the coefficients
are statistically insignificant on Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei and Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei in
models (1) and (3), and on (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei for models (2) and
(4), implies that private and public firms constrain debt issuance to a similar extent
when their credit ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Note, however,
that the coefficients on Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1 for models (1) and (3), and
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 for models (2) and (4), are negative and highly significant.
This implies that both public firms and private firms that are backed by equity
funds constrain their debt issuance when their ratings are on the aforementioned
boundaries.
1.5.4 Effect of rating thresholds on debt issuance of firms with median
ratings above investment grade, and firms that issue abnormally large
number of bonds
The tradeoff theory of capital structure suggests that firms balance the bene-
fits of debt issuance such as the value of interest tax shields against the costs
of bankruptcy. Thus, a potential concern is that my results, that private firms
constrain debt issuance more than public firms when their ratings are on up-
grade/downgrade boundaries, are primarily driven by low quality firms for which
investors are concerned about default risk.
To address this concern, I rerun all the regression models specified in equations
(2) and (3) for private and public firms with median S&P credit ratings above
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investment grade. The coefficients reported in table 7 reinforce my results in table
4 for firms with low default risk. This suggests that the gap in debt issuance
between private and public firms is not driven by concerns about firms’ default
risks that elevate their sensitivity to rating changes. Instead, the results reinforce
the intuition that private firms have limited information available for investors,
and thus are more sensitive to the publicly available credit rating fluctuations, in
comparison with public firms.
Next, I move on to evaluate whether private firms adjust their debt issuance
similarly to public firms that issue abnormally large number of bonds, when their
credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds. The rationale is that pub-
lic firms that issue large number of bonds are relying heavily on the bond mar-
ket as a channel to raise capital, and thus are more sensitive to credit rating
changes. Consequently, their debt issuance response to credit ratings being on
upgrade/downgrade boundaries is likely to be similar to that of private firms.
Table 8 includes data for private and public firms with number of bonds is-
sued that exceeds the median number of bonds issued by firms in the same in-
dustry. Similarly to table 7, the dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is
the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1
Assetsi,t−1
. The dependent variable
in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance [mod-
els (1),(2)] and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for
ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs
(Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a dummy variable for private firms with plus
and minus coefficients (Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei), and controls
such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales, and year and in-
dustry fixed effects. The statistically insignificant coefficients on interaction terms
Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗Privatei, and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗Privatei
outline that there is no discrepancy in debt issuance between private firms and
public firms that issue abnormally large number of bonds, when their ratings are
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on downgrade or upgrade thresholds. This reinforces the intuition that when pub-
lic firms issue large number of bonds, they become highly sensitive to credit rating
fluctuations as they rely heavily on the public debt market to raise capital.
1.5.5 Effect of credit rating thresholds on debt issuance prior and
following firms’ IPOs
After evaluating the impact of ratings on upgrade/downgrade thresholds on debt
issuance for private, public, and firms that receive financing from private equity
funds, I turn to analyzing the effect on debt issuance for private firms that became
public through an IPO12. To that end, I construct a sample from Nasdaq.com of
all firms that filed for initial public offering on NYSE or NASDAQ with more than
$150,000 of equity offerings. Then, I construct a time series of credit ratings from
Bloomberg for each of those firms. I limit the analysis to Standard and Poor’s long
term bond ratings since those ratings have frequent updates and are available for
all firms in my sample. Consistently with the literature, I assign for each rating
a number between 1 and 23 where bonds with low default risk get high rating
numbers, while bonds with high default risk are assigned low rating numbers13.
Subsequently, I limit my sample to firms that were issued credit ratings prior
and following their IPOs, and merge firm characteristics and credit ratings for
those firms from Capital IQ and Bloomberg. Finally, I add firms’ IPO years from
Nasdaq.com and the number of years each firm has been in business as well as
industry sic classifications from firms’ websites and Nasdaq.com. Consequently,
I end up constructing a panel dataset for 155 firms with credit ratings prior and
following to their IPOs.
Figure 4 shows summary statistics of the average new debt net of equity is-
12This analysis focuses on firms that filed for initial public offering, and exclude firms that
had secondary offerings.
13For example, AAA rating gets a level of 23, while AA+ ratings get 22, and so forth.
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suance prior and following firms’ IPOs by credit rating signs14. The top figure
(Prior to IPO) suggests that firms constrain their debt net of equity issuance prior
to their IPOs when their ratings have plus or minus signs, in contrast to years
when firms’ credit ratings were not on the boundaries. However, the pattern of
restricting debt issuance when ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds dis-
appears following firms’ IPOs, as depicted in the figure at the bottom (Following
IPO). This result reinforces the intuition that public firms are less responsive to
credit rating fluctuations since they disclose more information to public investors
relative to private firms and thus reduce information asymmetry between firm in-
siders and outside investors. Figure 3 suggests that the pattern of constraining
debt net of equity issuance when ratings are on upgrade/downgrade boundaries
is consistent for more than 2 years prior to firms’ IPOs as well as within 2 years
prior to IPOs. However, firms tend to reduce overall debt issuance as they get
closer to initial public offering.
I test the implications of my summary statistics in figure 4 with a regression
analysis outlined in table 9. Model (1) of table 9 limits the data sample only
for years prior to the firms’ initial public offerings. I regress debt net of equity
issuance which is defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
on lagged firm plus
and minus dummy variables and controls. I include revenue growth, firm age, and
number of years following IPOs, as well as lagged controls for firm ratings, cash
over assets, profitability, leverage, and firm and year fixed effects to adjust for
potential evolution in firm’s business following initial public offering. Thus, the
regression specification for model (1) in table 9 is specified in equation 4.
14New debt net of equity issuance is defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1
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4Debti,t −4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β0Minusi,t−1 + β1Plusi,t−1 + β2S&Pi,t−1
+β3RevenueGrowthi,t−1 + β4FirmAgei,t−1 + β5Y earsRelativeToIPOi,t
+β6Profitabilityi,t−1 + β7
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
+ β8Leveragei,t−2 + γi + γt + εi,t
(4)
The results of model (1) are consistent with my results in table 3, that suggest
that when private firms have credit ratings with plus or minus signs, they constrain
debt net of equity issuance. The negative coefficients on Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1
dummies have similar magnitudes. This implies that firms respond to concerns
of downgrades that may lead to ratings of lower letter bins in a similar way that
they respond to the possibility of upgrades that may lead to ratings of higher
letter bins. Further, the magnitude of the coefficients on Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1
in table 9 is lager than the magnitude for the respective coefficients in model (4)
of table 3. This discrepancy can be driven by the fact that when firms anticipate
to file for IPOs, they may be particularly sensitive to credit rating fluctuations
that would impact their valuation, and thus constrain debt issuance more in cases
when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds.
Finally, models (2) and (3) in table 9 include firms’ data for years prior and
following their IPOs15. The dependent variable and the controls are identical to
model (1) however, I add a dummy variable for the time period prior to the
IPO (BeforeIPOi,t−1) as well as interaction terms of this dummy coefficient
with plus and minus dummies (BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗Plusi,t−1 and BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗
Minusi,t−1). Thus, regression model (2) in table 9 can be described in equation
5.
15Note that model (2) in table 9 includes year and firm fixed effects while model (3) on table
9 includes industry and firm fixed effects
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4Debti,t −4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β0Minusi,t−1 + β1Plusi,t−1 + β2BeforeIPOi,t−1
+β3BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗Minusi,t−1 + β4BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗ Plusi,t−1 + β5S&Pi,t−1
+β6RevenueGrowthi,t−1 + β7FirmAgei,t−1 + β8Y earsRelativeToIPOi,t
+β9Profitabilityi,t−1 + β10
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
+ β11Leveragei,t−2 + γi + γt + εi,t
(5)
My negative and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction terms
(β3 and β4) suggest that firms constrain debt issuance at least 10 percentage points
more prior to going public, when their ratings are on the upgrade/downgrade
thresholds. In contrast, no such pattern is observed following initial public of-
ferings. This result is consistent with the intuition that private firms are more
responsive to rating fluctuations relatively to public firms and thus constrain debt
issuance more when their ratings are close to upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
Moreover, the positive coefficient on BeforeIPOi,t−1 suggests that when ratings
do not have a positive or negative signs, firms issue more debt net of equity prior
to their IPOs. This result is consistent with the intuition that during the years
when firms were private, they had larger information asymmetry between firm
insiders and outside investors and thus had larger discrepancy between the cost of
debt and equity, which incentivized them to issue more debt as a share of assets
relative to years following their IPOs.
1.5.6 Effect of ratings on upgrade/downgrade thresholds on firm in-
vestment
Thus far, I have evaluated the impact of credit ratings on capital structure for pri-
vate and public firms. I have demonstrated that firms constrain debt issuance when
their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade boundaries. Thus, it appears that firms
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face greater costs of raising capital when their rating are on upgrade/downgrade
thresholds since debt issuance becomes less cost effective, and alternative sources
of financing such as equity issuance and bank loans are often more expensive.
Consequently, I test whether firms reduce their investment when their credit
ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. I hypothesize that firms reduce
their investment following periods when their ratings were on upgrade/downgrade
boundaries since raising funds becomes less cost effective during those times. In-
deed, I find that private firms constrain investment by 8.46 percentage points when
their ratings have negative signs and reduce investment by 9.81 percentage points
when their ratings have positive signs after controlling for firm characteristics as
well as industry and year fixed effects16.
Similarly to Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), I define invest-
ment as capital expenditure over total assets. Figure 5 depicts the average change
in private firms’ investments defined as CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
for
credit ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs. The figure suggests that,
on average, private firms decrease investment by approximately 6.37 percentage
points during years when their credit ratings have negative signs relative to years
when firms’ credit ratings do not have a sign. Consistently, these firms decrease
investment by 8.15 percentage points during years when their credit ratings have
positive signs. Table 10 includes data for investment of private firms that issue
bonds to public investors. In model (1), I regress the change in firm investment
defined as CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
on dummy variables for ratings
with plus signs (Plusi,t−1) and a dummy variables for ratings with minus signs
(Minusi,t−1). In model (2), I also control for credit rating levels (Ratingi,t−1), a
dummy for ratings outlooks (RatingOutlooki,t−1), and firm controls such as lever-
age, sales, and profitability. Finally, in model (3), I also control for year and
industry fixed effects. Consistently, the regression model in column (3) is specified
in equation (6)
16Table 10, column (3)
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CapitalExpenditurei,t − CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β1Minusi,t−1 + β2Plusi,t−1
+β3Ratingi,t−1 + β4RatingOutlooki,t−1 + β5Leveragei,t−1 + β6Log(Salesi,t−1)
+β7Profitabilityi,t−1 + γi + γt + εi,t
(6)
All regression models in table 10 report negative and highly significant coeffi-
cients on Minusi,t−1 and Plusi,t−1 dummy variables ranging from -6.37 and -9.81
percentage points. These results suggest that private firms constrain investments
by at least 6.37 percentage points when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade
thresholds.
Subsequently, I evaluate if private firms reduce investment more than public
firms when their ratings are close to upgrade or downgrade thresholds. I hypoth-
esize that since private firms are more sensitive to credit rating fluctuations, they
decrease investment more than equivalent public firms when their credit ratings are
on upgrade/downgrade boundaries. Table 11 includes data for investment of pri-
vate and public firms that are issued credit ratings. Similarly to table 10, I define
investment as capital expenditure over total assets. In models (1) and (3), I regress
the change in firm investment defined as CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
on
a dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), a dummy for ratings with
plus signs (Plusi,t−1), credit rating levels (Ratingi,t−1), a dummy for private firms
(Privatei) as well as year and industry fixed effects. In models (2) and (4), I
also control for firm leverage, sales, and profitability. Columns (3) and (4) report
results for matched private and public firms within the same industry that have
the closest assets, sales, and profitability. In summary, the regression models in
columns (2) and (4) of table 11 are specified in equation (7)
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CapitalExpenditurei,t − CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
= α + β1Minusi,t−1 + β2Plusi,t−1
+β3Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei + β4Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei + β5Ratingi,t−1 + β6Privatei
+β7Leveragei,t−1 + β8Log(Salesi,t−1) + β9Profitabilityi,t−1 + γi + γt + εi,t
(7)
The coefficients on the interaction terms of a dummy variable for private firms
with dummies for ratings with negative and positive signs (Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei
and Plusi,t−1∗Privatei) outline the relative impact of credit ratings on investment
for private versus pubic firms. The negative and highly significant coefficients on
these interaction terms (β3 and β4) suggest that private firms constrain investment
more than public firms when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
Across regression models (1) to (4), the coefficients on the interaction terms range
from -6.52 percentage points to -9.97 percentage points. This suggests that private
firms constrain investment at least 6.52 percentage points more than public firms
do, when their credit ratings are on the upgrade/downgrade boundaries. Note
that the coefficients on the interaction terms (β3 and β4) in models (1) and (2)
have similar magnitudes to the coefficients in columns (3) and (4). This implies
that matching private and public firms does not change the results in a meaningful
way.
1.5.7 Leverage for private and public firms prior and following first
access to the public debt market
After analyzing how private and public firms adjust their capital structure and
investment when their credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds, I turn
to evaluate the discrepancy in the leverage levels for these firms prior and following
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first access to public debt.
Private firms do not have access to the public equity market. Therefore, they
are more likely to utilize public debt as a channel to raise funds. Figure 6 demon-
strates that prior to first access to public debt, the leverage for private and public
firms is very similar across years. However, following first credit rating, the lever-
age level for public firms (the dashed line) is downward sloping following an initial
spike at the year of first issuance of bonds to public investors. However, following
the first credit rating, leverage for private firms trends upward and diverges from
the leverage level for public firms. Therefore, I evaluate the aforementioned gap
between the leverage levels of private and public firms using the regression model
specified in equation 8.
Debti,t
Assetsi,t
= α + β0(AccessToPublicDebti,t) ∗ Privatei + β1AccessToPublicDebti,t
+β2Privatet + β3Profitabilityi,t + β4Log(Salesi,t) + β5
Debti,t−1
EBITDAi,t−1
+ εi,t
(8)
The dependent variable of the regression is leverage for firm i in year t, de-
fined as total debt as a share of assets. Privatei = 1 when firm i is private.
AccessToPublicDebti,t = 1 for years following first credit ratings and 0 otherwise.
Similarly to Faulkender & Petersen (2006), I use first credit rating as a signal
for the first time a firm has access to public debt. Thus, the interaction term
(AccessToPublicDebti,t) ∗ Privatei = 1 for private firms during years when they
have access to pubic debt, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on this interaction
term (β0) is my primary object of interest since it outlines the relative impact for
private versus public firms, of having access to the public debt market as a channel
to raise capital, on firm leverage.
The data in table 12 includes matched private and public firms within the same
industry with similar assets, sales, and profitability. The sample is limited to only
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private and public firms where I observe financials during years prior and follow-
ing the first assigned credit ratings. This allows me to construct leverage level for
equivalent private and public firms for years before and after first access to the
public debt market. The results in table 12 confirm the findings of Faulkender
& Petersen (2006) as my coefficients on AccessToPublicDebti,t are positive and
highly significant for all regression specifications. It implies that when public firms
have access to the public bond market, their level of leverage rises17. However, the
fact that coefficient β0 on the interaction term (AccessToPublicDebti,t)∗Privatei
is positive and highly significant implies that private firms increase their lever-
age level substantially more than equivalent public firms following first access to
public debt18. Note that employing difference in difference methodology seems
appropriate in this context since the leverage levels for private and public firms
exhibit similar patterns across years prior to first credit rating19.
17Note that in models (2)-(4) of table 12, I also control for profitability, log of sales, and
lagged debt as a share of earning. However, it does not have a meaningful impact on the results.
18For the regression specifications in table 12, I match for each private firm, an equivalent
public firm within the same industry that has similar profitability, assets, and sales in the first
year it is observed in the data.
19As depicted in the non-shaded section of figure 6
39
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
This study is the first to evaluate the effect of credit ratings on capital structure
and investment of private versus public U.S. firms. It contributes to the growing
literature on discrepancies between private and public firms, as well as to the lit-
erature on credit ratings and capital structure. I find that credit rating agencies
disagree more frequently about ratings assigned to private, as apposed to public
firms. This result suggests that there is greater information asymmetry between
firm insiders and outside investors, for private firms, which makes the rating agen-
cies’ task of assessing default risk more difficult for those firms. This finding is
hardly surprising since less information about private firms is available in com-
parison to public firms. This is because private firms do not have publicly traded
shares and are not required to file some financial disclosures that public firms are
mandated to file. This limited information about private firms drives investors to
pay closer attention to publicly posted credit ratings, which in turn makes private
firms highly sensitive to rating fluctuations.
Consequently, I hypothesized that private firms constrain their debt issuance
more than public firms when their ratings are on thresholds where rating changes
yield large shifts in the cost of debt. This allows firms to boost cash flow to
equity holders, and thereby send a favorable signal to rating agencies, in order to
avoid a downgrade or possibly achieve a rating upgrade. Indeed, I find that when
firms’ ratings are on upgrade or downgrade boundaries, private firms constrain
debt issuance at least 4.5 percentage points more than equivalent public firms. As
a result, private firms reduce investment by more than 6.5 percentage points when
their credit ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds, since raising capital
on the debt market becomes particularly costly in that instance, and alternative
channels of financing are less cost effective than public debt financing.
Consistently, I demonstrate that private firms that file for IPOs constrain debt
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issuance at least 10 percentage points more, during years prior to going public,
if their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds. Furthermore, my findings
suggest that private firms that have access to alternative sources of financing,
such as private equity funds, do not constrain debt issuance more than public
firms, when their ratings are on a boundary. These results support the intuition
that private firms are highly sensitive to rating changes due in part to the fact
that they rely heavily on public debt as a channel to raise capital. Lastly, I
document that private and public firms have similar leverage trajectories prior to
their first access to the public debt market. However, following their first credit
rating, private firms issue substantially more debt as a share of assets, relative to
equivalent public firms20. This confirms that private firms utilize the public debt
market as a channel to raise capital, more than public firms.
20Following first credit rating, private firms issue on average 56% debt as a share of assets
relative to only 25% for public firms.
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1.8 APPENDIX A: FIGURES
Figure 2
Debt, Equity, and Debt Net of Equity Issuance for Private Firms
The figure on the left (New Debt Issuance) depicts the change in annual debt issuance for private
firms averaged by credit rating signs. The vertical axis represents the change in debt issuance
between year t−1 and t over assets in year t−1 [Debti,t−Debti,t−1Assetsi,t−1 ]. The horizontal axis represents
ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs. The figure on the right (New Equity Issuance)
represents the change in equity issuance for private firms averaged by credit ratings signs. The
vertical axis represents the change in private equity issuance between year t−1 and t over assets
in year t − 1 [Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1Assetsi,t−1 ]. The horizontal axis represents ratings with minus signs,
no signs, and plus signs. The figure at the bottom (Debt Net of Equity Issuance) depicts the
average change in debt net of equity issuance for private firms averaged by credit rating signs.
The vertical axis represents the change in debt net of equity issuance between year t − 1 and t
over assets in year t− 1 [ [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 ]. The horizontal axis represents
ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs.
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Figure 3
Debt Net of Equity Issuance
More Than and Within 2 Years Prior to IPOs
The figure on the top (More Than 2 Years Prior to IPO) depicts
the change in debt net of equity issuance averaged by credit
rating signs (rating signs include three categories: plus, minus,
and no sign) for private firms more than 2 years prior to their
IPOs. The vertical axis represents the change in debt net of eq-
uity issuance defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 .
The horizontal axis represents ratings with minus sings, no
signs, and plus signs. The figure at the bottom (Within 2
Years Prior to IPO) depicts the change in debt net of eq-
uity issuance averaged by credit rating signs for private firms
within 2 years prior to their IPOs. The vertical axis rep-
resents the change in debt net of equity issuance defined
as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 . The horizontal axis
represents ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs.
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Figure 4
Debt Net of Equity Issuance
Prior and Following Firms’ Initial Public Offerings
The figure on the top (Prior to IPO) depicts the change in debt
net of equity issuance averaged by credit rating signs (rating
signs include three categories: plus, minus, and no sign) for
private firms during years prior to their initial public offer-
ings. The vertical axis represents the change in debt net of eq-
uity issuance defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 .
The horizontal axis represents ratings with minus signs, no
signs, and plus signs. The figure at the bottom (Follow-
ing IPO) depicts the change in debt net of equity issuance
averaged by credit rating signs for firms that turned pub-
lic during years following their IPOs. The vertical axis rep-
resents the change in debt net of equity issuance defined
as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 . The horizontal axis
represents ratings with minus signs, no signs, and plus signs.
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Figure 5
Private Firms’ Investment when Credit Ratings
are on Upgrade or Downgrade Thresholds
I define investment as capital expenditure over total assets sim-
ilarly to Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994). The
figure depicts the average change in firm investment defined as
CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
for credit ratings with minus
signs, no signs, and plus signs. The figure suggests that, on average, firms
decrease investment by approximately 6.37 percentage points during years
when their credit ratings have negative signs relative to years when firms’
credit ratings do not have plus or minus signs. Similarly, firms decrease
investment by 8.15 percentage points during years when their credit rat-
ings have positive signs relative to years when ratings do not plus or minus
signs.
48
Figure 6
Private and Public Firms’ Leverage
Prior and Following Access to Public Debt
The figure depicts average debt as a share of assets for private and public
firms by year relative to first year of public debt issuance. The vertical axis
represents the average level of leverage for private and public firms defined
as Leveragei,t =
Debti,t
Assetsi,t
. The horizontal axis represents years relative to
first year of public debt issuance or first year of receiving credit ratings. For
instance, year 0 represents the first year of access to the public debt market.
Year +3 represents the third year for firm i following first year of public debt
issuance. Similarly, year -5 represents five years prior to first year of receiving
a credit rating. The solid (dashed) line represents the average debt as a share
of assets for private (public) firms by year relative to first year of access to the
public debt market. The shaded area represents years following first issued
credit ratings when firms gained access to the public bond market.
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Figure 7
Data Construction and Matching Private and Public Firms
The figure describes the data construction and matching methodology of private and
public firms in my sample. I obtain a list of private firms from the Forbes list of largest
American private firms. I then supplement that list with private firms in Bloomberg
with more than $1 Billion in revenue. Afterwards, I obtain credit ratings and firm char-
acteristics from Bloomberg and Capital IQ for a total of 257 firms from the consolidated
list of private firms. Next, I match the set of private firms with available credit ratings
and firm characteristics with data from WRDS on 33,177 public firms. This allows me
to match for each private firm in my sample, a public firm within the same industry
with the closest assets, sales, and profitability. The matching is done based on the first
year I observe public and private firms in the data.
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1.9 APPENDIX B: TABLES
Table 1
Average Annual Firm Characteristics
Table 1 depicts summary statistics for 257 private firms,
33,177 public firms, and 257 public firms that are matched
to private firms within the same industry, by assets, sales,
and profitability. The sample of private firms consists of
corporations that are assigned credit ratings and are in-
cluded in the 2014 Forbes list of largest American private
firms as well as all private firms with credit ratings on
Bloomberg that have more than one Billion US dollars
in revenue. The dataset is constructed over 1990-2014.
The sample for private firms includes on average 9 years
per firm as reported from Bloomberg and Capital IQ. The
sample for public firms includes 8 years on average as re-
ported from WRDS. The credit ratings sample focuses on
long term bonds issued by Standard & Poor and Moody’s.
For each bond, I construct daily time series of credit rat-
ings which I then aggregate monthly or annually by firm
based on the context of my analyses. Subsequently, I
match firm specific credit ratings with firm annual charac-
teristics that I obtain from WRDS, Bloomberg, and Cap-
ital IQ.
Private Public Matched Public
Firms 257 33,177 257
Observations 2,305 252,627 1,875
Years Per Firm ≈ 9 ≈ 8 ≈ 7
Mean Rating BB BBB- BBB-
Median Rating BB- BBB- BBB-
Total Assets $5.59B $5.16B $6.14B
Total Liabilities $4.07B $4.27B $5.22B
Sales $3.01B $1.61B $3.51B
Total Revenues $2.89B $1.61B $3.51B
Total Debt $2.83B $2.01B $2.12B
Operating Income $383M $228M $412M
EBITDA $321M $313M $353M
Cash Flow $299M $108M $232M
Leverage 56% 25% 24%
Profitability 12% 16% 12%
Cash Over Assets 6% 6% 5%
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Table 2
Disagreement Between Credit Rating Agencies
about Ratings Assigned to Private and Public Firms
Table 2 includes data for private and public firms that are matched within the same industry,
by assets, sales and profitability. The dependent variable in the ordered logit regression models
(1) and (2) is the absolute value of the difference between S&P and Moody’s credit ratings. The
dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is the squared difference between S&P and Moody’s
ratings. Privatei is a dummy variable for private firms. The positive and statistically significant
coefficient on Privatei implies that rating agencies disagree more frequently about ratings given
to private firms relative to public firms. Additional controls include profitability, log sales, assets,
as well as year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|S&Pi,t −Moodyi,t| |S&Pi,t −Moodyi,t| (S&Pi,t −Moodyi,t)2 (S&Pi,t −Moodyi,t)2
Privatei 0.123∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.123) (0.120)
Profitabilityi,t 0.103 0.478
(0.202) (0.579)
Assetsi,t 0.009 0.126
(0.027) (0.127)
Log(Salesi,t) -0.073∗∗ -0.255∗
(0.036) (0.130)
N 1009 1009 1009 1009
R2 0.008 0.017 0.009 0.039
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3
Debt and Equity Issuance for Private Firms
Table 3 includes data for private firms that issue bonds to public investors. The table demon-
strates that private firms constrain debt issuance more than 9% percentage points, when
their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. The dependent variable in models
(1) and (2) is the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The dependent
variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)]
and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs
(Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), and dummy variables
for negative and positive rating outlooks (NegativeOutlooki,t−1, PositiveOutlooki,t−1). The
regression specification includes controls such as lagged rating level, profitability, log of sales,
and year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Plusi,t−1 -0.107∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0369) (0.0448) (0.0451)
Minusi,t−1 -0.0924∗∗∗ -0.0914∗∗∗ -0.0954∗∗ -0.0972∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0343) (0.0406) (0.0407)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0105 0.0149 0.0110 0.0170
(0.00924) (0.00942) (0.0106) (0.0110)
NegativeOutlooki,t−1 0.0204 0.0189 -0.00219 -0.00762
(0.0297) (0.0295) (0.0347) (0.0350)
PositiveOutlooki,t−1 -0.0601 -0.0636 -0.106∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0437) (0.0503) (0.0502)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.295∗ -0.0115
(0.168) (0.195)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.172∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗
(0.0512) (0.0610)
CashF lowi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
0.437∗∗ 0.160
(0.222) (0.258)
N 545 545 511 511
R2 0.334 0.364 0.348 0.358
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4
Debt and Equity Issuance for Private and Public Firms
Table 4 includes data for private and public firms that issue bonds to public investors. The
table demonstrates that private firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms, when
their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. The dependent variable in models
(1) and (2) is the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The dependent
variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)]
and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs
(Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a
dummy variable for private firms with plus and minus dummy variables (Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗Privatei), and controls such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales,
and year and industry fixed effects. The coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt
issuance between public and private firms when their ratings are on downgrade or upgrade
thresholds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Minusi,t−1 -0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0100∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0506∗∗∗ -0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0174)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0452∗∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0190)
Privatei 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0008∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Leveragei,t−2 -0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0611∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.1270∗∗∗ 0.1270∗∗∗ -0.0920∗∗∗ -0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗ -0.0019∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 -0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0089∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0019)
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0142)
N 20283 20283 20257 20257
R2 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.054
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5
Debt and Equity Issuance for Private and Public Firms
Matched Sample of Private and Public Firms
Table 5 includes data for private and public firms, matched within the same industry, by assets,
sales, and profitability. The table demonstrates that private firms constrain debt issuance more
than equivalent public firms within the same industry, when their ratings are on upgrade or
downgrade thresholds. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the change in debt
over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is the
change in debt net of equity over assets defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 . I
regress the change in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)] and debt net of equity issuance [models
(3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings
with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a dummy variable for private firms with
plus and minus dummy variables (Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei), and controls
such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales, and year and industry fixed
effects. The coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, and
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt issuance between public and
private firms when their ratings are on downgrade or upgrade thresholds. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Minusi,t−1 0.0007 0.0021
(0.0168) (0.0205)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0023 0.0054
(0.0169) (0.0207)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0600∗∗ -0.0649∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0323)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0739∗∗∗ -0.0940∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0347)
Privatei 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0679∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0186) (0.0186)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0065∗∗ 0.0064∗∗ 0.0022 0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Leveragei,t−2 -0.0821∗∗∗ -0.0820∗∗∗ -0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0707∗∗∗
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.2620∗∗∗ 0.2620∗∗∗ -0.1210 -0.1220
(0.0674) (0.0673) (0.0826) (0.0825)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗ -0.0194∗
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0010) (0.0099)
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 -0.0008 0.0037
(0.0134) (0.0164)
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0263)
N 1091 1091 1065 1065
R2 0.114 0.114 0.111 0.111
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6
Debt and Equity Issuance for Public Firms
and Private Firms that are Backed by Private Equity Funds
Table 6 includes data for public firms and private firms that are backed by private equity funds.
Private firms that receive financing from private equity funds are less sensitive to rating changes
and have more channels to raise capital than non-backed private firms. Thus, their capital struc-
ture adjustments to rating being on upgrade/downgrade boundaries are more consistent with
those of public firms, that have multiple channels to raise capital cost effectively. The dependent
variable in models (1) and (2) is the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The
dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)]
and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs
(Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a
dummy variable for private firms with plus and minus dummy variables (Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗Privatei), and controls such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales,
and year and industry fixed effects. The coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt
issuance between public and private firms when their ratings are on downgrade or upgrade
thresholds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Minusi,t−1 -0.0070∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0023)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0023)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei 0.0100 0.0468
(0.0266) (0.0329)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0168 -0.0124
(0.0274) (0.0339)
Privatei 0.0147 0.0147 0.0094 0.0095
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0147) (0.0147)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0007∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Leveragei,t−2 -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.0677∗∗∗ -0.0678∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.1160∗∗∗ 0.1160∗∗∗ -0.1060∗∗∗ -0.1060∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0133) (0.0133)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0083∗∗∗ -0.0083∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0019∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0087∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0019)
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei -0.0029 0.0183
(0.0208) (0.0257)
N 19984 19984 19984 19984
R2 0.050 0.050 0.057 0.056
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7
Debt and Equity Issuance for Private and Public Firms
Firms with Median Ratings Above Investment Grade
Table 7 includes data for private and public firms with median S&P credit ratings above in-
vestment grade. The regression demonstrates that the discrepancy in debt issuance between
private and public firms when ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds is prevalent for
firms with low probability of default in addition to risky firms. The dependent variable in
models (1) and (2) is the change in debt over assets defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The depen-
dent variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)]
and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs
(Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs (Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a
dummy variable for private firms with plus and minus dummy variables (Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗Privatei), and controls such as lagged rating level, leverage, profitability, log of sales,
and year and industry fixed effects. The coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt
issuance between public and private firms when their ratings are on downgrade or upgrade
thresholds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Minusi,t−1 -0.0049∗∗ -0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0027)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0028)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0423∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0196)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0770∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0196)
Privatei 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0661∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0013∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Leveragei,t−2 -0.0628∗∗∗ -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0728∗∗∗ -0.0730∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.1340∗∗∗ 0.1340∗∗∗ -0.0374∗∗ -0.0376∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0187)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 -0.0056∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0022)
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei -0.0813∗∗∗ -0.0476∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0161)
N 10054 10054 10029 10029
R2 0.073 0.073 0.091 0.091
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8
Debt and Equity Issuance for Private Firms and Public Firms
with Number of Bonds Issued Above Industry Standard
Table 8 includes data for private firms that issue public debt as well as for public firms that
issued number of bonds for each month in the data, that exceed the median number of bonds
issued by firms in the same industry. Public firms with abnormally large bond issuance are
particularly sensitive to credit rating fluctuations and thus are more comparable to private firms
that are sensitive to credit rating changes due to limited availability of information about their
performance. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is the change in debt over assets
defined as Debti,t−Debti,t1Assetsi,t−1 . The dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is the change in debt
net of equity over assets defined as [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1 . I regress the change
in firm debt issuance [models (1),(2)] and debt net of equity issuance [models (3),(4)] on a
lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with minus
signs (Minusi,t−1), interaction terms of a dummy variable for private firms with plus and minus
dummy variables (Minusi,t−1∗Privatei, Plusi,t−1∗Privatei), and controls such as lagged rating
level, leverage, profitability, log of sales, and year and industry fixed effects. The coefficients
on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗Privatei, and (Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗
Privatei outline the discrepancy in debt issuance between public and private firms when their
ratings are on downgrade or upgrade thresholds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
Debti,t−Debti,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
4Debti,t−4Equityi,t
Assetsi,t−1
Minusi,t−1 -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0057)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0063)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei 0.0030 0.0033
(0.0127) (0.0225)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0111 -0.0100
(0.0129) (0.0244)
Privatei -0.0075 -0.0066 0.0118 0.0126
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0021 0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0012
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Leveragei,t−2 -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0700∗∗∗ -0.0910∗∗∗ -0.0906∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0266) (0.0268)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.2500∗∗∗ 0.2500∗∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0164
(0.0493) (0.0495) (0.0716) (0.0717)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0040 -0.0038
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0038)
Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1 -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0048)
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei -0.0035 -0.0027
(0.0106) (0.0188)
N 2013 2013 1987 1987
R2 0.165 0.165 0.193 0.193
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9
Debt Issuance Prior and Following IPOs when Ratings
are on Upgrade/Downgrade Thresholds
Table 9 includes data for firms that filed for IPOs on NYSE and NASDAQ. The table demon-
strates that firms constrain debt issuance substantially, during years prior to becoming public,
when their ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Model (1) limits the regression data
to only pre-IPO observations. Models (2) and (3) include data for both pre and post IPO years.
The dependent variable in all models is the change in debt net of equity over assets defined as
[Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]
Assetsi,t−1
. I regress the change in debt net of equity issuance on
a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), lagged dummy for ratings with minus
signs (Minusi,t−1), and interaction terms of these dummy variables with a dummy variable for
the pre-IPO years (BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗Minusi,t−1, BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗ Plusi,t−1) for models (2)
and (3). All specifications include controls for firm evolution following an IPO such as number of
years relative to an IPO, firm revenue growth, firm age and others. In addition, all specifications
include firm and industry fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: [Debti,t−Debti,t−1]−[Equityi,t−Equityi,t−1]Assetsi,t−1
(1) (2) (3)
Prior to IPO Prior and Following IPO Prior and Following IPO
Minusi,t−1 -0.215∗∗∗ 0.005 0.018
(0.076) (0.036) (0.043)
Plusi,t−1 -0.204∗∗ 0.019 0.016
(0.080) (0.040) (0.024)
BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗Minusi,t−1 -0.142∗∗ -0.146∗∗
(0.061) (0.071)
BeforeIPOi,t−1 ∗ Plusi,t−1 -0.142∗∗ -0.100∗∗
(0.056) (0.042)
BeforeIPOi,t−1 0.098∗∗ 0.072∗
(0.047) (0.040)
S&Pi,t−1 0.021 0.030∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
Leveragei,t−2 0.003 -0.014 -0.015
(0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
Profitabilityi,t−1 -1.618∗∗∗ -1.365∗∗∗ -1.335∗∗∗
(0.423) (0.180) (0.497)
RevenueGrowthi,t−1 -0.151∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.047
(0.061) (0.024) (0.065)
FirmAgei,t−1 0.037 0.038 0.0001
(0.032) (0.026) (0.0004)
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
0.009 0.109 -0.078
(0.657) (0.256) (0.369)
Y earsRelativeToIPOi,t 6.370 6.266 0.0002
(4.829) (3.891) (0.005)
N 401 1004 1004
R2 0.522 0.275 0.163
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10
Private Firms’ Investment when Credit Ratings
are on Upgrade/Downgrade Thresholds
Table 10 includes data for investment of private firms that issue
bonds to public investors. The table demonstrates that private
firms constrain investment when their ratings are on upgrade or
downgrade thresholds. Similarly to Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (1994), I define investment as Capital Expenditure
over Total Assets. I regress the change in firm investment defined
as CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1Assetsi,t−1 on a lagged dummy for
ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with
minus signs (Minusi,t−1), lagged credit rating level (Ratingi,t−1),
and a dummy for ratings outlooks (RatingOutlooki,t−1). Addi-
tional firm controls include lagged leverage, sales, and profitabil-
ity, as well as year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1Assetsi,t−1
(1) (2) (3)
Minusi,t−1 -0.0637∗∗ -0.0738∗∗ -0.0846∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0356) (0.0424)
Plusi,t−1 -0.0815∗∗ -0.0908∗∗ -0.0981∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0448) (0.0476)
Ratingi,t−1 0.0093 0.0056
(0.0078) (0.0088)
RatingOutlooki,t−1 0.0843 0.0748
(0.0790) (0.0776)
Leveragei,t−1 0.1300 0.0941
(0.0907) (0.0900)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0191 -0.0129
(0.0154) (0.0161)
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.1850 -0.2990
(0.4810) (0.3450)
Constant 0.0279 0.0990 0.1840
(0.0272) (0.1570) (0.2490)
N 561 500 500
R2 0.007 0.037 0.098
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11
Public and Private Firms’ Investments when Credit Ratings
are on Upgrade/Downgrade Thresholds
Table 11 includes data for investment of public and private firms that issue bonds to pub-
lic investors. The table demonstrates that private firms constrain investment more than
public firms when their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade boundaries. Similarly to Blan-
chard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994), I define investment as capital expenditure over
total assets. In all specifications, I regress the change in firm investment, defined as
CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
on a lagged dummy for ratings with minus signs
(Minusi,t−1), a lagged dummy for ratings with plus signs (Plusi,t−1), interaction terms of a
dummy variable for private firms with plus and minus dummy variables (Minusi,t−1 ∗Privatei,
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei), lagged credit rating levels (Ratingi,t−1), and dummy for private firms
(Privatei), as well as year and industry fixed effects. In models (2) and (4), I also control
for firm leverage, sales, and profitability. Columns (3) and (4) report results for matched pri-
vate and public firms within the same industry with the closest assets, sales, and profitabil-
ity. The coefficients on interaction terms Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei, and
(Minusi,t−1&Plusi,t−1) ∗ Privatei outline the discrepancy in investment between public and
private firms when their ratings are on downgrade or upgrade thresholds. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CapitalExpenditurei,t−CapitalExpenditurei,t−1Assetsi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unmatched Firms Unmatched Firms Matched Firms Matched Firms
Minusi,t−1 0.0013 0.0021 0.0127 0.0236
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0240) (0.0295)
Plusi,t−1 0.0010 0.0028∗ -0.0048 0.0030
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0240) (0.0304)
Minusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0862∗∗ -0.0997∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0096) (0.0390) (0.0448)
Plusi,t−1 ∗ Privatei -0.0822∗∗∗ -0.0912∗∗∗ -0.0863∗∗ -0.0967∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0415) (0.0479)
Ratingi,t−1 -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0018 0.0036
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0048)
Privatei 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0365 0.0391
(0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0230) (0.0261)
Leveragei,t−1 -0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0461
(0.0023) (0.0316)
Log(Salesi,t−1) -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0134
(0.0005) (0.0108)
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.0488∗∗∗ -0.1190
(0.0072) (0.1170)
N 35631 20635 1330 1124
R2 0.011 0.016 0.040 0.047
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12
Leverage for Private and Public Firms
Prior and Following Access to Public Debt Market
Table 12 includes data for matched private and public firms within the same
industry, by assets, sales and profitability , during years prior and following
to first debt issuance to public investors. The table demonstrates that prior
to first access to the public debt market, private and public firms have sim-
ilar leverage levels. However, following first credit rating, private firms issue
substantially more debt as a share of assets in comparison with public firms.
The dependent variable for all specifications is leverage, defined as Debti,tAssetsi,t . I
regress leverage on a dummy variable for years following first public debt issuance
(AccessToPublicDebti,t), an interaction effect of this variable with a dummy for
private firms [(AccessToPublicDebti,t) ∗ Privatei], a dummy for private firms
[Privatei], and lagged controls for profitability, log of sales, debt over earnings,
and year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(AccessToPublicDebti,t) ∗ Privatei 0.0973∗∗∗ 0.1000∗∗∗ 0.1130∗∗∗ 0.1060∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0373) (0.0235) (0.0244)
AccessToPublicDebti,t 0.1130∗∗∗ 0.1420∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0273) (0.0163) (0.0195)
Privatet 0.0451 0.0303 -0.1560∗∗∗ -0.1710∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0521) (0.0524)
Profitabilityi,t 0.1772 -0.4390∗∗∗ -0.4380∗∗∗
(0.1382) (0.1211) (0.1210)
Log(Salesi,t) -0.0547∗∗∗ -0.0097 -0.0071
(0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0128)
Debti,t−1
EBITDAi,t−1
-0.0574 0.0182 0.0134
(0.1180) (0.0657) (0.0650)
N 676 672 672 672
R2 0.089 0.146 0.784 0.801
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
62
1.10 APPENDIX C: THEORETICAL MODEL
I develop a Bayesian updating model with normally distributed priors to demon-
strate that private firms distort their debt issuance more than public firms when
their ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds in-order to send a favorable
signal to the rating agencies by constraining debt issuance. Figure 8 depicts the
average change in debt issuance for private and public firms by rating sign. When
ratings do not have positive or negative signs, firms’ decisions of debt issuance are
not driven by concerns of signaling their credit worthiness to the rating agencies.
Thus, public and private firms choose their debt issuance optimally when their
ratings are not on upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
Figure 8
Debt Distortion for Private and Public Firms
Myers’ and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory suggests that the cost of
financing increases with asymmetric information. Consequently, private firms will
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have larger discrepancy between the cost of debt and equity and therefore will
issue more debt as a share of assets than public firms when signaling concerns are
not prevalent. This explains why the change in debt issuance is larger for private
firms than for public firms when credit ratings do not have a plus or minus sign (as
described in figure 8). Figure 8 also demonstrates empirically that private firms
distort their debt issuance substantially more than public firms when their ratings
are on the boundaries. The model below provides theoretical foundation for that
empirical result.
Private and public firms send a creditworthiness signal (SCR) to the rating
agencies by distorting debt issuance (x) when their ratings have a plus or minus
signs. Kisgen (2006) demonstrates that firms constrain debt issuance when their
ratings are on the boundaries since investors respond strongly to rating downgrades
or upgrades that yield a new rating of a different letter group. Consistently, firms
choose their debt issuance optimally without signaling concerns when their ratings
do not have plus or minus signs, as they are not as concerned about upgrades or
downgrades.
However, when ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds, firms send signal
SCR = C
∗+ξCR+x to the rating agencies. The signal consists of steady-state firm
riskiness of default (C∗), error term of firm riskiness of default (ξCR), and debt
issuance distortion (x) that firms adjust to boost cash flow to equity holders and
thus send a favorable signal to the CRAs when their ratings have plus or minus
signs. Thus, the distortion of debt issuance (x) represents to what extent firms
constrain their debt issuance to send signals to the rating agencies. The credit
rating agencies in-turn, adjust the creditworthiness signal with their expected
firm debt issuance distortion in equilibrium (x̂). Thus, the unbiased signal that
the CRAs perceive is ŜCR = SCR − x̂.
Further, credit rating agencies that assign ratings to private firms, adjust their
beliefs about firm riskiness using Bayesian updating given the unbiased signal
from private firms (ŜCR), and then issue their ratings CRPrivate = E[C∗|ŜCR].
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Similarly, rating agencies that assign ratings to public firms, adjust their beliefs
given unbiased signals from public firms (ŜCR), but they also observe equity in-
formation S1 = S∗ + ξS1 . This information consists of share steady-state value
(S∗) and equity price error term (ξS1). Then, rating agencies update their beliefs
and issue their credit ratings to public firms given the aforementioned information
CRPublic = E[C
∗|ŜCR, S1]. Thus, the equations for share price and firms’ signals
to rating agencies can be summarized in equations 9-11.
S1 = S
∗ + ξS1 (9)
SCR = C
∗ + ξCR + x (10)
ŜCR = C
∗ + ξCR + x− x̂ = SCR − x̂ (11)
I am assuming that S∗, C∗, ξCR, ξS1 are normally distributed with mean µ = 0
and positive variance. I am allowing for non zero covariance between S∗ and C∗
(σSC 6= 0). The assumptions are summarized in equations 12-14.
S∗
C∗
 ∼ N

0
0
 ,
 σ2S σSC
σSC σ
2
C

 (12)
ξCR ∼ N
[
0 σ2ξCR
]
(13)
ξS1 ∼ N
[
0 σ2εS1
]
(14)
In equation 15, I outline a Bayesian updating model to show how credit rating
agencies update their beliefs given signals from private firms, and subsequently as-
sign credit ratings to private firms. Similarly, in equation 16, I describe a Bayesian
updating model for how the rating agencies that assign ratings to public firms up-
date their beliefs given creditworthiness signals that they receive from those firms
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as well as stock price information.
CRPrivate = E[C
∗|ŜCR] = σ
2
C
σ2C + σ
2
ξCR
ŜCR =
σ2C
σ2C + σ
2
ξCR
(SCR − x̂) (15)
CRPublic = E[C
∗|ŜCR, S1] = β1ŜCR + β2S1 (16)
Next, investors in private firms update their beliefs about the creditworthiness
of private firms given credit ratings assigned by the rating agencies (equation 17).
Consistently, investors in public firms update their beliefs about the riskiness of
public firms given credit ratings and equity information (equation 18).
E[C∗|CRPrivate] = E[C∗| σ
2
C
σ2C + σ
2
ξCR
ŜCR] = E[C
∗|ŜCR] = σ
2
C
σ2C + σ
2
ξCR
ŜCR = α
PrivateŜCR
(17)
E[C∗|CRPublic, S1] = E[C∗|β1ŜCR+β2S1, S1] = E[C∗|ŜCR, S1] = αPublic1 ŜCR+αPublic2 S1
(18)
Subsequently, I demonstrate that investors respond more to signals from pri-
vate firms than to signal from public firms by showing that the coefficient on ŜCR
is larger for private firms (i.e αPrivate > αPublic1 ). I solve directly for the coefficient
on ŜCR for private firms in equations 17 to get that αPrivate =
σ2C
σ2C+σ
2
ξCR
. However,
to get αPublic1 , I solve the following multivariate normal model with conditional
distribution;
[X1|X2 = a] ∼ N
[
µ Σ
]
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µ = µ1 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (a− µ2) = Σ12Σ−122 a

C∗
SCR
S1
 ∼ N


0
0
0
 ,

σ2C σ
2
C σSC
σ2C σ
2
C + σ
2
ξCR
σSC
σSC σSC σ
2
S + σ
2
εS1



C∗
SCR
S1
 ∼ N


0
0
0
 ,

Z Z E
Z A E
E E B


Σ22 =
A E
E B

Σ12 =
[
Z E
]
a =
SCR
S1

∣∣∣∣Σ22∣∣∣∣ = AB − E2
Σ−122 =
1
AB − E2
 B −E
−E A

Σ12Σ
−1
22 a =
1
AB − E2
[
Z E
] B −E
−E A

SCR
S1

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αPublic1 =
ZB − E2
AB − E2
Since
αPrivate =
σ2C
σ2C + σ
2
ξCR
=
Z
A
>
ZB − E2
AB − E2 = α
Public
1
Thus
αPrivate > αPublic1
This implies that investors are more responsive to debt distortion signals from
private firms than from public firms. Next, I define profit functions for public
and private firms (respectively) as piPublic = R(E[C∗|CRPublic, S1]) − C(x) and
piPrivate = R(E[C∗|CRPrivate])−C(x). Firm cost (C(x)) is a convex function with
respect to debt distortion (x). Thus, the profit functions for public and private
firms can be written as
piPublic = R(E[C∗|CRPublic, S1])− C(x) = R(αPublic1 ŜCR + αPublic2 S1)− C(x)
= R(αPublic1 (C
∗ + ξCR + x− x̂) + αPublic2 S1)− C(x)
piPrivate = R(E[C∗|CRPrivate])− C(x) = R(αPrivateŜCR)− C(x)
= R(αPrivate(C∗ + ξCR + x− x̂))− C(x)
First order conditions with respect to debt issuance distortion (x):
dpiPublic
dx
= R′(E[C∗|CRPublic, S1])αPublic1 − C ′(xPublic) = 0 (19)
αPublic1 =
C ′(xPublic)
R′(E[C∗|CRPublic, S1] (20)
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dpiPrivate
dx
= R′(E[C∗|CRPrivate])αPrivate − C ′(xPrivate) = 0 (21)
αPrivate =
C ′(xPrivate)
R′(E[C∗|CRPrivate]) (22)
Assuming that the increase in revenue is larger for private than public firms
as a result of them adjusting their debt issuance to send a favorable signal to the
rating agencies, it follows that
R′(E[C∗|CRPrivate]) > R′(E[C∗|CRPublic, S1]) (23)
Since
αPrivate > αPublic1
Then
C ′(xPrivate) > C ′(xPublic)
Since C(x) is a convex function
C ′(xPrivate) > C ′(xPublic)⇒ xPrivate > xPublic
Therefore, private firms constrain debt issuance more than public firms when
their ratings have plus or minus signs relative to their optimal debt issuance when
their credit ratings are not on upgrade or downgrade thresholds.
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2.0 CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ON
MORTGAGE SERVICER COMPENSATION
(with Michael Connolly)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore a new channel through which asymmetric informa-
tion affects mortgage outcomes. We focus on the principal-agent problem arising
between sellers and servicers of Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities (MBS).21
Under full information, mortgages for which the seller and servicer are the same
institution should perform identically to those for which the seller and servicer are
different institutions. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, sellers
possess more information about the underlying quality of mortgages in the MBS
pool than servicers do, resulting in better performance for same seller/servicer
loans relative to different seller/servicer loans.22 Exploiting unique institutional
features of the Fannie Mae MBS market, we show that the decision of sellers to
retain mortgage servicing rights (MSR) at the point of security issuance, our proxy
for asymmetric information, corresponds with lower rates of default, foreclosure,
and loss severity, but not with lower servicer compensation.
Among the many explanations put forth to explain the recent financial cri-
sis, much attention in the academic literature has been devoted to the transition
from an originate-to-hold to an originate-to-distribute model of mortgage lending
in the U.S. The argument pervading much of this literature is that securitization
21Sellers are the institutions that “sell” pools of mortgages to Fannie Mae in exchange for
mortgage-backed securities or cash. Servicers are the institutions that administer the loans, for
example by collecting monthly mortgage payments, managing the relationship with mortgagors,
and remitting payments to the trust (Fannie Mae) in exchange for servicing fees.
22The existing literature has documented that mortgages in which originators and servicers are
affiliated are less likely to default, are priced at lower yields, and are more likely to be modified
conditional on default (Demiroglu and James (2012); Conklin, Diop and D’Lima (2016); Le
(2016)).
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led to a misalignment of incentives between different parties in the securitization
process.23 New means of securitization created distance between many parties in-
volved in originating, servicing, and holding mortgage loans. In contrast to much
of the literature on loan sales, which test for asymmetric information in private-
label MBS, we focus on the market for Fannie Mae-insured MBS. A distinguishing
feature of these data is that the credit risk on the pool of loans is insured by Fannie
Mae, precluding concerns that the servicing retention decision is in fact driven by
the decision to retain the MBS itself.
The institutional setting that we consider affords a clean test of asymmetric
information between sellers and servicers. On the one hand, there are a num-
ber of reasons why asymmetric information should not be a major factor among
Fannie Mae-insured mortgages. Inclusion in Fannie Mae MBS pools is subject
to strict underwriting standards and buyback provisions. The mortgages that we
study in this paper are full-documentation and are originated based on “hard”
information. Additionally, sellers and servicers are generally large, experienced
financial institutions that are actively monitored by Fannie Mae. On the other
hand, if sellers possess private information unobservable to servicers, then loans in
which the seller and servicer are affiliated should out-perform loans in which they
are not, conditional on risk characteristics. Furthermore, since non-performing
loans are more costly to service than performing loans, we would expect that any
differences in risk should be accounted for in servicing fees at the point of MBS
issuance. Thus, we structure our empirical analysis around testing for the pres-
ence of asymmetric information in the Fannie Mae MBS market and whether this
asymmetric information is factored into mortgage servicer compensation.
Using a dataset of conforming, 30-year, fixed-rate, fully-amortizing, single-
family mortgages insured by Fannie Mae, we first find that same seller/servicer
mortgages are significantly less likely to default and foreclose ex-post than dif-
23A non-exhaustive list of papers in this literature include: Mian and Sufi (2009); Berndt and
Gupta (2009); Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010); Purnanandam (2011).
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ferent seller/servicer mortgages, conditional on observable risk characteristics. In
particular, same seller/servicer loans are approximately 1.3 percentage points less
likely to default than different seller/servicer loans. Evaluated at mean default
rates in the sample, this corresponds with a 16 percentage point difference. We
also find that seller/servicer loans are approximately 0.2 percentage points less
likely to foreclose than different seller/servicer loans, which is an 8 percentage
point difference when evaluated at the mean foreclosure rate. Conditional on fore-
closure and risk characteristics, Fannie Mae loses approximately $3000 more on
different seller/servicer loans relative to same seller/servicer loans, or 4.5% of the
mean loss on foreclosed loans. When evaluated at the total number of different
seller/servicer loans in our sample, this corresponds with an approximate $571
million loss to Fannie Mae, or 2% of the total loss on single-family loans in our
sample. These differences in default and foreclosure rates are not driven by loans
in which the seller is also the originator. This result suggests that the source
of asymmetric information in same seller/servicer loans is not exclusively due to
superior information from the originator.
Having established that same and different seller/servicer loans exhibit differ-
ent risk profiles, we then ask whether this risk is priced in servicing contracts
at the point of MBS issuance. Theory offers the implication that servicing fees
should be an increasing function of default risk, as it is significantly more expen-
sive to service non-performing loans than performing loans. This is due, among
other factors, to a high labor cost of default management. Using a security-level
dataset of 30-year, fixed-rate Fannie Mae MBS, we find no statistically signifi-
cant difference in servicing fees for same seller/servicer pools relative to different
seller/servicer pools. While asymmetric information between sellers and servicers
of Fannie Mae MBS is not priced in servicing fees cross-sectionally, we exploit a
quasi-experiment which altered the incentive to retain MSR. In December 2011,
the FHFA implemented a policy whereby the guarantee fee charged between large
and small sellers of Fannie Mae MBS shrank. This changed the incentive for small
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sellers to retain MSR relative to large sellers. In fact, we show that servicing fees
for large sellers decline relatively more than for small sellers following the regu-
lation. We conclude that the composition of same seller/servicer pools changed,
which resulted in different pricing between large and small sellers following the
policy change.
In Section 2 we describe the institutional background and the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the theory and testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes
the two main datasets used in our analysis. Section 5 introduces the empirical
models and presents results. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 BACKGROUND
2.2.1 Institutional Details
The securitization of Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities (MBS) begins with
the sale of pools of mortgages by financial institutions. These mortgages are orig-
inated by lenders, either underwriters themselves or third-party brokers, and are
sold to Fannie Mae via a designated financial institution that meets certain re-
quirements as a seller. Strict credit quality guidelines ensure that only conforming
mortgages are eligible to be acquired by Fannie Mae. These loans are either pur-
chased from the seller outright for cash, or they are securitized and exchanged for
MBS. Fannie Mae assumes the credit risk (the timely payment of principal and
interest to the investor) on the pool of mortgages in exchange for a guarantee fee.
The seller has the option then to either hold the MBS or sell it into the secondary
market. They also retain the right to service the asset or sell MSR to a third
party. We study the choice by sellers to retain MSR on some Fannie Mae MBS as
apposed to other MBS securities on which MSR are not retained.
Figure 9 displays the process of securitization of a mortgage into an MBS pool
and the subsequent exchange of payments and fees by different parties.24 The
key assumption in this figure is that the seller, servicer, and investor are different
institutions. First, a mortgage is originated (step 1), packaged and sold in a pool
of loans by a seller to Fannie Mae (step 2), and exchanged for MBS (step 3).
The seller then sells the MBS into the secondary market (step 4) and designates
a different servicer on the pool (step 5) through the sale of MSR. At the begin-
ning of each month, the mortgagor pays a fixed monthly payment of principal and
interest to the servicer (step 6), which is then remitted to the trust at the end
of the month in exchange for a servicing fee (step 7). Servicers must meet and
abide by guidelines established by Fannie Mae, who serves also as master servicer
24Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide an excellent overview of the major frictions in the
sub-prime MBS market. We adapt their discussion to the particulars of the Fannie Mae MBS
market.
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of the MBS trust (step 8). Finally, Fannie Mae disburses payments to investors
in exchange for a fee that assumes credit risk on the pool of mortgages (step 9).
In figure 10, we present a scenario in which the seller and servicer of the mort-
gage are the same institution, but the investor is a separate entity. In this case,
much of the securitization process is consolidated. The trading desk of a financial
institution exchanges the pool of mortgages for MBS (steps 2 and 3), then places
the pool of MBS onto the secondary market for sale to investors (step 4). The
servicing arm of that same institution handles the full servicing of the mortgages
(steps 5 through 8). For our purposes, whether the seller retains the MBS is not
a first-order concern, as Fannie Mae insures the credit risk on the underlying pool
of mortgages in the MBS.
The primary difference between same and different seller/servicer mortgages
is the consolidation of steps in the securitization process. Our focus in this paper
is the adverse selection problem between sellers and servicers (step 5 in figure 9).
Sellers possess private unobserved information about the quality of the pool of
mortgages relative to servicers. Thus, we would expect sellers to either screen
loans more aggressively for which they subsequently plan to hold the servicing
rights, or to cherry-pick those of highest quality to service25. Note that in this
figure we abstract from the channel of origination. In the case where the origina-
tor, seller, and servicer are the same institution, we would expect that asymmetric
information is likely to be greatest.
A number of factors likely mitigate the magnitude of this adverse selection
problem. First, Fannie Mae implements strict underwriting standards and credit
quality guidelines in its issuance of MBS. Sellers are subject to buyback provisions
in the event that the borrower defaults in the first few months of a mortgage. They
also pay a fee for the right to sell mortgages to MBS, and thus are able to perform a
critical function of liquidity transformation relatively cheaply. Being unable to do
25Demiroglu and James (2012) find that the former reason explains much of the difference in
default rates of private-label MBS
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so would risk reputational and monetary loss for the seller. Taken together, these
facts suggest that the institutional structure is in place to minimize the likelihood
that asymmetric information should be sufficiently large to generate differences in
performance.26
2.2.2 Literature Review
Our paper relates to a broad literature on securitization and mortgage outcomes,
including default rates and loan performance27, modification and foreclosure28,
and pricing29. Our paper also contributes to the literature studying the effect
of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) on mortgage outcomes (Adelino,
Frame, and Gerardi (2017)). Relative to these papers, we focus our analysis on
mortgages that are securitized in Fannie Mae MBS pools. As such, we exploit
variation within securitized pools of mortgages, which helps study information
frictions not arising necessarily from observable risk characteristics.
Recent work has explored the relationship between originator-servicer affilia-
tion and mortgage performance. Demiroglu and James (2012) show that originator-
sponsor and originator-servicer affiliation in private-label MBS deals results in
significantly lower deal default rates. They interpret their result as evidence that
having “skin in the game” increases loan screening incentives of originators, how-
26Another major friction is the moral hazard problem between the servicer, who exhibits
unobserved risky effort that can adversely affect the distribution of cash flows to the trust and to
the investor. Fannie Mae can somewhat reduce this friction through monitoring (step 8 in figure
9) by implementing procedures for servicers to follow regarding default management. There is
also moral hazard between the mortgagor and the servicer (step 6 in figure 9) regarding the right
to strategically default on a mortgage. This friction would likely be mitigated by originators
that have an incentive to maintain a relationship with the borrower. We do not observe if the
mortgagor has a pre-existing relationship with the originator/seller, and thus cannot rule out
the explanation for retention of MSR based on relationship lending.
27Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009, 2010); Purnanandam (2011); Demiroglu and James
(2012); Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012); Nadauld and Sherlund (2013); Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil
(2014); Bubb and Kaufman (2014); Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2015); Begley and Purnanandam
(2017)
28Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, and Evanoff (2011); Agarwal, Amromin,
Ben-David, and Dinc (2012); Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2013, 2014); Kruger (2016); Rat-
nadiwakara (2016); Reid, Urban, and Collins (Forthcoming); Kuong and Zeng (2015)
29Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010); He, Qian, and Strahan (2012)
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ever this should matter only among deals where “soft” information would matter
most. In fact, they find that both measures of affiliation are positively related to
performance only among low-documentation deals. They also find that this result
is not driven by cherry-picking. They compare unaffiliated loans originated and
not retained by sponsors with those originated by mortgage brokers, and find no
difference in default rates between the two sets of loans. Finally, they show that as
the share of loans in a deal serviced by the originator increases, the average yield
spread on the MBS falls, but only among low-documentation deals. Essentially,
market prices somewhat reflect the difference in risk between affiliated and un-
affiliated deals. He, Qian, and Strahan (2012) document that originator-servicer
affiliation is correlated with higher yields on AAA tranches of MBS deals, but
lower yields on non-AAA tranches. Conklin, Diop and D’Lima (2016) show that
originator-servicer affiliation affects mortgage modifications, conditional on a loan
being in serious default. This relationship holds even among loans originated based
on “hard” information. They also find that re-default rates of originator-servicer
loans are lower following modification. In a related paper, Le (2016) also finds
lower likelihood of re-default.
Our study contributes to the existing literature on affiliation in a number of im-
portant dimensions. First, we add to the literature relating affiliation and ex-ante
pricing by focusing on mortgage servicer compensation, instead of MBS yields.
This is an important distinction since servicing fees directly affect the incentive
to foreclose on defaulting loans. Second, we relate affiliation with likelihood of
foreclosure. Third, in contrast to much of the prior literature, we focus on the
Fannie Mae MBS market. Doing so allows us to study the asymmetric informa-
tion problem among high-documentation loans. Furthermore, we can approximate
excess servicing fees based on the institutional features of this market. Finally,
we explore how guarantee fee bargaining power can affect the composition and
servicing fees of same seller/servicer MBS deals.
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2.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we briefly discuss the underlying theory and develop hypothe-
ses for our empirical tests. Levitin and Twomey (2011) show that retention of
mortgage servicing rights can be profitable for mortgage servicers as long as the
likelihood of default on the serviced loans is low. For performing loans, servicers
have developed highly efficient, low-cost payment processing systems, which fa-
cilitate processing mortgage payment transactions on a large scale. However,
servicing can be costly for non-performing loans since servicers face high labor
costs associated with default management, as well as escalating costs associated
with mortgages in foreclose.
Sellers of mortgage-backed securities specializing in transactions processing re-
tain servicing rights on loans where the probability of default is low since servicing
non-performing mortgages can be four to five times more expensive than servicing
performing loans (Levitin and Twomey (2011)). Two theories have been put forth
in the literature to justify the reason that sellers retain low-risk mortgages at the
point of MBS issuance. First, among originated loans, they choose to retain ser-
vicing rights on loans where they expect the lowest likelihood of default, a practice
called “cherry picking.” The assumption underlying this theory is that the seller
possesses unobserved private information about asset quality which the servicer
does not account for in pricing servicing rights. Alternatively, sellers that also orig-
inate mortgages underlying MBS pools can choose to actively screen loans more
carefully and retain servicing rights on loans with lower likelihood of default.30
The decision to retain servicing rights on MBS proxies for asymmetric infor-
mation between sellers and servicers. There are a number of reasons why sellers
are at an informational advantage regarding borrower and loan quality relative to
servicers. First, sellers often originate the mortgages which they include in MBS
30Demiroglu and James (2012), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), and Purnanandam
(2011) provide evidence that screening incentives affected loan performance during the financial
crisis.
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pools. As a result, they can extract “soft” information about borrower and loan
riskiness. Second, even if sellers acquire mortgages from different originating in-
stitutions, they often have long-standing relationships with the originators which
allow them to learn about borrower quality. Lastly, sellers are often large financial
institutions that have sophisticated models which allow them to assess the risk
profile of loans and borrowers. This is particularly true of many large sellers in
the Fannie Mae MBS market, which serve as aggregators of loans originated by
smaller institutions.
The institutional setting that we consider affords a clean test of asymmetric
information between sellers and servicers. While the literature has found some ev-
idence of information frictions in the agency MBS market (Downing, Jaffee, and
Wallace (2009)), we exclusively utilize dataset of conforming, 30-year, fixed-rate,
single-family mortgages insured by Fannie Mae. There are a number of reasons
why we would expect that asymmetric information about borrower quality should
not matter for these data. First, all of the mortgages that we study are full-
documentation loans, which subsequently are securitized as Fannie Mae MBS, one
of the most liquid mortgage products in the world. Demiroglu and James (2012) ar-
gue that “soft” information should be less important for full-documentation deals,
and thus differences in borrower quality should not be large enough to generate
differences in loan performance, which they show for private-label MBS. Second,
it is not necessarily clear ex-ante that the acquiring servicer is at an informational
disadvantage relative to the seller. In fact, in our dataset, the servicers that pur-
chase MSR on the secondary market are large financial institutions, with years of
experience servicing Fannie Mae mortgages. Third, Fannie Mae has strict under-
writing standards governing the types of loans that can be sold and securitized
in a pool. This includes buy-back provisions in the case of fraud or early delin-
quency. In fact the market for Fannie Mae MBS is liquid enough to be traded
too-be-announced (TBA) as a way of providing liquidity to originators. Fourth,
sellers of Fannie Mae MBS face both reputational risk, for originating loans of du-
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bious quality, and warehousing risk, for being stuck with loans that do not meet
underwriting standards. Finally, since Fannie Mae is the master servicer on all
of its MBS products, they actively monitor servicer performance. This includes
the possiblity of removing MSR from under-performing servicers. With this back-
ground, we would expect that differences in borrower quality should be relatively
minor across same and different seller/servicer loans.
In our first set of tests we evaluate whether retention of servicing rights is re-
lated to subsequent mortgage performance using loan-level data. Under the null
hypothesis of full information, we would expect that mortgage default rates for
same seller/servicer loans are the same as for different seller/servicer loans (H1).
Under asymmetric information, sellers have the incentive to retain servicing rights
on higher-quality loans to avoid default management labor costs associated with
poor performance. We also test if same seller/servicer loans are equally likely
to enter foreclosure as different seller/servicer loans (H2). If the servicer is the
same institution as the seller at the point of foreclosure, and the servicer possesses
private information about borrower quality, then we would expect that the ser-
vicer would be less likely to foreclose. Lastly, we test whether the loss incurred by
Fannie Mae on foreclosed properties is equal for same seller/servicer and different
seller/servicer loans (H3).
In our second set of tests we evaluate if retention of servicing rights is priced
in mortgage servicing fees. We test whether differences in risk profiles between
same and different seller/servicer mortgages are factored in to servicer compen-
sation due to higher expected default risk. Formally, we test the null hypothesis
under full information that same seller/servicer MBS pools have identical excess
servicing fees as different seller/servicer MBS pools (H4).
In our last set of tests, we exploit a quasi-experiment in order to identify
whether servicing fees differ between same and different seller/servicer loans. Fan-
nie Mae announced guidelines in December 2011 that set guarantee fees for the
smallest volume sellers of MBS closer to those of the largest sellers in order to elim-
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inate price advantages for the latter group.31 Prior to this regulatory change, a
common practice in the Fannie Mae MBS market, known as aggregation, resulted
in small sellers frequently selling mortgages to large sellers without the option to
retain servicing rights, in part due to the higher guarantee fees charged to small
sellers. This change in regulation made it more cost effective for small sellers to
retain servicing rights on more of their high-quality loans. Thus, we test the null
hypothesis that same seller/servicer MBS pools had identical excess servicing fees
for pools sold by small and large sellers following the Fannie Mae 2012 change
in guarantee fees (H5). We hypothesize that one consequence of this change in
regulation is that the riskiness of MBS pools sold by small and large sellers also
changed. In particular, given the cost advantage of a narrowing gap in guarantee
fees, small sellers had a greater incentive to retain servicing rights on riskier loans
than before, while large sellers had a greater incentive to retain servicing rights
on less risky loans.
2.4 DATA
For loan-level analysis we use the Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance
dataset. These data include both origination characteristics and performance of
30-year, single-family, conforming, fully-amortizing, full-documentation fixed-rate
mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae between January 2002 and December 2015.
Origination characteristics include the name of the seller of the mortgage to Fan-
nie Mae and the channel by which the loan was originated (retail, broker, corre-
31As mentioned in the institutional background, guarantee fees are paid to Fannie Mae in
exchange for insuring ultimate payment principal and interest of each mortgage. Starting from
2012, guarantee fees paid by the largest sellers increased 9 basis points to 34 basis points, while
fees paid by the smallest sellers increased 7 basis points to 40 basis points (Federal Housing
Finance Agency (2013)). The report suggests that the difference between the average guarantee
fees paid by lenders in the extra-small-volume and the extra-large-volume groups declined by 2
basis points. In fact, over subsequent years, the gap between the largest and smallest sellers of
Fannie Mae MBS narrowed due to the convergence of guarantee fees.
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spondent). Borrower characteristics include the primary borrower’s credit score,
the number of borrowers, an indicator for first-time homebuyers, the purpose of
the loan, the type of property, the number of units, occupancy status, the prop-
erty state, the first three digits of the zip code of the property’s location, and for
certain mortgages, the percentage of insurance defined under the master primary
insurance policy. Loan characteristics include the original interest rate, original
unpaid principal balance, term of the loan, loan-to-value ratio, combined loan-to-
value ratio (includes additional liens), debt-to-income ratio, origination date, and
first payment date.
The performance file includes the reporting month from the time of acquisition
by Fannie Mae to the termination of the loan and the name of the servicer in a
given month. Current loan characteristics include the interest rate, unpaid prin-
cipal balance, age, months to legal maturity, adjusted months to legal maturity
(adjusted for delinquency), and the maturity date. The file also includes informa-
tion on the number of months in delinquency, an indicator for whether or not the
loan was modified, the reason and date for which the loan has zero balance, and
detailed information on foreclosure costs.
From the data we identify loans for which the seller of the mortgage to Fannie
Mae and the servicer of the loan in the first available month are the same institu-
tion. Fannie Mae restricts the release of information on seller and servicer identity
to only those with greater than 1% unpaid principal balance in a given quarter.
Loans not satisfying this criterion are denoted “OTHER” in the dataset. As a
result, we can only identify loans with either both names available at the time of
acquisition by Fannie Mae, or those loans with one name identified (for example
if the seller is unidentified as “OTHER” but the servicer is “Bank of America”)32.
Table 13 lists the number of loans dropped by each criterion in the data screen-
32Our exclusion procedure is fairly conservative. We exclude loans that we suspect are same
seller/servicer loans, but cannot definitively identify the identity of one party. Included in that
case, we exclude loans from sellers that we know had the capability to service, but due to size
restrictions do not appear in the data.
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ing process. We first restrict the sample to all loans originated after 200233. We
drop missing data from our key variables of interest and loans in which we cannot
definitively identify if the seller and servicer are the same institution.
In the loan-level analysis, we focus on two main outcomes of interest: default
and foreclosure. Figures 11 and 12 show that default rates (90+ days delinquent)
and foreclosure rates for same seller/servicer mortgages are lower than those on dif-
ferent seller/servicer mortgages.34 Figure 13 shows that loan severity (the amount
paid out to investors minus proceeds to Fannie Mae from foreclosure sale) is higher
for different seller/servicer loans. All figures capture the general trend that de-
fault, foreclosure, and severity increased among loans originated during the hous-
ing boom. While these patterns are suggestive of potential differences between the
two sets of mortgages, they could be driven by underlying risk characteristics. In
particular, it could be that different seller/servicer loans are more likely to default
and be foreclosed upon mainly because they are riskier.
Table 14 provides summary statistics for the sample of loans in our dataset.
The two sets of loans differ in a statistically significant way on observable charac-
teristics. Thus, any difference in performance might be driven by risk characteris-
tics that are unobservable to the econometrician. Given the significant difference
in borrower quality on observable characteristics, we control for a large range of
borrower and loan characteristics in all regressions. In our regression specification,
we make the identifying assumption that our set of borrower- and loan-specific con-
trol variables fully account for differences in risk characteristics, which we think
is a reasonable assumption since we observe most of the characteristics that in-
vestors do. We then attribute any difference in performance due to differences in
borrower quality observed by the seller, but not by the servicer, at the point of
issuance of the MBS.
The other main dataset that we utilize in our analysis is monthly pool-level
33We have this restriction due to lack of servicer names before December 2001.
34Note that we calculate seller/servicer status as of the last observed date.
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data on conventional long-term, single-family MBS generally maturing or due in
30 years or less, downloaded using the Fannie Mae PoolTalk R©portal for securities
issued between 2003 and 2015. We select these data in order to map most closely
with the loan-level performance data.35 For each security, we observe informa-
tion on the pool (CUSIP number, pool/trust number, issue and maturity dates,
the original security balance), as well as issuance statistics reflecting the risk of
mortgages underlying the pool (the quartile distribution of loan size, coupon rates,
LTV ratios, credit scores, loan terms, loan age, year of origination, state of origina-
tion, identities of sellers and servicers, loan purpose, property type, and occupancy
type). Importantly, we observe the weighted average coupon rate and the weighted
average pass-through rate on the security, the difference of which we use as a proxy
for excess servicing fees.
Table 15 provides mean pool-level statistics. Overall, same seller/servicer se-
curities have both lower weighted average interest rates and pass-through rates,
smaller average loan size, but larger initial security balance. This is likely due to
there being more loans in same seller/servicer pools overall. In terms of risk char-
acteristics, same seller/servicer securities have higher average credit scores, but
also higher LTV ratios. Thus, different seller/servicer pools look riskier on most
observable dimensions. For all variables the difference is statistically different from
zero, so we include them as controls in all pool-level regressions.
35We are unable to definitively match loan-level and pool-level data, although based on fea-
tures of each dataset they are generated from similar underlying data.
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2.5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
2.5.1 Model
We estimate the relationship between seller/servicer affiliation and performance
of Fannie Mae mortgages. In our main loan-level regressions, we estimate the
following linear model (i indexes loan)36:
Outcomei = α + βSi + γXi + i (24)
where Outcomei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan defaulted (foreclosed),
0 if not, Si equals 1 if the loan is a same seller/servicer loan at the point of acqui-
sition by Fannie Mae for the default regressions (at the last observed date for the
foreclosure regressions), 0 if it is a different seller/servicer loan, and Xi are a set
of loan and borrower characteristics. We also estimate a specification where loan
severity, the net loss to Fannie Mae on foreclosed properties, is included as an out-
come variable. We test the null hypotheses that default (H1) and foreclosure (H2)
probabilities, and loan severity (H3) between same and different seller/servicer
loans are identical (β = 0), conditional on risk characteristics.
Our main identifying assumption in estimating β is that we properly account
for the information set of acquiring servicers at the time of transfer of MSR for
the default regressions, and the last observed date for the foreclosure regressions.
Fannie Mae provisions require that sellers provide servicers acquiring MSR with
sufficient files and records regarding the mortgage loan37. In our regressions, we
control for the full set of information provided by the Fannie Mae Single-Family
Loan Performance database, including both origination and performance charac-
36Our results are robust to estimating the model via probit. We choose the linear probability
model specification for computational ease.
37Section A2-5.1-02 of the Fannie Mae servicing guide states that: “If the seller/servicer does
not service the mortgage loan, it must transfer the files and records to the servicer to ensure that
the servicer will have complete information about the mortgage loan in its records.” Included in
the mortgage loan file are the mortgage or deed of trust, underwriting documents, and insurance
policy information, among other documents.
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teristics. We notably do not observe borrower income at origination, but we do
utilize a number of variables that proxy, at least in part, for income. However,
we recognize that, conditional on controlling for risk characteristics at origination,
sellers might have based their decision to retain MSR on some borrower char-
acteristic unobservable to the econometrician and acquiring servicer. We would
expect that such an omitted factor would likely be positively correlated with the
MSR retention decision, but negatively correlated with default probability, and
thus bias downward our estimate of β. We acknowledge that this is certainly a
concern for our estimation. However such a factor would have to matter system-
atically enough to bias our estimates conditional on controlling for the full set of
observable characteristics and the Fannie Mae institutional setting.
In our second set of regressions, we determine whether mortgage servicer com-
pensation reflects differences in risk between same/seller servicer and different
seller/servicer loans. To answer this question, we first develop a proxy of excess
servicing fees38, which represent the compensation for risk that servicers expect
for loans with higher default risk. Using an identity that is true of all Fannie Mae
MBS, we calculate excess servicing fees as the difference between the weighted
average coupon rate and the MBS pass-through rate, the guarantee fee, and the
baseline servicing fee.39
Weighted Average Coupon Rate− Pool Level Pass-Through Rate =
Guarantee Fee + Baseline Servicing Fee + Excess Servicing Fee
(25)
In the MBS data we observe the pass-through rate and weighted average in-
terest rates. Guarantee fees are determined by negotiations between sellers and
Fannie Mae each year and are adjusted for each loan pool as a function of ob-
servable risk characteristics. Baseline servicing fees are typically constant, except
38We do not explicitly observe excess servicing fees, although we utilize a feature of the Fannie
Mae MBS market to argue that our estimates represent goods approximations of the true fees.
39While we do not observe the price at which MSR are transacted, we make the assumption
that servicing fees reflect MSR valuations at loan issuance.
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for adjustments due to observable risks. This implies that when we regress the
difference between the weighted average coupon rate and the pass-through rate on
a dummy variable for same/seller servicer loans and control for seller identity and
risk characteristics, the coefficient on the same seller/servicer dummy variable rep-
resents, to an approximation, the difference between average excess servicing fees
of same and different seller/servicer loans. In particular, our main MBS pool-level
regressions are of the following form (here i indexes MBS security):
Weighted Average Coupon Ratei − Pass-Through Ratei
= α + β1Si + γXi + i (26)
where Weighted Average Coupn Ratei equals the at-issuance average of all inter-
est rates in each MBS security (weighted by share of original unpaid balance),
Pass-Through Ratei is the rate paid to holders of the MBS security, Si is a dummy
variable for same seller/servicer loans and Xi are a set of loan and borrower char-
acteristics. We test the null hypothesis that our approximation of excess servicing
is the same between same and different seller/servicer MBS pools (H4).
In our last set of tests, we exploit a quasi-experiment announced in December
2011 which increased guarantee fees on all Fannie Mae MBS, but did so more for
large-volume sellers of MBS relative to small-volume sellers. The goal of those
guidelines was to narrow the gap between the two types of sellers in order to give
small sellers the incentive to retain servicing rights on loans which they previously
sold off to aggregators.40
We exploit this quasi-experimental setting to estimate the differential effect of
seller/servicer affiliation for small sellers relative to large on servicer compensation,
40According to an FHFA report in August 2016, the gap between the guarantee fees for large
and small sellers decreased from 6 basis points in 2011 to 3 basis points in 2015. That fall
in guarantee fees constitutes a reduction from 24% of the guarantee fees for the largest sellers
by loan volume in 2011 (those sellers pay the lowest guarantee fees) to merely 5.17% of the
guarantee fees paid by the largest sellers in 2015.
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following the regulatory change.
Weighted Average Coupon Ratei − Pass-Through Ratei
= α + β1Si + β2Posti + β3Si × Posti + γXi + i (27)
The major difference in equation (27) relative to equation (26) is the inclusion
of Posti, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MBS pool was acquired
following December 2011, and 0 otherwise.41. We test the null hypothesis (β3 = 0)
that same seller/servicer MBS had identical excess servicing fees for pools sold by
small and large sellers following the change in guarantee fees (H5).
2.5.2 Results: Loan-Level Regressions
Loan-level regression results for mortgage performance variables are given in table
16. Same seller/servicer loans are approximately 1.3 percentage points less likely
to default than different seller/servicer loans (16 percentage points less likely at
mean default rates), conditional on risk characteristics. Loans in which the seller
and servicer are affiliated at the point of foreclosure are also approximately 0.2
percentage points less likely to foreclose than different seller/servicer loans (8
percentage points less likely at mean foreclosure rates) and lose $3000 less per
foreclosed loan (4 percentage points lower loss at mean level of severity). Due
to the fact that we omit all sellers and servicers with under 1% of total unpaid
principal balance in a given quarter, we view these results as conservative esti-
mates of the true effect. Variables that proxy for higher risk, such as the interest
rate and LTV and DTI ratios, positively correlate with default, foreclosure, and
severity. Variables that proxy for lower risk, such as credit score, first-time buyers,
number of borrowers, and original unpaid principal balance, negatively correlate
with default, foreclosure, and severity. Overall, we find evidence to reject null hy-
potheses (H1), (H2), and (H3). Taken together, the evidence suggests that there
41Note that we include controls for issuance year, and so are able to identify β2
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is asymmetric information between sellers and servicers in this market.
2.5.3 Results: MBS Pool-Level Regressions
In this section we evaluate whether the difference in the risk profile between same
and different seller/servicer loans is priced in servicer compensation. Pool-level
regression results are presented in table 17. Columns 1 and 2 provide evidence
suggesting that our proxy for excess servicing fees does not differ between same
seller/servicer and different seller/servicer pools. Thus, we are unable to reject
null hypothesis (H4). The evidence suggests that sellers and servicers did not
price in the additional risk associated with loans where servicing rights are not
retained by sellers. This mispricing of servicing fees could be due to servicers not
recognizing that the asymmetric information problem was significant enough to
matter for perceptions of ex-ante default rates.42
2.5.4 Robustness: Originator/Servicer Affiliation
In table 18, we explore the source of asymmetric information by introducing a
term for same originator/seller/servicer into the baseline regressions. If there is
sufficient private information conveyed between origination and sale of the mort-
gage to Fannie Mae, we would expect this coefficient to be negative and signif-
icant. Overall, we do not find evidence to suggest that default and foreclosure
rates, and severity between same originator/seller/servicer mortgages and same
seller/servicer (different originator) mortgages differ.
42In unreported regressions, we also find limited evidence regarding the pricing or risk associ-
ated with loans where the sellers, servicers, and originators are not the same firm. While we find
that same seller/originator/servicer loans have lower excess servicing fees, the marginal impact
of an increase of an additional percent in the share of same seller-servicer loans being originated
by the same firm, leads to merely 0.02 to 0.03 basis points decrease in excess servicing fees.
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2.5.5 Robustness: Change in Guarantee Fees
We exploit a quasi-experiment to identify the effect of seller/servicer affiliation
on excess servicing fees. In table 19, we present regression results that evaluate
the impact of guidelines announced in December 2011 that increased Fannie Mae
guarantee fees by 10 basis points and narrowed the gap between guarantee fees
of large and small sellers. In all regression models in table 19, we find that the
coefficients on the dummy variable for same seller/servicer loans are statistically
insignificant. This suggests that at least prior to the implementation of FHFA
guidelines, the difference in risk between same and different seller/servicer loans
was not priced in excess servicing fees. In column 2, we find that the Fannie Mae
regulation did in fact increase our proxy for excess servicing fees for all sellers. This
is due to the fact that our proxy for excess servicing fees contains the guarantee
fees as a component, and thus when guarantee fees rise following the regulation,
mechanically the excess servicing fees should increase as well. Our proxy for excess
servicing fees fell by approximately 5 bp for same seller/servicer pools following
the implementation of these new guidelines.
There are two main explanations for why the riskiness of same and different
seller/servicer loans changed following the guarantee fee regulation. First, large-
volume sellers experienced larger increases in their guarantee fees following the
regulation than small-volume sellers. This suggests that, in relative terms, it be-
came less cost-effective for large sellers to retain servicing rights, implying that
large sellers retained servicing rights on higher-quality loans following the regu-
lation. For small sellers, it became more cost- effective to retain servicing rights,
which gave them the incentive to retain servicing rights on riskier loans. As a
result, following the Fannie Mae regulation, the pool of same seller/servicer loans
became less risky for large sellers and riskier for small sellers. Second, as it be-
came more cost-effective for small sellers to retain servicing rights, some of the
risky loans on which servicing rights used to be sold to large sellers were then
retained by small sellers. This suggests that the pool of different seller/servicer
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loans held by large sellers became less risky following the regulation. In columns
3 and 4 we demonstrate that the decrease in our proxy for excess servicing fees
for same seller/servicer loans was driven by large sellers retaining less risky loans
following the regulation.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
This study is the first to evaluate the impact of asymmetric information between
mortgage sellers and servicers on mortgage servicer compensation. We proxy for
asymmetric information using the decision to retain mortgage servicing rights.
Retention of servicing rights can be profitable for mortgage servicers as long as
the likelihood of default on serviced loans is low. However, when the probability
of default is high, servicing can be costly since servicers face high labor costs
associated with default management of non-performing loans (Levitin and Twomey
2011).
Sellers of loans to Fannie Mae observe more information than independent
servicers since in many cases they also serve as the originators, or have long-
standing relationships with brokers that allow them to learn about borrower and
loan quality. Finally, sellers often have more sophisticated models than servicers
that allow them to utilize data from the secondary market to learn about loan
performance. Since sellers have more information about borrower and loan quality
than servicers, and servicing non-performing loans can be costly, sellers may choose
to retain servicing rights on higher quality loans based on information unobserved
to the servicers.
Using loan-level data on Fannie Mae-insured, full-documentation mortgages,
we document that loans where sellers retain servicing rights are on average 1.3
percentage points less likely to default and 0.2 percentage points less likely to
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foreclose than loans where servicing rights were not retained by sellers, even af-
ter controlling for borrower and loan risk characteristics. Higher foreclosure rates
among different seller/servicer loans correspond with larger costs to Fannie Mae.
Conditional on risk characteristics, same seller/servicer loans lose approximately
$3000 less per loan in foreclosure than different seller/servicer loans. This repre-
sents an overall cost of $571 million to Fannie Mae, or approximately 2% of the
loss on all single-family loans in our sample.
If servicers internalize that loans for which servicing rights are not retained by
sellers are riskier than loans for which servicing rights are retained, they should
demand higher excess servicing fees to be compensated for this additional risk.
We evaluate whether the retention of servicing rights is priced using a proxy for
excess servicing fees. We find no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that excess
servicing fees for same and different seller/servicer loans are identical.
Lastly, we exploit a quasi-experiment which changed the incentive to retain
servicing rights for small sellers of MBS relative to large sellers. Starting from
December 2011, the FHFA implemented guidelines to increase guarantee fees for
all sellers, and narrow the gap in guarantee fees between large-volume and small-
volume MBS sellers. We find that excess servicing fees for same/seller servicer
pools decreased by approximately 5 bp following the regulatory change. This
relative decrease was driven by the riskiness of the pool of retained loans for large-
volume sellers declining relatively more.
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2.8 APPENDIX A: FIGURES
Figure 9
Different Seller/Servicer of MBS
Figure 9 displays the process of securitization of a mortgage into an MBS pool and the
subsequent exchange of payments and fees by different parties. The key assumption in this
figure is that the seller, servicer, and investor are different institutions. First, a mortgage
is originated (step 1), packaged and sold in a pool of loans by a seller to Fannie Mae (step
2), and exchanged for MBS (step 3). The seller then sells the MBS into the secondary
market (step 4) and designates a different servicer on the pool (step 5) through the sale
of MSR. At the beginning of each month, the mortgagor pays a fixed monthly payment of
principal and interest to the servicer (step 6), which is then remitted to the trust at the
end of the month in exchange for a servicing fee (step 7). Servicers must meet and abide
by guidelines established by Fannie Mae, who serves also as master servicer of the MBS
trust (step 8). Finally, Fannie Mae disburses payments to investors in exchange for a fee
that assumes credit risk on the pool of mortgages (step 9).
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Figure 10
Same Seller/Servicer of MBS
Figure 10 presents a scenario in which the seller and servicer of the mortgage are the same
institution, but the investor is a separate entity. In this case, much of the securitization
process is consolidated. The trading desk of a financial institution exchanges the pool
of mortgages for MBS (steps 2 and 3), then places the pool of MBS onto the secondary
market for sale to investors (step 4). The servicing arm of that same institution handles
the full servicing of the mortgages (steps 5 through 8).
98
Figure 11
Default Rates by Seller/Servicer Type
and Acquisition Year Vintage
Figure 11 depicts the average annual default rates for same seller-servicer loans
(gray bar) and different seller-servicer loans (black bar). It demonstrates that
default rates (90+ days delinquent) for same seller/servicer mortgages are lower
than those on different seller/servicer mortgages. The figure captures the gen-
eral trend that default rates increased among loans originated during the housing
boom.
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Figure 12
Foreclosure Rates by Seller/Servicer Type
and Acquisition Year Vintage
Figure 12 depicts the average annual foreclosure rates for same seller-servicer
loans (gray bar) and different seller-servicer loans (black bar). It demonstrates
that foreclosure rates for same seller/servicer mortgages are lower than those on
different seller/servicer mortgages. The figure captures the general trend that
foreclosure rates increased among loans originated during the housing boom.
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Figure 13
Severity by Seller/Servicer Type
and Acquisition Year Vintage
Figure 13 depicts the annual severity rates for same seller-servicer loans (gray
bar) and different seller-servicer loans (black bar). The figure shows that
loan severity (the amount paid out to investors minus proceeds to Fannie
Mae from foreclosure sale) is higher for different seller/servicer loans. The
figure captures the general trend that severity rates increased among loans
originated during the housing boom.
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2.9 APPENDIX B: TABLES
Table 13
Data Screening of FNMA Mortgages (2002-2015)
Table 13 lists the number of loans dropped by each criterion in
the data screening process. We first restrict the sample to all
loans originated after 2002 (we have this restriction due to lack
of servicer names before December 2001). We drop missing data
from our key variables of interest and loans in which we cannot
definitively identify if the seller and servicer are the same institu-
tion.
Total Number of Loans Acquired: 20,624,403
Drop Loans With:
Seller and Servicer “OTHER” 6,158,511
Servicer “OTHER” 1,662,874
Seller “OTHER” 370,150
Missing Data 341,246
Total Number of Loans After Screening: 12,091,622
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Table 14
Mean Loan-Level Statistics (2002-2015)
Table 14 provides summary statistics for the sample of same and different seller-
servicer loans in our dataset, as well as a p-value for the difference in means for
each of the categories. Different seller/servicer loans look riskier on most observable
dimensions. For all variables the difference is statistically different from zero.
Same Different
mean mean p
Default Rate (90+ Days Delinquent) 7.98 9.81 0.00
Loan Characteristics :
Original Interest Rate 5.50 5.84 0.00
Original Unpaid Balance ($000) 209.26 187.41 0.00
Original Loan-to-Value Ratio 71.64 73.07 0.00
Original Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 72.69 74.07 0.00
Original Debt-to-Income Ratio 34.41 36.75 0.00
Borrower Characteristics :
Credit Score 738.60 730.30 0.00
New Buyer 0.11 0.10 0.00
Number of Borrowers 1.57 1.55 0.00
Number of Units 1.04 1.05 0.00
Origination Channel :
Retail 35.19 49.05 0.00
Broker 50.51 32.03 0.00
Correspondent 14.30 18.92 0.00
Mortgage Type:
Purchase 37.97 42.59 0.00
Cash-Out Refinance 32.77 26.07 0.00
Not Cash-Out Refinance 29.22 31.27 0.00
Other Type of Refinance 0.05 0.07 0.00
Property Type:
Single-Family 71.16 73.65 0.00
Condo 9.44 9.17 0.00
Co-op 18.18 16.03 0.00
Manufactured Home 0.46 0.59 0.00
Planned Unit Development 0.75 0.56 0.00
Occupancy Status:
Principal 88.33 88.22 0.01
Second 4.55 4.25 0.00
Investor 7.11 7.53 0.00
Number of Observations 11,402,747 688,875 12,091,622
Seller/Servicer status at last observed date
Foreclosure Rate 2.50 3.04 0.00
Number of Observations 5,790,731 6,085,582 11,876,313
Seller/Servicer status at foreclosure date
Severity ($000) 66.73 69.12 0.00
Number of Observations 150,977 184,998 329,680
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Table 15
Mean Pool-Level Statistics (2002-2015)
Table 15 provides summary statistics for the sample of same and different seller-
servicer loans in our pool-level dataset. Overall, same seller/servicer securities
have both lower weighted average interest rates and pass-through rates, smaller
average loan size, but larger initial security balance. This is likely due to
there being more loans in same seller/servicer pools overall. In terms of risk
characteristics, same seller/servicer securities have higher average credit scores,
but also higher LTV ratios. Thus, different seller/servicer pools look riskier on
most observable dimensions. For all variables, the difference between same and
different seller-servicer pools of loans is statistically different from zero.
Same Different
mean mean p-value
Weighted Average Coupon Rate 5.46 5.60 0.00
Pass-Through Rate 4.90 5.07 0.00
Excess Servicing Fee Proxy 0.56 0.53 0.00
Average Loan Size ($1000) 181.58 184.98 0.00
Original Balance ($1000) 18,362.46 8,370.21 0.00
Weighted Average Credit Score 718.93 677.65 0.00
Weighted Average LTV Ratio 76.47 73.53 0.00
Weighted Average Loan Age 1.06 7.03 0.00
Pool Loan Count 93.99 44.21 0.00
Number of Observations 181,175 7,965 189,140
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Table 16
Seller/Servicer Affiliation and Mortgage Performance (2002-2015)
This table presents estimates from a linear probability model of the relation be-
tween seller/servicer affiliation and loan-level default, foreclosure, and severity
rates for loans originated between 2002 and 2015. In column 1, the depen-
dent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mortgage defaulted (90+ days
delinquent) at least once before 2016Q1 and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the
dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mortgage foreclosed before
2016Q1 and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable equals loan
severity (unpaid principal balance + delinquent interest + foreclosure costs +
property preservation and repair costs + asset recovery costs + miscellaneous
holding expense credits + associated taxes for holding property) - (net sales
proceeds + credit enhancement proceeds + repurchase make-whole proceeds
+ other foreclosure proceeds). Coefficient estimates and corresponding stan-
dard errors are displayed in percentage points for columns 1 and 2, thousands
of dollars in column 3. The last two rows give the mean default, foreclosure,
and severity rates in each sample and the difference is calculated at the mean.
Additional controls include: original combined loan-to-value ratio, number of
units, the percentage of mortgage insurance on the property, property state,
and indicators for seller identity, origination year, acquisition quarter X ac-
quisition year, channel, loan purpose, property type, occupancy status, type
of mortgage insurance. Standard errors are clustered by servicer at point of
acquisition by Fannie Mae (column 1) or last loan date (columns 2 and 3).
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Default Foreclosure Severity
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Same Seller/Servicer -1.282*** -0.221* -3.091*
(0.382) (0.118) (1.661)
Loan Characteristics:
Original Interest Rate 2.121*** 1.294*** 3.467***
(0.290) (0.108) (0.612)
Original Unpaid Balance ($000) -0.002*** -0.000 0.221***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Original LTV Ratio 0.089*** 0.024*** 1.328***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.053)
Original DTI Ratio 0.083*** 0.026*** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010)
Borrower Characteristics:
Original Credit Score -0.109*** -0.024*** -0.037***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
First-Time Buyer -0.707*** -0.264*** 0.281
(0.092) (0.033) (0.353)
Number of Borrowers -2.586*** -1.177*** -1.071***
(0.339) (0.104) (0.188)
Additional Controls Y Y Y
Number of Observations 12,091,622 11,876,313 329,680
R-squared 0.137 0.065 0.315
Mean Rates 8.081 2.776 68.069
Difference in Rates -15.864 -7.961 -4.541
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Table 17
Excess Servicing Fees and Seller/Servicer
Affiliation (2002-2015)
This table estimates the relation between seller/servicer affiliation and
our proxy for excess servicing fees. Coefficient estimates and corre-
sponding standard errors are displayed in basis points. Additional con-
trols include indicators for seller identity, year of issuance, and distri-
butional characteristics of the mortgages underlying each MBS pool.
Standard errors are clustered by the month-year of security issuance.
*** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 10 % levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Excess Servicing Fee Proxy (bp)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2)
Same Seller-Servicer 0.0060 0.0023
(0.0066) (0.0049)
Loan Characteristics:
Loan to Value 0.0019***
(0.0004)
MBS Loan Count 0.0055
(0.0072)
Loan Size -0.0240
(0.0641)
Loan Age -0.0005
(0.0007)
Borrower Characteristics:
Credit Score -0.0002
(0.0001)
N 189,140 189,140
R2 0.227 0.482
Seller Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
MBS and Borrower Controls No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes
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Table 18
Originator/Servicer Affiliation and
Mortgage Performance (2002-2015)
This table presents estimates from a linear probability model of the relation
between seller/servicer affiliation, originator/seller/servicer affiliation, and
loan-level default, foreclosure, and severity rates between for loans origi-
nated between 2002 and 2015. In column 1, the dependent variable is an
indicator equal to 1 if the mortgage defaulted (90+ days delinquent) at
least once before 2016Q1 and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the dependent
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the mortgage foreclosed before 2016Q1
and 0 otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable equals loan severity
(unpaid principal balance + delinquent interest + foreclosure costs + prop-
erty preservation and repair costs + asset recovery costs + miscellaneous
holding expense credits + associated taxes for holding property) - (net
sales proceeds + credit enhancement proceeds + repurchase make-whole
proceeds + other foreclosure proceeds). Coefficient estimates and corre-
sponding standard errors are displayed in percentage points for columns
1 and 2, thousands of dollars in column 3. Additional controls include:
original interest rate, original unpaid principal balance, original LTV ratio,
original DTI ratio, original credit score, first-time buyer indicator, num-
ber of borrowers, original combined loan-to-value ratio, number of units,
the percentage of mortgage insurance on the property, property state, and
indicators for seller identity, origination year, acquisition quarter X acqui-
sition year, channel, loan purpose, property type, occupancy status, type
of mortgage insurance. Standard errors are clustered by servicer at point
of acquisition by Fannie Mae (column 1) or last loan date (columns 2 and
3). *** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 10 % levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Default Foreclosure Severity
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Same Seller/Servicer -1.167*** -0.182 -3.111*
(0.361) (0.115) (0.395)
Same Originator/Servicer -0.449 -0.110 0.069
(0.295) (0.001) (0.395)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12,091,622 11,876,313 329,680
R-squared 0.137 0.065 0.315
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Table 19
Excess Servicing Fees and Guarantee Fee Regulation (2002-2015)
This table estimates the relation between seller/servicer affiliation and our proxy for
excess servicing fees. Coefficient estimates and corresponding standard errors are dis-
played in basis points. Large seller denotes a seller to Fannie Mae ranked in the top
50% based on amount of unpaid balance in a given year. Additional controls include
indicators for seller identity, year of issuance, and distributional characteristics of the
mortgages underlying each MBS pool. Standard errors are clustered by the month-
year of security issuance. *** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 10 % levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variables: Excess Servicing Fee (bp)
All All Large Sellers Small Sellers
Data Data Top 50% Bottom 50%
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Seller-Servicer 0.0023 0.0050 0.0067 -0.0081
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0161)
Post Dec-2011 0.1007*** 0.1055*** 0.0063
(0.0138) (0.0126) (0.0392)
Same Seller-Servicer x Post Dec-2011 -0.0530*** -0.0587*** 0.0483
(0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0392)
Loan to Value 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 0.0019*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Credit Score -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
MBS Loan Count 0.0055 0.0057 0.0047 -0.1025
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.1972)
Loan Size -0.0240 -0.0223 -0.0367 0.0392
(0.0641) (0.0643) (0.0682) (0.1946)
Loan Age -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Constant -0.0077 -0.0189 0.0280 0.2899**
(0.0607) (0.0611) (0.0588) (0.1464)
N 189,140 189,140 179,349 9,791
R2 0.482 0.482 0.478 0.633
Seller Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MBS and Borrower Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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3.0 CHAPTER 3
ISSUER VERSUS INVESTOR-PAID RATING AGENCIES, EQUITY
ANALYSTS, AND THE INFORMATION FLOW TO THE
STOCK AND BOND MARKETS
(with Thomas Chemmanur and Francesca Toscano)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the financial crisis, credit rating agencies’ reputation was undermined
as they were often criticized for issuing untimely and inaccurate ratings. Critics
argue that the compensation structure of many rating agencies that are paid by
bond issuers generates conflicts of interests that lead raters to inflate issuers’
ratings scores. Equity analysts, on the other hand, seemed to adjust their forecasts
more quickly with the onset of the financial crisis (Sidhu and Tan 2011). This could
in part explain why they did not face similar scrutiny to the credit rating agencies
following the financial crisis. Equity analysts and credit rating agencies (CRAs)
have the same objective of providing valuations of firms’ performance to investors.
However, while bond raters provide assessment of the bonds’ default risk, equity
analysts are concerned with firms’ equity performance, which includes assessments
of firms’ possibility of asset appreciation and dividend payouts.
The literature has investigated the information flows between equity analysts
and credit rating agencies to better understand which one provides more precise
and timely recommendations. Ederington and Goh (1998) suggest that credit
rating agencies and equity analysts influence each others recommendations. Ed-
erington and Yawitz (1987), on the other hand, show that credit ratings affect
equity analysts’ recommendations. They argue that given that credit rating agen-
cies have access to information that is not available to equity analyst researchers,
the analysts have an incentive to utilize the unique information available to rating
agencies by following any of their changes. Finally, Fong et al. (2014) show that
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analyst coverage is likely to have a disciplining effect on credit rating agencies.43
They argue that the larger is the number of equity analysts monitoring a firm,
the lower is the asymmetric information between firm’s managers and investors.
This, in-turn, puts greater the pressure on credit rating agencies to provide reliable
ratings.
While the literature has addressed the information flows between issuer-paid
rating agencies and equity analysts, the impact of credit ratings issued by CRAs
that are compensated by investors (investor-paid raters) on these information flows
has not been studied. The investor-paid rating model gained popularity because it
alleviates the conflicts of interests between issuers and the rating agencies. Since
the raters are compensated by investors, they do not face pressure by bond issuers
to inflate their ratings. Therefore, investor-paid credit ratings are believed to be
timelier, more informative, and accurate in predicting default risk (Jiang et al.,
2012, Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2013).
In this paper, we evaluate the information content of signals by investor and is-
suer paid rating agencies, as well as equity analyst recommendations. Specifically,
we investigate whether investor-paid rating agencies provide more informative and
timely ratings than issuer-paid rating agencies and equity analysts. Further, we
evaluate how the bond and stock markets respond to changes in valuations pro-
vided by issuer and investor paid rating agencies, as well as equity analysts. Next,
we turn to studying the impact of bond ratings and analysts’ recommendations
on firms’ investment decisions. Then, we evaluate how rating agencies and equity
analysts respond to firms’ leverage changes, and whether disagreement between
equity analysts about firm performance translates into great disagreement in rat-
ings issued by CRAs.
We conduct five tests to address the aforementioned empirical questions. First,
we investigate who is the main information driver among the three financial gate-
keepers (i.e., issuer-paid rating agencies, investor-paid rating agencies and equity
43Analyst coverage is defined as the number of equity analysts monitoring a firm
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analysts). Specifically, we evaluate whether a change in any of these evaluations
is able to trigger changes, of the same sign, in other evaluations. We find that
investor-paid ratings impact signals by issuer-paid CRAs and equity analysts.
This result is driven in-part by those investor-paid rating agencies being the first
to make adjustments to their signals to reflect market conditions.
Second, we study the response of the bond and stock markets to issuer-paid
and investor-paid rating changes, as well as to equity analyst recommendation
adjustments. We find that bond investors are more responsive to ratings issued
by the credit rating agencies, while equity investors are more susceptible to recom-
mendations by equity analysis. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
outlined in Merton (1987) that it is costlier for stock market investors to pay at-
tention to bond analysts relative to paying attention to stock analyst forecasts.
Conversely, it is costlier for bond market investors to pay attention to stock ana-
lysts rather than bond analysts. Investors in firms that have a high probability of
default, however, respond more to investor-paid ratings than to signals by equity
analysts or issuer-paid rating agencies.
Third, we investigate how rating agencies and equity analysts respond to
changes in leverage. The intuition behind this test relies on the different objec-
tives of rating agencies and equity analysts. Rating agencies focus on predicting
bonds’ default risk, while equity analysts focus on firms’ equity performance. Con-
sistently, we find that increases in leverage lead to lower ratings by CRAs, and
more favorable recommendations by equity analysts due to firms’ additional liq-
uidity resulting from bond issuance. Specifically, investor-paid ratings perceive
an increased leverage as an increase in the probability of default, which leads to
lower ratings. On the other hand, equity analysts react positively to an increase
in leverage being less concerned about default and more about liquidity and cash
flow growth.
Fourth, we study how firms adjust their investment levels following issuer-paid
and investor-paid rating changes as well as equity analyst recommendation adjust-
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ments. We find that firms’ investment decisions are in-line with changes of rat-
ings by investor-paid rating agencies. This result is consistent with investor-paid
CRAs being perceived to produce timelier and more reliable signals. Lastly, we
investigate whether disagreement between equity analysts about firm performance
translates into disagreements in ratings assigned by issuer-paid and investor-paid
CRAs. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs among equity analysts is correlated
with heterogeneity in beliefs among bond rating agencies.
The aforementioned tests utilize data on S&P ratings from Compustat (as
representatives of the issuer-paid rating agencies), Egan and Jones ratings obtained
directly from the Egan-Jones Ratings Company (as representatives of the investor-
paid CRAs), and equity analyst recommendations from the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the lit-
erature. Section 3 outlines the hypotheses tested throughout the paper. Section
4 describes the data. Section 5 describes the empirical results, and section 6
concludes.
3.2 RELATED LITERATURE
The literature has largely studied the capability of financial intermediaries to
convey information to capital markets. Particular attention has been devoted to
the role of equity analysts and credit rating agencies as well as to their interaction
and impact on the capital markets.
Regarding the role of equity analysts, a big effort has been exerted to study the
real effects of the information they provide. Verrecchia (1996) shows the informa-
tional role of security analysts in increasing firm value, Womack (1996) illustrates
the capability of equity analysts to increase firm visibility, Brennan and Subrah-
manyan (1995) and Roulstone (2004) provide evidence of the link between analyst
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following and increased liquidity of firms’ securities. The informative power of eq-
uity analysts is often compared to the one of credit rating agencies. Although
dealing with different assets and clients, several studies (Beyer et al., 2010; Fong
et al., 2014) argue that sell-side equity analysts and credit rating agencies are com-
petitors. They both provide information to the market and, although for different
reasons, they both have an incentive to issue optimistic evaluations. Sell-side eq-
uity analysts have a tendency to assign optimistic stock recommendations to curry
favour with the management (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Ertimur et al., 2011). On
the other side, rating agencies have largely been accused of biasing their ratings
optimistically on corporate debt (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Kraft, 2011) and
structured finance projects (Lynch, 2009; Riddiough and Zhu, 2010) to generate
business. Which financial intermediary, between equity analysts and credit rating
agencies, is able to deliver more timely and precise information is an open question
that the literature has tried to address from different angles. Batta and Muslu
(2011) compare the company adjusted reported earnings released by credit rating
agencies with those of equity analysts to point out that, although both informa-
tive, adjusted earnings in equity analysts are better in predicting future earnings
and cash-flows. Following Lui et al. (2007), Lui et al. (2012) shows that equity
changes are timilier and have a larger overall stock price impact than credit rating
changes.
A first attempt to establish a direction in the information flow between bond
rating agencies and stock analysts is provided in Ederington and Goh (1998) which
shows that the Granger causality flows both ways: bond downgrades are preceded
by declines in actual and forecast earnings and actual earnings, as well as forecasts
of future earnings, tend to fall following downgrades. Other subsequent papers try
to answer the same question by focusing on the advantages that equity analysts
have on rating agencies and vice-versa. Equity analyst recommendations are of-
ten thought to be more objective than the recommendations assigned by other
intermediaries because of the large number of equity analysts that rate the same
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firm. Consequently, firms covered by many equity analysts are perceived as less
opaque and thus riskier. Exploiting the idea that analyst coverage is a proxy for
asymmetric information, part of the literature finds that the number of equity
analysts monitoring a firm is negatively related to the firm’s default risk (Cheng
and Subramanyan, 2007) and is likely to reduce the optimistic bias in credit rat-
ings44(Fong et al., 2014). However, there is also evidence that rating agencies have
access to information not available to equity analysts such as minutes of board
meetings, profit breakdowns by profit and new product plans (Ederington and
Yawitz, 1987). Following Jung et al. (2007), the informational advantage of credit
ratings has increased starting from October 2000, when the Fair Disclosure Reg-
ulation became effective45. The larger information set available to credit rating
agencies should lead to a greater reliance of equity analysts on rating evaluations.
As far as we are aware, current literature has focused on the interaction between
equity analysts and credit rating agencies without investigating the role played
by the compensation system adopted by those rating agencies. More in detail,
previous works have focused on equity analysts and rating agencies paid by the
rated firms (issuer-paid rating agencies). An alternative rating model is the one
in which rating agencies get paid by investors (investor-paid rating agencies).
The compensation structure adopted by the latter ensures a reduced exposure to
conflicts of interest, a greater capability of providing timely ratings and hence,
an enhanced informativeness (Jiang et al., 2012; Strobl and Xia, 2012; Cornaggia
and Cornaggia, 2013; Xia, 2014). Althought studies on the performance of the
two rating models have always been considerable, there is a gap in the literature
that needs to be filled. To our knowledge, no previous paper has aimed to study
44The disciplining effects of competition on credit rating agencies, among credit ratng agen-
cies, are studied theoretically in Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro
(2012), Camanho et al. (2010), Manso (2013), Mathis et al. (2009), and Skreta and Veldkamp
(2011), among others. On the empirical front Becker and Milbourn (2011) find evidence that
the entry of Fitch lead to better ratings. The opposite results are reported in Doherty et al.
(2012) in their analysis of entry into insurance market by A.M. Best.
45The Fair Disclosure Regulation introduces restrictions on the information that companies
can disclose to analysts. Credit rating agencies are not subject to these limitations.
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the reciprocal influence of issuer-paid, investor-paid ratings and equity analyst.
Similarly, literature has not compared the effects of all these recommendations on
the bond and stock markets as well as their effects on corporate investment. We
conduct a study on equity analysts and different rating models in the following
sections.
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
In this section, we briefly discuss the underlying theory and develop hypotheses
for our empirical tests. The study investigates the idea that while equity analysts
and credit rating agencies have a similar objective of evaluating firms’ quality,
they employ different approaches to achieve this goal. Specifically, credit rating
agencies provide opinions about the firm’s probability of default. Equity analysts,
on the other hand, issue recommendations that reflect firm’s expected stock per-
formance. Furthermore, while Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and equity analysts are
compensated by firms who they provide ratings for, Egan-Jones (EJR) is compen-
sated by investors. This suggests that EJR has less incentive to inflate ratings or
be reluctant to downgrade firms’ ratings.
Since issuer paid rating agencies and equity analysts face pressure to provide
favorable recommendations to firms that retain their services, we hypothesize that
an investor paid rating agencies such as Egan and Jones (EJR) update their ratings
faster to reflect the most up-to-date information available for investors. Issuer
paid rating agencies such as S&P and equity analysis may be particularly slow to
update their ratings when negative information about firm performance becomes
available. Thus, we test whether EJR rating changes trigger shifts in S&P ratings
and equity analyst recommendations of the same direction (H1).
As previously mentioned, equity analysts provide recommendations about the
firm’s expected stock performance while the investor and issuer paid rating agen-
cies provide ratings that reflect the probability of default on firms’ bonds. There-
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fore, equity investors may be more responsive to equity analysts’ signals while
bond investors and investors in risky firms will be inclined to pay particular at-
tention to signals by rating agencies such as EJR and S&P. Thus, we test whether
equity analyst recommendations have a stronger impact on firms’ equity excess
returns compared to ratings by EJR and S&P (H2). Similarly we test whether
EJR and S&P ratings have a stronger impact firms’ bond spreads compared to
equity analyst recommendations (H3).
To further investigate the stock market response to signals by rating agencies
and equity analysts about firm quality, we replicate our stock market analysis for
a subset of firms that are classified to be speculative (i.e., firms whose ratings are
below the S&P investment grade threshold). This analysis allows us to study which
of the aforementioned signals has the largest impact on the equity performance of
risky firms (with higher probability of default). Thus, we test whether EJR ratings
have a stronger impact on equity excess returns for firms with higher probability of
default, in comparison to S&P ratings and equity analyst recommendations (H4).
Moreover, to investigate the bond market response to the outlined signals
about firms quality, we replicate our bond market analysis for firms that are
classified as speculative and for firms that are crossing the investment threshold
(i.e., firms that at time t-1 have a rating from Standard and Poor’s equal to
BBB- but are downgraded to a BB+ rating in the following period). We focus
on these firms to better understand the reaction of the bond market to credit
rating and equity analyst recommendation changes for poor performing firms.
We expect a magnified effect of EJR rating changes on the bond spread if the
analysis is restricted to firms with a high probability of default. Thus, we test
whether EJR rating changes have a stronger impact on bond spreads for firms
with higher probability of default, in comparison to S&P ratings and equity analyst
recommendations (H5) and if EJR rating changes have a stronger impact on bond
spreads for firms that were downgraded below investment grade, in comparison
S&P ratings and equity analyst recommendations (H6).
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Credit ratings and equity analyst recommendations affect firms’ financing op-
portunities. Higher ratings or better equity analyst recommendations translate
into an easier access to capital markets, which, in turn, implies greater investment
opportunities. Consequently, we evaluate whether firms internalize issuer-paid,
investor-paid and equity analyst recommendation changes and, consequently, uti-
lize these ratings for their investment decisions. If investor-paid rating agencies
have greater information content, we expect to see a greater increase (decrease)
in firm’s investment following investor-paid upgrades (downgrades) compared to
rating changes by to issuer-paid agencies such as S&P or changes in equity ana-
lyst recommendations. Thus, we test whether EJR rating changes have a stronger
impact on firm investment in comparison S&P ratings or equity analyst recom-
mendations (H7).
Moreover, an increase in firm’s leverage is likely to lead to lower ratings scores
by the credit rating agencies since it will raise the firm’s probability of default. At
the same time, an increase in leverage implies that a firm was able to raise more
capital cost effectively on the bond market, which suggests that it has greater
investment opportunities. Thus, the effect of an increase in leverage on firm’s ex-
pected stock performance is ambiguous and remains an empirical question. Hence,
we test whether the impact of an increase in leverage has a differential effect on
S&P and EJR ratings as apposed to equity analyst recommendations and evaluate
the magnitudes of these effects (H8).
Finally, we evaluate whether greater disagreement between equity analysts
about recommendations for firm’s equity performance translates into a greater
disagreement between EJR and S&P ratings. The intuition is that equity analysts
disagree in their assessment of equity performance about some firms more than
others. This heterogeneity in beliefs about firm quality can be driven by limited
or noisy of information about firm performance. Consistently, for some firms,
bond rating agencies are more likely to disagree in their assessment of default risk.
Thus, we test whether higher disagreement in equity analyst recommendations is
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associated with a higher disagreement between EJR and S&P ratings (H9).
Thus, in summary, in this paper we test the hypotheses below:
H1 EJR rating changes trigger shifts in S&P ratings and equity analyst recom-
mendations of the same direction.
H2 Equity analyst recommendations have a stronger impact on firms’ equity
excess returns compared to ratings by EJR and S&P.
H3 EJR and S&P ratings have a stronger impact firms’ bond spreads compared
to equity analyst recommendations.
H4 EJR ratings have a stronger impact on equity excess returns for firms with
higher probability of default, in comparison to S&P ratings and equity analyst
recommendations.
H5 EJR rating changes have a stronger impact on bond spreads for firms with
higher probability of default, in comparison to S&P ratings and equity analyst
recommendations.
H6 EJR rating changes have a stronger impact on bond spreads for firms that
were downgraded below investment grade, in comparison S&P ratings and
equity analyst recommendations.
H7 EJR rating changes have a stronger impact on firm investment in compar-
ison S&P ratings or equity analyst recommendations.
H8 Increase in leverage has a differential effect on S&P and EJR ratings as
apposed to equity analyst recommendations
H9 Higher disagreement in equity analyst recommendations is associated with
a higher disagreement between EJR and S&P ratings.
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3.4 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample requires the merge of different databases that provide information on
ratings, equity analysts’ recommendations, firm characteristics and stock returns
details.
The first step we follow is to merge the S&P database, the EJR database and
the IBES database.
The S&P long-term credit ratings are obtained from Compustat North Amer-
ica Ratings. All the observations for which there are no rating data are deleted
from the sample. Following existing literature, we assign numerical values to each
rating on notch basis: AAA=23, AA+=22, AA=21, AA-=20, A+=19, A=18, A-
=17, BBB+=16, BBB=15, BBB-=14, BB+=13, BB=12, BB-=11, B+=10, B=9,
B-=8, CCC+=7, CCC=6, CCC-=5, CC=4, C=3, D=2, SD=1. Since firm char-
acteristics are available only quarterly, we construct a quarterly time series for
the S&P rating database. To this aim, we average the rating actions happening
in the same quarter meaning that if there are more than one rating action in the
same quarter, we take the average of these ratings based on the above numerical
conversion. The original S&P dataset includes 4,615 firms for a total number of
observations of 143,950 from 1998 until 2014.
The EJR database is obtained directly from the Egan and Jones Rating com-
pany. The database contains issuers’ names, tickers, rating actions, including new
rating assignments and related rating dates. This database is constructed on a
time series basis where each credit rating with a rating action is treated as an
observation. We, thus, construct a quarterly time series for the EJR database
where we assign a rating in the current quarter equal to the rating in the previous
quarter if no rating action has occurred. Since EJR and S&P use the same rating
scale, we use the same numerical conversion adopted for the S&P database. As
before, we delete observations when rating data are not available. The original
EJR database includes 2,402 firms for a total number of observations equal to
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58,583 from 1999 until 2014.
We obtain all equity analyst recommendations issued between January 1993
and December 2014 from the I/B/E/S detail files. Equity analysts use a five-tier
rating system. More specifically, the I/B/E/S recommendation file tracks each
recommendation made by each analyst, where recommendations are standardized
and converted to numerical scores where "1" denotes a Strong Buy recommenda-
tion, "2" denotes a Buy recommendation, "3" denotes a Hold recommendation,
"4" denotes a Underperform recommendation and "5" denotes a Sell recommenda-
tion. The original I/B/E/S file provide recommendations that are analyst specific.
We average all the recommendations in a given firm-year-month to get the average
monthly recommendation for every firm in our sample. This delivers a sample of
analysts recommendations that covers 1,799 firms for a total number of observa-
tions of 158,511 from 1994 until 2014. This database offers also the opportunity
to construct a measure of heterogeneity in equity analysts beliefs. The measure,
based on the standard deviation of analysts’ recommendations, provides insights
on how dispersed is the information they are able to provide.
The S&P, EJR and I/B/E/S databases are merged by firm ticker, year and
month. The final database of equity analysts’ recommendations and ratings con-
tain 1,150 firms from 1999 until 2014.
The analysis requires additional data on Moodys’ ratings. Moody’s ratings are
collected using the Moody’s website. The rating scale adopted by Moodys is differ-
ent from the S&P and EJR’s one. In order to make the comparison across ratings
more manageable, we convert Moodys’ ratings using the following numerical con-
version: Aaa=23, Aa1=22, Aa2=21, Aa3=20, A1=19, A2=18, A3=17, Baa1=16,
Baa2=15, Baa3=14, Ba1=13, Ba2=12, Ba3=11, B1=10, B2=9, B3=8, Caa1=7,
Caa2=6, Caa3=5, Ca=4, C=3. We collect ratings for a subset of large firms (firms
whose assets are larger than 1 million). We are able to collect Moodys ratings for
286 firms. The total number of observations for the Moodys file is 3,652. The
Moodys sample period goes from 2004 to 2014.
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The file containing ratings and equity recommendations is augmented with
financial statement and financial market data from Compustat and the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Compustat provides firm specific variables. More precisely, by exploiting this
dataset, we construct variables such as Investment, Size, Tangibility, Market-to-
Book, Profitability, Long-Term Leverage, Debt Issuance and Cash-Asset ratio.
Investment is defined as the ratio of Capital Expenditures over Assets. Size is
constructed as the log of quarterly total assets. To construct this variable, we
delete observations if total assets are equal or lower than zero. Tangibility is
defined as the ratio of property plant and equipment over total assets. Market-to-
Book is constructed as the ratio of the market value of assets over the book value
of assets, where the market value of assets is defined as the market value of equity
(close price multiplied by common shares outstanding) minus the book value of
equity (total assets minus total liabilities plus deferred taxes and investment tax
credit) plus the book value of total assets. We delete observations if market-to-
book is equal or lower than zero. Profitability is proxied by the Return on Assets,
computed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. The Long-
Term Leverage is given by the long-term debt over total assets. Debt Issuance is
constructed as the ratio between the first difference of the firm total debt and the
lagged book value of total assets. Finally, the Cash ratio is computed as the ratio
of cash over total quarterly assets. Missing values for all the variables cited above
are deleted. To limit the effects of outliers, all the variables are winsorized at the
1% level.
We use CRSP data to get stock information data. The use of this dataset al-
lows to construct two main variables. First, we can define the stock market excess
return for every firm in our sample by looking at the difference between the stock
market return and the return on a benchmark, the S&P500 portfolio. Second,
the use of the CRSP database provides the opportunity to construct an addi-
tional measure of heterogeneity in equity analysts beliefs, the monthly turnover.
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A number of empirical papers in the finance literature (among others, Kandel and
Pearson, 1995) as well as in the accounting literature (Bamber, 1987; Bamber,
Barron and Stober, 1997) have used trading activity as a proxy for heterogeneous
beliefs among investors. We construct the monthly turnover variable as the trad-
ing volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. This proxy is also used
in Chemmanur, Loutskina and Tian (2008).
Finally, the analysis requires the use of bond data. Bond information is gath-
ered from FINRA’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine database (TRACE).
This database contains information about bond prices, returns, yields and years
to maturity. To get bond spreads, we collect the Treasury yields46 from the US
Treasury database, available online. We construct bond spreads for each firm as
the difference between the bond yield of each security and the Treasury yield with
comparable maturity and coupon. We drop observations if the spread is equal or
lower than zero or if there are missing data.
3.5 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND REGRESSION RESULTS
3.5.1 Information Flow between CRAs and Equity Analysts
A preliminary work by Ederington and Goh (1998) has shown that equity analysts
and credit rating agencies influence each other, meaning that actual earnings and
forecasts of future earnings trend to fall following downgrades as well as down-
grades tend to fall after declines in actual and forecast earnings. The analysis
conducted by Ederington and Goh focuses on a time interval that goes from Jan-
uary 1984 until December 1990, it neglects any difference in the compensation
system adopted by CRAs and, consequently, does not allow to study how the
information released by different CRAs affect equity analysts and vice-versa.
46Treasury yields are interpolated by the Treasury from the daily yield curve, which relates
the yield on a security to its maturity based on the closing-market bid yields on actively traded
Treasury securities in the over-the-counter market. The yield values are read from the yield
curve at fixed yearly maturities: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, 30 years.
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To study the information flow between issuer-paid credit rating agencies, in-
vestor paid credit rating agencies and equity analysts we will use a model in which
S&P or EJR credit rating changes (or equity analyst recommendation changes)
are regressed against past S&P and EJR rating changes as well as past equity
analyst recommendations. The intuition behind this analysis relies on the need
to check who is the main information provider among S&P, EJR and the equity
analysts. If the idea that investor-paid credit rating agencies are more accurate
and timely is true, then we should expect to see other information providers, as
represented by the equity analysts and the issuer-paid credit rating agency S&P,
to mimic the information sent by EJR ratings and to behave accordingly.
The specifications we use to test for the information flow among the three
information providers are provided below:
∆IBESi,t = α + β1∆EJRi,t−1 + β2∆S&Pi,t−1 + β3∆IBESi,t−1 + γ1∆EJRi,t+1
+γ2∆S&Pi,t+1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (28)
∆EJRi,t = α + β1∆IBESi,t−1 + β2∆S&Pi,t−1 + β3∆EJRi,t−1 + γ1∆IBESi,t+1
+γ2∆S&Pi,t+1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (29)
∆S&Pi,t = α + β1∆EJRi,t−1 + β2∆IBESi,t−1 + β3∆S&Pi,t−1 + γ1∆EJRi,t+1
+γ2∆IBESi,t+1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (30)
The first Model studies the effect of past EJR (∆EJRi,t−1) and S&P (∆S&Pi,t−1)
rating changes on future changes in equity analyst recommendations (∆IBESi,t).
The second model proposes a similar analysis where the effect of past changes in eq-
uity analyst recommendations (∆IBESi,t−1) and S&P rating changes (∆S&Pi,t−1)
on future EJR rating changes (∆EJRi,t) are taken into account. The third model
focuses on S&P rating changes (∆S&Pi,t) and how they are affected by past eq-
uity recommendation changes (∆IBESi,t−1) and EJR rating changes (∆EJRi,t−1).
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Additionally, all the models include lead changes of the main variables in order
to better investigate the direction of the information flow. Firm specific controls,
year and industry fixed effects are included as well.
Results for the first model are presented in table (22). Column (1) shows the
effects of past rating changes, from either S&P or EJR, on subsequent changes in
equity analyst recommendations. Column (2) adds firm specific controls. Column
(3) considers lead values for the main test variables as specified in Column (1).
Column (4) focuses on the effect of the lead variables.
As shown in Columns (1), (2) and (3), past EJR rating changes have an ef-
fect on future equity recommendation changes. More in detail, EJR credit rating
changes induce equity analyst recommendation changes of the same sign. S&P
rating changes play no role on the equity analyst activity. Moreover, current
changes in equity recommendations do not affect future changes in EJR or S&P.
The main takeaway from table (22) is that equity analysts change their recom-
mendations only following EJR rating changes. Similar analysis is shown in table
(23) which provides results for our second model. Here, the dependent variable is
represented by current changes in EJR ratings. Each column of the table has the
same interpretation as before. The results outlines in table 23 suggest that EJR
rating changes are independent of previous changes from either S&P or the equity
analysts. The result persists when controlling for lead values and firm specific
controls. Finally, results for third model are presented in table (24). Now, the
dependent variable is represented by current changes in S&P ratings. The table
illustrates that S&P follows all the signals available but it is not able to impact
any of them.
Taken together, the results illustrate that EJR ratings are able to affect both
S&P ratings and equity analyst recommendations. Equity analyst recommenda-
tions affect S&P ratings, but the credit rating changes of the latter have no power
in generating subsequent changes in either EJR ratings or equity recommenda-
tions.
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3.5.2 Impact of Leverage on equity analyst recommendations and
Credit Rating Changes
Both equity analysts and credit rating agencies provide information about the
state of firms or industries. They provide this information based on research that
looks at the firms’ bonds and stocks performance together with other relevant firm
specific characteristics. Although the goal of credit rating agencies and equity an-
alysts is similar (i.e. helping investors in the evaluation of firms’ future prospects),
the point of view assumed by equity analysts and credit rating agencies is different
and translates into different job descriptions. Equity analysts provide recommen-
dations about the firm’s equity performance. On the other side, credit rating
agencies are more interested in providing guidelines to investors about the firm’s
expected probability of default.
The different focus of equity analysts and credit rating agencies leads us
to investigate what will be the effect, in terms of equity analyst recommenda-
tion changes and credit rating changes (from either S&P or EJR), of an in-
crease/decrease in leverage. Intuitively, a change in leverage should affect dif-
ferently the way equity analysts and credit rating agencies evaluate a firm. An
increase in firm leverage might be interpreted as a way to boost the amount of
cash available for firms’ operations. Consequently, a higher level of leverage, could
be interpreted positively from the point of view of equity analysts, who are more
concerned with evaluating firms’ equity performance. However, an increase in
leverage can also be interpreted as a signal of an increased probability of default
on firm’s debt obligations. A higher leverage signals higher probability of default
and, thus, might generate a negative assessment from credit rating agencies. In
this paper we focus on two different credit rating agencies, S&P and EJR, that
because of their adopted compensation systems, provide ratings that differ in ac-
curacy and timeliness. EJR is an information provider for investors, and therefore
is less likely to inflate ratings and more likely to invest in monitoring activity of
the rated companies. Consequently, we should expect EJR to react more quickly
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to changes in leverage than S&P.
To capture the effects of a change in leverage on equity analyst recommenda-
tions and credit ratings, we consider the following regression models:
∆IBESi,t = α + β∆Leveragei,t−1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (31)
∆EJRi,t = α + β∆Leveragei,t−1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (32)
∆S&Pi,t = α + β∆Leveragei,t−1 + ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (33)
In the above models, we regress changes in equity analyst recommendations
(∆IBESi,t) or changes in credit ratings (∆EJRi,t, ∆S&Pi,t) on past changes in
firm leverage (∆Leveragei,t−1) as well as on firm specific characteristics. Year
fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. Results are presented in table (25). Column (1) shows the effect
of changes in leverage on subsequent changes in equity analyst recommendations.
Column (2) shows the effect of changes in leverage on future EJR rating changes.
Column (3) presents the effect of past leverage changes on S&P credit rating
changes.
The coefficient on ∆Leveragei,t−1 illustrates how equity analysts and credit
rating agencies perceive changes in leverage. Consistently with the intuition de-
scribed above, an increase in leverage generates a better equity analyst recom-
mendation but a lower EJR credit rating. Put differently, an increase in the firm
level of leverage generates an upgrade in equity analyst recommendations and a
downgrade in EJR credit ratings. However, as pointed out in Column (3) of table
(25), changes in leverage do not generate any subsequent change in S&P ratings.
The insignificant coefficient on ∆Leveragei,t−1 when the dependent variable is rep-
resented by future S&P rating changes might be explained in light of the slower
monitoring activity of S&P. The results confirm the intuition that a higher firm
leverage is interpreted differently by credit rating agencies and equity analysts and
that, among credit rating agencies, S&P is less responsive than EJR to leverage
changes.
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3.5.3 Impact of rating changes on investment
Next, we turn to evaluate the impact of EJR, S&P, and equity analysts upgrades
and downgrades on firms’ investments, defined as capital expenditure as a share
of assets. We average the equity analysts recommendations as well as EJR and
S&P ratings for every firm-year and merge those with annual firm characteristics
publicly available from WRDS. The regression model below evaluates the impact
of rating changes on investment. The dependent variable (investment) is defined as
capital expenditure over assets. Columns (1)-(3) in table (26), outlines the impact
of changes in ratings on investment, separately for EJR, S&P, and equity analysts
recommendations (respectively), while model (4) incorporates all rating changes
as independent variables. Firm controls include leverage, revenue, cash flow, as
well as rating level controls for IBES, EJR, and S&P, and year and industry fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm ticker.
The dummy variables EJRupgradei,t−1 and EJR
downgrade
i,t−1 turn on when Egan and
Jones average lagged annual ratings increase or decrease (respectively) by more
than one rating notch. Similarly, IBESupgradei,t−1 and S&P
downgrade
i,t−1 turn on when
S&P ratings rise or fall (respectively) by more than one notch for firm i during
year t − 1. Consistently, equity analysts recommendations are assigned values
from 1 to 5, and IBESupgradei,t−1 , IBES
downgrade
i,t−1 dummy variables refer to lagged
decreases or increases (respectively) of at least one level in the average levels of
equity analysts recommendations47.
CapitalExpenditurei,t
Assetsi,t
= α + β1EJR
upgrade
i,t−1 + β2EJR
downgrade
i,t−1 + β3S&P
upgrade
i,t−1
+β4S&P
downgrade
i,t−1 + β5IBES
upgrade
i,t−1 + β6IBES
downgrade
i,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θt + θsic + i,t
(34)
47The equity analysts recommendations are classified as follows: strong buy=1, buy=2,
hold=3, sell=4, strong sell=5
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The regression results in model (1) of table (26) suggest that EJR upgrades
lead to an average statistically significant increase of 0.45 percentage points in
investment48. Consistently, EJR downgrades lead to a decrease of 0.62 percentage
point in capital expenditure over assets. This result is consistent with the intuition
that investors respond strongly to EJR rating changes since those fluctuations have
substantial impact on the cost of debt, which in-turn changes the availability of
cash flow for investment.
Model (2), however, suggests that only a downgrade in S&P ratings has a
statistically significant impact on investment at the %1 level, while the effect of
upgrade in S&P on investment is significant only at the %10 level49. Similarly,
model (3) suggests that only downgrades of equity analysts’ recommendations
lead to an average decrease of 0.53 percentage points in capital expenditure as a
share of assets. Finally, in model (4), we include S&P and EJR rating changes as
well as changes in equity analysts’ recommendations as independent variables50.
The results suggest that Egan and Jones upgrades and downgrades lead to statis-
tically significant increases and decreases (respectively) in the investment levels.
However, only downgrades in S&P ratings and equity analysts’ recommendations
have a negative impact on investment that is statistically significant at 1% level51.
Those findings suggest that investors respond strongly to Egan and Jones rat-
ing changes, and only react to downgrades by equity analysts and S&P. Those
findings reinforce the intuition that investors are highly responsive to EJR rating
fluctuations since they internalize that it is an investor-paid rating agency that
is accountable only to investors that retain it’s services. This is in contrast to
S&P, that is subjected to pressure from bond issuers to inflate their ratings, or
48Investment is defined as capital expenditure over assets
49S&P downgrade leads to a decrease of 0.74 percentage points in investment, defined as
capital expenditure over assets.
50The regression also includes firm controls such as leverage, revenue, cash flow, as well as
controls for S&P and EJR rating levels and equity analysts’ recommendations.
51The effect of upgrade is only statistically significant at the 10% level in this case
128
sell-side equity analysts which are incentivized to recommend equity shares that
their employer offers for sale.
3.5.4 Impact of upgrade/downgrade rating thresholds on Investment
In addition to evaluating the impact of rating changes on investment, we also
study the effect of ratings being on upgrade or downgrade thresholds on firm
investment, defined as capital expenditure over assets. Similarly to Kisgen (2006),
we define rating downgrade and upgrade thresholds as ratings with minus and plus
signs (respectively). Firms on upgrade or downgrade rating thresholds will incur a
distinct changes in the cost of debt issuance if their ratings change. Thus to avoid
a downgrade (when rating has a minus sign) or achieve an upgrade (when rating
has a plus sign) firms will constrain debt issuance, to boost cash flow to equity
holder, and thereby send a favorable signal to the rating agencies. Therefore,
if firms constrain debt issuance when their ratings are on the boundaries, they
have less free cash flow to invest in projects. Consequently, we hypothesize that
when firms’ ratings are on upgrade/downgrade thresholds, they may constrain
investment.
We analyze the impact of rating boundaries on investment using the regression
model specified below. The dependent variable (investment) is defined as capi-
tal expenditure over assets. EJRMinusi,t−1 , EJRPlusi,t−1 are dummy variables that turn
on when EJR ratings have negative or positive signs (respectively) next to the
letter of the credit rating. Similarly, S&PMinusi,t−1 , S&P Plusi,t−1 are dummy variables
for downgrade and upgrade S&P rating boundaries. The regression model also
includes controls for EJR and S&P rating levels as well as equity analysts’ recom-
mendations. Additionally, the model includes firm controls for revenue, leverage,
cash flow, number of employees and debt over earnings as well as industry and
year fixed effects. Finally, we cluster the standard errors by firm ticker.
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CapitalExpenditurei,t
Assetsi,t
= α + β1EJR
minus
i,t−1 + β2EJR
plus
i,t−1 + β3S&P
minus
i,t−1
+β4S&P
plus
i,t−1 + β5EJRi,t−1 + β6S&Pi,t−1 + β7IBESi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θt + θsic + i,t
(35)
The regression results are depicted in table (27). Models (1),(2) evaluate the
impact of ratings being on upgrade/downgrade boundaries on investment, sepa-
rately for EJR and S&P (respectively). Model (3) incorporates coefficients for up-
grade/downgrade rating boundaries for both rating agencies. The results suggest
that investors are highly sensitive to upgrade and downgrade thresholds of rat-
ings issued by Egan and Jones but not to Standard and Poor’s rating boundaries.
Specifically, firms constrain investment approximately 0.18 percentage points when
EJR ratings have plus or minus signs. However, we find no statistical evidence
to suggest that firms reduce investment when their S&P ratings are on those up-
grade/downgrade boundaries. These results are consistent with the intuition that
investors respond more strongly to EJR than S&P rating thresholds, since unlike
Standard and Poor’s, Egan and Jones is compensated by investors rather issuers,
and therefore is not incentivized to inflate credit ratings in order to appease bond
issuers that retain their services.
3.5.5 Impact of rating changes on excess returns
In this section, we evaluate the impact of daily changes in Egan and Jones (EJR)
and standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings, as well as changes in the equity
analysts’ recommendations on firms’ excess stock returns, defined as daily share
returns net of the S&P500 index.
Egan and Jones and standard and Poor’s primary responsibility as credit rating
agencies is to predict default probabilities of firms’ bonds. This implies that credit
rating agencies pay special attention to evaluating the riskiness of firms with high
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probability of default. Thus, investors may find credit ratings to be particularly
informative when they consider firms with median ratings below investment grade,
as those firms are more likely to default.
Moreover, unlike S&P, EJR is compensated by investors rather then issuers.
Therefore, EJR is not subjected to pressure to inflate ratings to appease bond
issuers, since it is primarily accountable to investors who pay for the firm’s ser-
vices. Consequently, investors may perceive EJR ratings as more accurate and
thus respond more strongly when EJR rating change, which will result in larger
impact of EJR than S&P changes on excess returns.
Further, equity analysts’ job description differs substantially from both EJR
and S&P. They provide recommendations about the firms’ equity performance,
rather then attempting to predict firms’ default rates, which is the main respon-
sibility of the credit rating agencies. This implies that investors in firms that are
not likely to default, may find the equity analysts’ recommendations about the
firms’ performance, to be more informative. Consequently, we hypothesize that
investors in firms with low probability of default, may respond more strongly to
changes in equity analysts recommendations rather then to fluctuations in EJR or
S&P ratings.
To test our hypothesis, we evaluate the impact of changes in equity analysts’
recommendation on excess equity returns using the regression models specified
in the equations below. The dependent variable Returni,t − S&P500i,t is the
difference between firms’ daily returns and S&P500 index returns. IBESUpgradei,t−1
and IBESDowngradei,t−1 are dummy variables that turn on when the average lagged
equity analysts recommendations for firm i increase or decrease (respectively) by
at least one notch. Firm controls include leverage, market to book, return on
assets, as well as controls for IBES, EJR, S&P rating levels, and industry and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm ticker.
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Returni,t−S&P500i,t = α+β1IBESDowngradei,t−1 +β2IBESUpgradei,t−1 +γXi,t−1+θsic+θt+εi,t
(36)
Returni,t−S&P500i,t = α+β1EJRDowngradei,t−1 +β2EJRUpgradei,t−1 +γXi,t−1+θsic+θt+εi,t
(37)
Returni,t−S&P500i,t = α+β1S&PDowngradei,t−1 +β2S&PUpgradei,t−1 +γXi,t−1+θsic+θt+εi,t
(38)
In order to ensure that our assessment of the impact of changes in equity an-
alysts’ recommendations on excess returns are not driven by changes in S&P and
EJR ratings, we construct a time window of 60 days prior and following changes
in average analysts’ recommendation where S&P and EJR levels remain constant.
We identify time windows [-60,+60] such that for days [-60,-1] average analysts’
recommendations remain constant, while during [0,+60], the equity analyst rec-
ommendations shift at least one notch upward or downward and remain constant
afterwards.
Columns (1) and (2) in panel A of table (28), depict results for the impact
of equity analysts’ recommendation changes on excess stock returns while S&P
and EJR ratings remain constant. Similarly columns (3),(4) and (5),(6) refer to
the impact of EJR and S&P changes (respectively) on excess returns while we
ensure that we construct time frames [-60,+60] around changes in EJR and S&P
(respectively) such that the other ratings remain constant. The specifications of
regression models 3-6 in tale (28) are similar to models 1-2, with the exception
that we replace dummy variable for equity analysts’ recommendation downgrades
and upgrades with dummy variables for EJR and S&P downgrades and upgrades.
The negative and highly significant coefficient on IBESDowngradei,t−1 in column (2)
in table 28 (panel A) suggests that downgrades in equity analysts recommenda-
tions yield an average decrease of 16.4 percentage points in equity excess returns.
Consistently, the positive and highly significant coefficient on IBESUpgradei,t−1 implies
that an upgrade of equity analysts’ recommendations leads to an increase of 16.7
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percentage points in excess returns within days [0,+60] following the change.
However, column (4) in table 28 (Panel A) suggests that only an EJR down-
grade (EJRDowngradei,t−1 ) impacts equity excess returns while EJR upgrade (EJR
Upgrade
i,t−1 )
does not have a significant effect. These results are hardly surprising since unlike
equity analysts, credit rating agencies assess the riskiness of firms’ default rates,
and thus are likely to have a smaller impact on returns of well performing firms in
comparison to equity analysts. Moreover, model (6) suggests that unlike equity
analysts and Egan and Jones, S&P ratings do not have a significant impact on
equity returns. These results are consistent with the idea that investors respond
less to S&P ratings since they internalize that S&P is subjected to conflicts of
interests with bond issuers that may impact the accuracy of their ratings.
Finally, in panel B, we preform similar regression analyses as in panel A, but we
restrict our data sample only to firms with median S&P ratings below investment
grade. In this instance, only downgrades and upgrades (EJRDowngradei,t−1 , EJR
Upgrade
i,t−1 )
of EJR have statistically significant impact on equity excess returns. This result
is fully consistent with our intuition that investors respond strongly to EJR rating
changes since EJR is an investor-paid rating agency whose main responsibility is
the predict default risk, and unlike S&P, it is not subjected to pressure from bond
issuers to inflate its ratings.
3.5.6 Impact of Equity Analyst Recommendations and Credit Rating
Changes on Bond Market Spread
In this section, we analyze the effect of equity analyst recommendations and credit
ratings from S&P and EJR on bond yields. Consistently with the previous section,
we expect the impact of S&P rating changes on the bond market to be smaller
than that of EJR since S&P faces pressure to inflate ratings of the issuers that pay
them for their ratings. EJR on the other hand, is compensated by investors, and
thus is likely to be more accurate and timely in their ratings. Consequently, we hy-
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pothesize that EJR rating changes would lead to larger bond spreads than changes
in S&P ratings. It follows from Merton’s (2007) "investor attention" theory that
it is more costly for bond investors to pay attention to the signals from equity
analysts than from bond analysts. Thus, we expect investors to respond more to
changes in ratings by EJR and S&P in comparison to changes in recommendations
by equity analysts.
The empirical model below outlines the regression that we run to evaluate the
impact of changes in EJR, S&P, and equity analyst recommendations on the bond
market
Log(Spread)i,t = α + β1EJR
downgrade
i,t−1 + β2EJR
upgrade
i,t−1 + γ1IBES
downgrade
i,t−1 +
γ2IBES
upgrade
i,t−1 + λ1S&P
downgrade
i,t−1 + λ2S&P
upgrade
i,t−1 +
ηXi,t−1 + θsic + θt + εi,t (39)
The dependent variable in the regression model above is the logarithm of the
bond spread. The bond spread is defined as the difference between the secu-
rity yield and the treasury (T-Bill) yield. Security yields and treasury yields are
matched by maturity and coupons. The logarithm of bond spread is regressed
on EJR rating changes, equity analyst recommendation changes and S&P rating
changes. Firm controls, year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included
as well.
Regression results are presented in table 29. The table is divided to three
panels. Panel (A) includes the entire sample. Panel (B) focuses on a subset of
speculative firms which are defined as firms whose average rating, from either
S&P or EJR, is below the investment threshold. Panel (C ) includes firms that
at least once in their life were downgrades from investment-grade ratings to the
speculative-grade range. In table 29, columns (1) and (2) describe the effects of
EJR rating changes on the log(spread), without and with the inclusion of firm
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specific controls, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) provide a similar analysis
when the EJR rating changes are replaced by the equity analyst recommendation
changes. Columns (5) and (6) focus on the S&P changes. Finally, column (7) and
(8) includes rating changes by EJR and S&P, as well as changes in equity analyst
recommendations as independent variables.
As denoted in column (8), EJR rating upgrades reduce the bond spread by
about 3.49 percentage points. EJR rating downgrades increase the bond spread
by about 15.3 percentage points. Similarly to EJR downgrades, equity analyst
recommendation downgrades have an impact on the bond market although the
magnitude is reduced to 2.03 percentage points. Interestingly, upgrades from
equity analysts do not seem to lead to statistically significant changes in the bond
spread.
The magnitude of the impact of equity analysts on bonds spreads is relatively
small since similarly to issuer-paid credit rating agencies, equity analysts are also
exposed to conflicts of interests that may compromise the credibility and the in-
formativeness of corporate equity recommendations. Equity analysts may decide
to inflate equity recommendations to appease the management. The significant
bond market response following EJR rating changes persists when we subset our
sample to firms that are more likely to default. Those firms have S&P or EJR
ratings below the investment grade threshold (Panel (B)).
In contrast to the regression results in panel A, S&P downgrades have a statis-
tically significant effect on the bond market (increase of 8.1 percentage points in
the bond spread). This result is consistent with the idea that firms that are more
likely to default are more sensitive to rating fluctuations. Finally, in panel C, we
subset our sample to firms that at least once in their life had a rating fall from
the investment-range to the speculative grade. Our regression results suggest that
only EJR rating changes are informative and impact bond spreads.
Overall, the results presented in this section illustrate that the EJR ratings
impact bond spreads more than ratings provided by S&P and the equity analyst
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recommendations, independently of the sample considered.
3.5.7 Heterogeneity in equity analyst beliefs and rating disagreement
Finally, we evaluate whether credit rating agencies diverge in their risk assessment
for firms where equity analysts disagree about their recommendations for firms’
equity performances. We hypothesize that for firms where equity analysts disagree
about future stock performance, rating agencies such as S&P that are compensated
by bond issuers, and thus are likely to inflate ratings to cater to bond issuers, will
be more concerned about reputational consequences. Therefore, they will issue
conservative assessments of firms’ probability of default. Consequently, as S&P
will issue conservative ratings for firms where equity analysts diverge in their
recommendations.
On the other hand, investor paid rating agencies, such as EJR, do not face
pressure to inflate ratings as issuer paid ratings, such as S&P. Therefore, they do
not feel the need to issue abnormally conservative ratings for firms where equity
analysts diverge in their equity recommendations. This is because their assigned
ratings reflect their most accurate belief about firms’ riskiness of default and they
are not influenced by conflicts of interests resulting from trying to appease bond
issuers. Consequently, we hypothesize that rating agencies that have different
models of compensations, for instance, EJR - an investors paid rater, and S&P -
an issuer paid rater, will diverge in their risk assessment of default risk, particularly
for firms where rating equity analysts disagree about firm quality. The empirical
models below describe the regressions that we run to test if heterogeneity in beliefs
among equity analysts translates into heterogeneity in beliefs among credit ratings
agencies.
|S&Pi,t − EJRi,t| = α + β1EquityAnalystsStdi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θt + θsic + i,t (40)
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|S&Pi,t − EJRi,t| = α + β1TradingV olumei,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θt + θsic + i,t (41)
Indeed, our results confirm this intuition. We test if S&P and EJR ratings
diverge for firms where equity analysts diverge in their recommendations, by re-
gressing the absolute value of monthly differences between S&P and EJR ratings
(|S&Pi,t−EJRi,t|) on monthly standard deviations of equity analysts recommen-
dation (EquityAnalystsStdi,t−1) as well as firm controls and year and industry fixed
effects. Firm controls include lagged leverage, return on assets, market to book,
cash over assets, sales, and rating level controls for equity analyst recommenda-
tions and S&P ratings. columns (1) and (2) in table 30 depict the results of the
regression model described in the equation above. These results suggests that
S&P and EJR levels diverge for firms with large standard deviation in equity ana-
lysts’ recommendations52. Those results are consistent with our expectation that
rating agencies with different compensations structures will respond differently to
heterogeneity of beliefs among equity analysts.
Finally, as a robustness check, we substitute our measure of disagreement about
firm equity value - standard deviation of equity analysts’ recommendations, with
another proxy for heterogeneity of beliefs about firms’ values - trading volume
of firms’ equity shares. Thus, the new regression model has similar specifica-
tions to the one in columns (1) and (2), with the exception that we substitute
EquityAnalystsStdi,t−1 with TradingV olumei,t−1. We define TradingV olumei,t−1 as
trading volume for each firm and year, over total shares outstanding. We re-
port regression results for the models in equation above in columns (3) and (4)
of table 30. The results confirm our findings that rating agencies that differ in
their compensation models (i.e. issuer versus investor paid) diverge in their as-
52Note that unlike in column (1) of table 30, the regression in column (2) includes firm
controls.
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signed ratings for firms where we observe large heterogeneity in equity analysts’
recommendations.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
This study evaluates the discrepancies in the information content of equity analyst
recommendations, and ratings by issuer and investor paid credit rating agencies.
We demonstrate that Egan and Jones, the largest investor-compensated rating
agency in the U.S., issues timelier ratings that impact equity analysts’ recommen-
dations and S&P ratings. This result is consistent with the intuition that being
an investor-paid rating agency, EJR does not face pressure to inflate ratings or
delay downgrades.
Moreover, we show that changes in credit ratings by EJR and S&P have larger
impact on bond yield spreads than equity analyst recommendations. Consistently,
analysts’ recommendations have a larger effect on firms’ equity returns. This result
is in-line with the intuition that bond investors rely on bond raters to better predict
default risk, while equity investors rely more on equity analysts to predict overall
firm performance. Interestingly, however, when firms have a high probability of
default, even equity investors rely more heavily on the investor-paid rating agency
(EJR) as a predictor of default risk.
Further, we demonstrate that changes in leverage are associated with lower
EJR (Egan and Jones) ratings but higher equity analyst recommendations. This
result suggests that rating agencies focus on default risk, and thus will evaluate
higher leverage as a negative signal. Equity analysts, on the other hand, focus on
overall firm performance, and therefore will balance the cost of higher default risk
with the benefit of greater liquidity resulting from bond issuance.
Finally, we find that investor-paid rating agency (EJR) has a larger impact
on firms’ investment decisions than equity analyst recommendations and S&P
ratings. This finding can be driven by the aforementioned result that EJR rating
138
are timelier than equity analyst recommendation and S&P ratings, or by the fact
that EJR does not face pressure to inflate ratings to please issuers, and thus can be
more informative for firms’ investment decisions. We conclude by demonstrating
that disagreement among equity analyst on their recommendations about firms’
performance is correlated with greater disagreement between S&P and EJR on
firms’ default risks.
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3.8 APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 20
Firm Characteristics for IBES, S&P, and EJR
The table provides summary statistics for each of the rating agencies
IBES, EJR, and S&P. EJR and S&P ratings are assigned valuers
from 1 to 23, where 23 refers to the rating with the lowest probabil-
ity of default (AAA). IBES recommendations are assigned ratings
from 1 to 5, where 1 refers to strong buy recommendation while 5
refers to strong sell recommendation.
(1) (2) (3)
IBES EJR S&P
Sample Period 1993-2014 1999-2014 1998-2014
Number of Firms 1,799 2,402 4,615
Number of Observations 158,511 58,583 143,950
Average Rating 2.357 13.977 13.623
Average Years Per Firm 9.18 6.25 12.36
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Table 21
Annual Firm Characteristics
The table provides summary statistics for each
of the rating agencies IBES, EJR, and S&P. EJR
and S&P ratings are assigned values from 1 to
23, where 23 refers to the rating with the low-
est probability of default (AAA). IBES recom-
mendations are assigned ratings from 1 to 5,
where 1 refers to strong buy recommendation
while 5 refers to strong sell recommendation.
Firm characteristics include: investment, cash
ratio, leverage, total assets, liabilities, revenue,
ebitda, operating income. The sample period
goes from 1999 until 2014. The total number of
firms is 1150. The total number of observations
is 10,922.
Years 1999-2014
Firms 1150
Observations 10,922
Years Per Firm ≈ 9.5
S&P Average Rating 14.53 (≈BBB)
EJR Average Rating 14.49 (≈BBB-)
IBES Average Rating 2.43 (≈Hold)
Investment 5.8%
Cash 6.6%
Leverage 13.9%
Total Assets $4.63B
Liabilities $3.82B
Revenue $1.46B
EBITDA $260M
Operating Income $109M
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Table 22
Impact of EJR and S&P Rating Changes
on Equity Analyst Recommendations
The table evaluates the impact of changes in EJR and
S&P ratings on equity analysts’ recommendations. The
dependent variable is 4IBESi,t defined as IBESi,t −
IBESi,t−1. In models (1), we regress changes in
4IBESi,t on 4EJRi,t−1 and 4S&Pi,t as well as lagged
rating levels, and year and industry fixed effects. Model
(2) has similar specification to model (1), but we also in-
corporate firm controls such as lagged return on assets,
log of sales, total debt, cash over assets, tangible assets,
and lagged changes in equity analysts’ recommendations.
Model (3) also incorporates lead changes in EJR and S&P
ratings (4EJRi,t+1, 4S&Pi,t+1). ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependant Variable: 4IBESi,t = IBESi,t − IBESi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4EJRi,t−1 -0.0494∗∗∗ -0.0479∗∗∗ -0.0479∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175)
4S&Pi,t−1 -0.0256 -0.0221 -0.0215
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204)
4EJRi,t+1 -0.0260 -0.0267
(0.0176) (0.0176)
4S&Pi,t+1 0.0308 0.0295
(0.0374) (0.0374)
4IBESi,t−1 -0.0681∗∗∗ -0.0681∗∗∗ -0.0682∗∗∗
(0.00552) (0.00552) (0.00552)
ROAi,t−1 -0.0967 -0.0929 -0.0979
(0.0868) (0.0868) (0.0868)
Sizei,t−1 0.00675 0.00664 0.00691
(0.00639) (0.00639) (0.00639)
Debti,t−1 -0.00100∗ -0.00100∗ -0.00101∗
(0.000568) (0.000568) (0.000568)
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
0.0480 0.0485 0.0445
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Tangiblesi,t−1 -0.0204 -0.0203 -0.0202
(0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0426)
N 28946 28946 28946 28946
R2 0.241 0.245 0.245 0.245
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 23
Impact of Equity Analysts’ and S&P
Ratings on Changes in EJR Ratings
The table evaluates the impact of changes in equity an-
alysts and S&P ratings on EJR ratings. The dependent
variable is 4EJRi,t defined as EJRi,t − EJRi,t−1. In
models (1), we regress changes in 4EJRi,t−1 on 4S&Pi,t
and 4IBESi,t−1 as well as lagged rating levels, and year
and industry fixed effects. Model (2) has similar specifi-
cation to model (1), but we also incorporate firm controls
such as lagged return on assets, log of sales, total debt,
cash over assets, tangible assets, and lagged changes in
EJR ratings. Model (3) also incorporates lead changes in
IBES and S&P ratings (4IBESi,t+1, 4S&Pi,t+1). ***,
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependant Variable: 4EJRi,t = EJRi,t − EJRi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4IBESi,t−1 0.00137 0.000851 0.000756
(0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00306)
4S&Pi,t−1 0.0128 0.00958 0.00976
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
4IBESi,t+1 -0.000839 -0.000863
(0.00291) (0.00291)
4S&Pi,t+1 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0207)
4EJRi,t−1 0.0216∗∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.0217∗∗
(0.00969) (0.00969) (0.00967)
ROAi,t−1 0.304∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481)
Sizei,t−1 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.00987∗∗∗ 0.00980∗∗∗
(0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00354)
Debti,t−1 -0.000840∗∗∗ -0.000833∗∗∗ -0.000831∗∗∗
(0.000315) (0.000315) (0.000315)
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
0.206∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.0827) (0.0827) (0.0827)
Tangiblesi,t−1 0.0107 0.0107 0.0104
(0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236)
N 28946 28946 28946 28946
R2 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.043
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 24
Impact of Equity Analysts’ and EJR
Ratings on Changes in S&P Ratings
The table evaluates the impact of changes in equity an-
alysts and EJR ratings on S&P ratings. The dependent
variable is4S&Pi,t defined as S&Pi,t−S&Pi,t−1. In mod-
els (1), we regress changes in 4S&Pi,t on 4IBESi,t−1
and 4EJRi,t−1 as well as lagged rating levels, and year
and industry fixed effects. Model (2) has similar specifi-
cation to model (1), but we also incorporate firm controls
such as lagged return on assets, log of sales, total debt,
cash over assets, tangible assets, and lagged changes in
S&P ratings. Model (3) also incorporates lead changes in
IBES and EJR ratings (4IBESi,t+1, 4EJRi,t+1). ***,
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependant Variable: 4S&Pi,t = S&Pi,t − S&Pi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4IBESi,t−1 0.00230∗∗ 0.00222∗∗ 0.00219∗∗
(0.000895) (0.000895) (0.000896)
4EJRi,t−1 0.00624∗∗ 0.00633∗∗ 0.00631∗∗
(0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283)
4IBESi,t+1 -0.000230 -0.000252
(0.000853) (0.000853)
4EJRi,t+1 0.00444 0.00459
(0.00285) (0.00285)
4S&Pi,t−1 -0.00429 -0.00437 -0.00385
(0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00330)
ROAi,t−1 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Sizei,t−1 0.00244∗∗ 0.00244∗∗ 0.00240∗∗
(0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00104)
Debti,t−1 -0.0000307 -0.0000298 -0.0000243
(0.0000921) (0.0000921) (0.0000921)
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0732∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Tangiblesi,t−1 -0.000936 -0.000956 -0.000819
(0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00691)
N 28946 28946 28946 28946
R2 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 25
Impact of Leverage on Equity Analyst
Recommendations and Credit Ratings
The table evaluates the impact of leverage on equity
analysts’ recommendations (model 1) and credit ratings
(models 2 and 3) in the subsequent quarter. The depen-
dent variable in model (1) is a change in equity analysts’
recommendation 4IBESi,t = IBESi,t−IBESi,t−1. The
dependent variables in models (2) and (3) are 4EJRi,t =
EJRi,t−EJRi,t−1 and4S&Pi,t = S&Pi,t−S&Pi,t−1 (re-
spectively). I regress the quarterly changes in the credit
ratings and equity recommendations on lagged changes
in leverage defined as 4Leveragei,t−1 = Leveragei,t−1 −
Leveragei,t−2. All regression specifications include con-
trols for lagged leverage, return on assets, net income.
cash over assets, tangible assets, debt, market to book,
and sales. I also control for industry and year fixed ef-
fects. Standard error are cluster by firm ticker. ***, **
and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, re-
spectively.
(1) (2) (3)
4IBESi,t 4EJRi,t 4S&Pi,t
4Leveragei,t−1 -0.886∗∗ -0.521∗∗ 0.566
(0.378) (0.256) (0.723)
Leveragei,t−1 0.171∗∗ -0.00799 0.0959
(0.0817) (0.0987) (0.0796)
ROAi,t−1 0.677∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.104
(0.220) (0.175) (0.0965)
NetIncomei,t−1 -0.00297 0.0228∗∗ 0.0152∗
(0.00970) (0.0114) (0.00773)
CashOverAssetsi,t−1 0.703∗ 1.628∗∗∗ 0.203
(0.376) (0.398) (0.165)
Tangiblesi,t−1 0.00712 -0.0427 -0.0946∗∗
(0.0789) (0.0828) (0.0437)
MarketToBooki,t−1 -0.0318∗ 0.0150 0.0283∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0185) (0.0131)
Salesi,t−1 0.0169∗ -0.00614 -0.0205∗∗
(0.00968) (0.0122) (0.00954)
N 5102 5102 5102
R2 0.023 0.122 0.055
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 26
Impact of Rating Changes on Investment
The table evaluates the impact of rating changes on investment. The de-
pendent variable (investment) is defined as capital expenditure over assets.
Models (1)-(3) evaluate the impact of changes in ratings on investment sepa-
rately for EJR, S&P, and IBES (respectively), while model (4) incorporates
all rating changes as independent variables. Firm controls include leverage,
revenue, cash flow, as well as rating level coefficients for IBES, EJR, and S&P.
The primary coefficients of interest are on the dummy variables for changes in
the IBES, EJR, and S&P ratings.Standard errors are clustered by firm ticker.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Investmenti,t =
CapitalExpenditurei,t
Assetsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EJRupgradei,t−1 0.00454∗∗ 0.00359∗∗
(0.00185) (0.00180)
EJRdowngradei,t−1 -0.00616∗∗∗ -0.00454∗∗∗
(0.00146) (0.00157)
S&P upgradei,t−1 0.00431∗ 0.00257
(0.00229) (0.00217)
S&P downgradei,t−1 -0.00743∗∗∗ -0.00486∗∗∗
(0.00170) (0.00188)
IBESupgradei,t−1 0.00252∗ 0.00168
(0.00132) (0.00131)
IBESdowngradei,t−1 -0.00528∗∗∗ -0.00434∗∗∗
(0.00160) (0.00161)
Leveragei,t−1 0.00411 0.00313 0.00221 0.00581
(0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0215)
Revenuei,t−1 0.00127 0.00132 0.00165 0.00123
(0.00200) (0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00200)
Cashi,t−1 -0.0140 -0.0124 -0.0105 -0.0142
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
IBESi,t−1 -0.00431∗∗∗ -0.00443∗∗∗ -0.00737∗∗∗ -0.00597∗∗∗
(0.00115) (0.00116) (0.00156) (0.00158)
S&Pi,t−1 -0.00370∗∗∗ -0.00311∗∗∗ -0.00348∗∗∗ -0.00340∗∗∗
(0.000788) (0.000787) (0.000771) (0.000823)
EJRi,t−1 0.00338∗∗∗ 0.00280∗∗∗ 0.00307∗∗∗ 0.00310∗∗∗
(0.000678) (0.000665) (0.000650) (0.000707)
N 8875 8875 8875 8875
R2 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.397
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 27
Impact of Upgrade/Downgrade Rating
Thresholds on Investment
The table evaluates the impact of rating being on upgrade or down-
grade thresholds on investment. The dependent variable (invest-
ment) is defined as capital expenditure over assets. Models (1),(2)
evaluate the impact of rating being on upgrade/downgrade bound-
aries on investment, separately for EJR and S&P (respectively).
Model (3) incorporates coefficients for rating boundaries for both
rating agencies. Firm controls include leverage, revenue, cash flow,
number of employees, debt over earnings, as well as rating level co-
efficients for EJR, and S&P. The primary coefficients of interest are
on dummy variables for rating thresholds of EJR and S&P. Addi-
tional controls include Employeesi,
Debti,t−1
Earningsi,t−1
. ***, ** and *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dep. Var: Investmenti,t =
CapitalExpenditurei,t
Assetsi,t
(1) (2) (3)
EJRMinusi,t−1 -0.00183∗∗ -0.00184∗∗
(0.000861) (0.000861)
EJRPlusi,t−1 -0.00183∗∗ -0.00181∗∗
(0.000857) (0.000858)
S&PMinusi,t−1 0.000870 0.000923
(0.000885) (0.000885)
S&P Plusi,t−1 -0.000474 -0.000382
(0.000890) (0.000891)
Leveragei,t−1 -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0262∗∗∗
(0.00982) (0.00982) (0.00982)
Revenuei,t−1 -0.00397∗∗∗ -0.00391∗∗∗ -0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00121) (0.00122) (0.00122)
Liabilitiesi,t−1 0.00969 0.00945 0.00955
(0.00649) (0.00649) (0.00649)
Cashi,t−1 0.00670 0.00657 0.00677
(0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618)
S&Pi,t−1 -0.00107∗∗∗ -0.00103∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗
(0.000254) (0.000254) (0.000254)
EJRi,t−1 0.00162∗∗∗ 0.00158∗∗∗ 0.00163∗∗∗
(0.000222) (0.000221) (0.000222)
N 7022 7022 7022
R2 0.607 0.607 0.607
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 28
Impact of Rating Changes on Excess Return
The table evaluates the impact of rating changes on excess equity returns. The dependent
variable (excess returns) is defined as Returni,t−S&P500i,t. Models (1),(2) evaluate the impact
of changes in IBES recommendations on equity excess returns. Similarly, models (3),(4) and
(5),(6) evaluate the impact of changes in EJR and S&P ratings (respectively) on equity excess
returns. Panel A includes data for all firms while Panel B includes data for firms with median
S&P ratings below investment grade. Models (1),(3),(5) include controls for rating levels of
IBES, EJR, and S&P. Models (2),(4),(6) also include firm controls such as leverage, return on
assets, market to book, in addition to rating level coefficients for IBES, EJR, and S&P. For
each regression, we create a time window of [-60,+60] days prior and following a rating changes.
This time window ensures that during this time frame only one of the ratings changes while the
others remained constant. Results in this table include data for all firms in the data. Standard
errors are clustered by firm ticker. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Panel A: Impact of Rating Changes on Excess Return - All Firms
Dependent Variable: Returni,t − S&P500i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IBESDowngradei,t -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0707)
IBESUpgradei,t 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0724)
EJRDowngradei,t -0.00300∗∗∗ -0.00411∗∗∗
(0.000979) (0.00138)
EJRUpgradei,t -0.00139 -0.000639
(0.00161) (0.00222)
S&PDowngradei,t 0.00130 0.00174
(0.00117) (0.00133)
S&PUpgradei,t -0.00171 -0.000858
(0.00334) (0.00300)
N 1386 1265 2921 2821 3310 3305
R2 0.015 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.011 0.012
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Impact of Rating Changes on Excess Return -
Firms with Median S&P Rating below Investment Grade
Dependent Variable: Returni,t − S&P500i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IBESDowngradei,t -0.00328 0.00791
(0.00220) (0.0296)
IBESUpgradei,t 0.00417 -0.00853
(0.00335) (0.0284)
EJRDowngradei,t -0.00457∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00206) (0.00528)
EJRUpgradei,t 0.00330∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(0.00145) (0.00476)
S&PDowngradei,t 0.00328 0.00262
(0.00240) (0.00252)
S&PUpgradei,t 0.000244 -0.000353
(0.00364) (0.00361)
N 502 419 1356 1356 2112 2108
R2 0.023 0.035 0.026 0.028 0.006 0.006
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 29
Bond Market Response to Rating and Recommendation Changes
Panels A,B, and C show results for OLS regressions of Log(Spread) on rating changes, upgrades
and downgrades, from EJR and S&P, equity analysts’ recommendations from IBES, firm specific
controls and bond specific controls. Panel A includes data for all firms. Panels B includes data for
firms with S&P ratings below investment grade, while Panel C includes data for firms with S&P
ratings that cross the investment grade. The bond spread is defined as the difference between
the security yield and the treasury yield. Security yields and treasury yields are matched by
maturity and coupons. Firm specific controls include: Size, Cash Ratio, Tangibility, Market-to-
Book Ratio, Profitability, Debt Issuance, S&P and EJR rating levels, IBES recommendations.
All the control variables are one period lagged and winsorized at the 1% level. Regressions (1)
and (2) show the effect of EJR rating changes on the bond spread. Regressions (3) and (4) show
the effect of IBES equity recommendations on the bond spread. Regressions (5) and (6) show
the effect of S&P rating changes on the bond spread. Regressions (7) and (8) show the effect of
all the rating changes and equity recommendations on the bond spread. Regressions (2), (4), (6)
and (8) add firm and bond specific controls. Regressions (1)-(8) account for year and industry
fixed effets. The results refer to the entire sample. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Firms
Dependent Variable: Log(Spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Up EJR -0.0270*** -0.0287*** -0.0320*** -0.0349***
(0.00960) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0126)
Down EJR 0.150** 0.154** 0.152** 0.153**
(0.0642) (0.0631) (0.0772) (0.0747)
Up IBES 0.00488 0.00735 -0.00300 -0.000598
(0.00724) (0.00652) (0.00727) (0.00772)
Down IBES 0.0162 0.0219*** 0.0142 0.0203**
(0.0101) (0.00843) (0.00991) (0.00864)
Up SP 0.0253 0.0130 0.0250 0.0118
(0.0221) (0.0237) (0.0241) (0.0257)
Down SP 0.0677*** 0.0764*** -0.0129 -0.00518
(0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0570) (0.0512)
N 29977 29977 29977 29977 29977 29977 29977 29977
R2 0.626 0.642 0.622 0.638 0.622 0.638 0.626 0.642
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year and Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Panel B: Firms with S&P Ratings Below Investment Grade
Dependent Variable: Log(Spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Up EJR -0.0293* -0.0286* -0.0281 -0.0284*
(0.0168) (0.0160) (0.0172) (0.0164)
Down EJR 0.0683*** 0.0704*** 0.0547*** 0.0547***
(0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0206)
Up IBES 0.0148 0.0165 0.0121 0.0140
(0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127)
Down IBES 0.00376 0.0121 0.00248 0.0111
(0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.00991)
Up SP -0.0270 -0.0318 -0.0262 -0.0327
(0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0234) (0.0228)
Down SP 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.0770*** 0.0810***
(0.0279) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0258)
N 8398 8398 8398 8398 8398 8398 8398 8398
R2 0.620 0.629 0.619 0.628 0.620 0.629 0.620 0.630
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year and Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C: Firms with S&P Ratings that Cross the Investment Grade
Dependent Variable: Log(Spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Up EJR -0.0369** -0.0305** -0.0357** -0.0308**
(0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0155)
Down EJR 0.0709*** 0.0789*** 0.0646*** 0.0722***
(0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0179)
Up IBES 0.00390 0.0116 0.00102 0.00869
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0119)
Down IBES 0.00148 0.0150 0.000560 0.0138
(0.0102) (0.00986) (0.0104) (0.00995)
Up SP -0.0206 -0.0254 -0.0151 -0.0243
(0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0211) (0.0206)
Down SP 0.0644*** 0.0597** 0.0376* 0.0285
(0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0224) (0.0223)
N 11530 11530 11530 11530 11530 11530 11530 11530
R2 0.636 0.650 0.635 0.649 0.635 0.649 0.636 0.650
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year and Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 30
Impact of Heterogeneity in Equity Analyst Beliefs on
Rating Disagreements
The table evaluates the impact of heterogeneity in beliefs about firms’ eq-
uity value on disagreement between rating agencies, measured as |S&Pi,t −
EJRi,t|. The heterogeneity in equity beliefs is measured by the standard devi-
ation of analysts’ recommendations (EquityAnalystsStdi,t−1) in models (1),(2),
and trading volume over assets (TradingV olumei,t−1) in models (3),(4).
Models (2) and (4) also include firm controls such as lagged leverage, return
on assets, market to book, cash over assets, sales, months from realization
of equity analyst recommendations, and rating level controls for IBES and
S&P. All regressions also include industry and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: |S&Pi,t − EJRi,t|
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EquityAnalystsStdi,t−1 0.453∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.0611) (0.0611)
TradingV olumei,t−1 0.0510∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗
(0.00629) (0.00679)
Leveragei,t−1 -0.443∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.121) (0.0896)
ROAi,t−1 -0.749 0.785∗
(0.630) (0.463)
Marketi,t−1
Booki,t−1
-0.0717∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0227)
Cashi,t−1
Assetsi,t−1
2.388∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.188)
Salesi,t−1 -0.00100 0.0242∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0111)
IBESi,t−1 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.00768
(0.0145) (0.0107)
S&Pi,t−1 -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.00239
(0.00750) (0.00561)
N 9352 9314 9314 9314
R2 0.185 0.202 0.195 0.200
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes
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